CASA NEXUS / Insights

CASA Research Pillar

We publish what we find, before we are asked to.

CASA NEXUS runs an independent research programme alongside its client work. When a decision is consequential enough and public enough, we evaluate it and publish the result, whether or not anyone commissioned us to.

Our policy research is open access. If analysis is going to shape a national decision, the people affected by that decision should be able to read it.

Featured series · Independent Evaluation Series

Four volumes issued 28 July 2026 · Open access

The Kenya Presidencies

Sixty years of Kenyan government, scored on one instrument that does not move

Four administrations, from independence to 2022, evaluated against the five pillars and twenty-five dimensions of the SSII Framework. The weight vector, dimension anchors and evidence rules were fixed at Volume I and have not changed since, which is what makes the volumes comparable to one another rather than four separate opinions.

Each volume is self-commissioned. There is no external client, no funder constraint on publication, and no finding on individual culpability. Every result carries two numbers: a Strategic Integrity Score for the performance, and an Evidence Confidence Index that governs which verbs the report is permitted to use about it.

4 / 5
Volumes issued · SSII

The Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy pillar scored 28.00 in both Volume I and Volume II, rose to 40.00 in Volume III, and reached 52.00 in Volume IV.

Protection performance is a variable of the Kenyan state, not a constant of it.

Composite results across the series. SIS is the Strategic Integrity Score, the weighted composite across five pillars. ECI is the Evidence Confidence Index, which sets the claim licence: at these levels every volume is Substantiated, meaning the reports may say the evidence supports and contributed to, and may not say caused. PILI is the Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy pillar, reported separately because a Safeguarding Veto caps the reportable band regardless of the arithmetic.
Vol. Administration SIS Reportable band ECI PILI Safeguarding Veto
I Kenyatta1963–1978 42.20 Low–Moderate 76.70 Subst. 28.00 Fired
II Moi1978–2002 31.60 Low–Moderate 79.30 Subst. 28.00 Fired
III Kibaki2002–2013 52.80 Moderate on arithmetic Capped to Low–Moderate 77.80 Subst. 40.00 Fired · decisive
IV Uhuru Kenyatta2013–2022 46.80 Low–Moderate 77.00 Subst. 52.00 Fired · not decisive
The Kenya Presidencies · Volumes

Detailed Evaluation Reports, in full

Volume ISIS 42.2028 July 2026

The Kenyatta Administration, 1963–1978

The volume that fixed the instrument. It scores the executive government from 12 December 1963 to 22 August 1978 across twenty-three distinct upstream provenance chains, drawing on a truth commission, a public land commission, a parliamentary select committee, a national statistical series and a peer-reviewed economic literature.

The material record is strong and not in dispute: life expectancy rose from 50.8 to 58.2 years, infant mortality fell from 100.7 to 72.5 per 1,000 live births, primary gross enrolment moved from 60.3 per cent in 1970 to 95.6 per cent in 1978, and real GDP compounded at 6.80 per cent a year. The Safeguarding Veto fired all the same, and the report leads with that. Four rival explanations for the growth survive testing, so the evaluation says the evidence supports and declines to say caused.

SSIIKenyaPublic sectorRetrospective36 pages
Volume IISIS 31.6028 July 2026

The Moi Administration, 1978–2002

The lowest composite in the series, resting on the highest evidence rating in it. The period was examined by a judicial commission into Goldenberg, a judicial commission into the ethnic clashes, a parliamentary select committee, a public land commission, a truth commission, and a household survey programme with no equivalent under the previous administration. The weak result rests on the stronger record.

Real GDP per capita compounded at minus 0.11 per cent a year across 1979 to 2002. Child survival improved while adult life expectancy fell. Against that, the administration legislated a two-term limit in 1992, was bound by it in 2002, lost decisively and handed power to the opposition, the first such transfer in the country’s history.

SSIIKenyaPublic sectorRetrospective36 pages
Volume IIISIS 52.80, capped28 July 2026

The Kibaki Administration, 2002–2013

The highest arithmetic result in the series, and the first volume in which the Safeguarding Veto changes the published verdict rather than restating a band the arithmetic had already reached. That the cap is decisive here is itself recorded as a finding.

The material record is the strongest in the series: life expectancy recovered the entire loss of the preceding twenty-four years, under-five mortality fell 40.8 per cent, primary enrolment rose 22.2 points after fee abolition, and HIV prevalence fell from 7.8 to 5.2 per cent. The 2010 Constitution, approved by roughly 67 per cent of voters, is assessed as the single largest positive institutional change in the fifty years the series covers to that point.

SSIIKenyaDevolutionConstitution 201035 pages
Volume IVSIS 46.8028 July 2026

The Uhuru Kenyatta Administration, 2013–2022

The first evaluand in the series scored against a constitution its predecessor created rather than one inherited from the colonial settlement, which makes every finding here also a finding about how the 2010 Constitution performed under sustained pressure from the executive it was designed to constrain.

Access to electricity rose from 40.1 to 76.0 per cent of the population, the largest single infrastructure movement in the series, and measured inequality fell for the first time. Public debt rose from about KSh 1.79 trillion to about KSh 8.7 trillion over the same period, and debt service as a share of exports moved from 4.7 per cent in 2013 to 38.4 per cent in 2019. PILI scores 52.00, the first pillar score above 50 in four administrations.

SSIIKenyaDebtRule of law36 pages
Also featured · Policy & Evaluation Series

March 2026 · Open access

Kenya NIF · Baseline evaluation

What the Evidence Shows, What the Gaps Mean, and What Ignoring Them Will Cost Kenya

An independent SSII Framework baseline evaluation of the National Infrastructure Fund Act, 2026, including a Social Return on Investment tracking architecture and a scenario analysis of what a KSh 5 trillion fund delivers when its design gaps are left unaddressed.

Kenya built at an unprecedented pace between 2013 and 2025 and paid for it largely through external borrowing. The NIF replaces that borrowing model with an investment portfolio model, pooling privatisation proceeds, pension capital, development finance, and climate finance into a professionally managed vehicle. Our evaluation asks whether the design can carry the ambition.

53 / 100
Bronze upper tier · SSII

The Fund is credible, the policy logic is sound, and the governance architecture, though imperfect, carries more safeguards than most comparable funds launched on the continent at this stage.

But 53 out of 100 is a Bronze score. And a Bronze fund cannot build a Gold economy.

67.8% Public debt as a share of GDP, the constraint the Fund was designed to work around. Context
62.6% Debt-service-to-revenue ratio. Over KSh 62 of every KSh 100 collected exits as repayment before reaching a hospital, school, or road. Cytonn / CBK, 2024
KSh 11.8T Total public debt stock carried into the Fund’s first year of operation. Debt position
KSh 5T The Fund’s ten-year target, and the reason its design gaps are worth naming now rather than later. NIF decade target
The library

Everything we have published, in full

White PaperNo. 04 / 202631 May 2026

From Revenue Rage to Fiscal Reckoning

A policy analysis of revenue mobilisation, expenditure credibility, and macroeconomic constraint. The paper makes a simple argument: public debate is over-concentrated on one instrument when three should be in view. The Finance Bill is a revenue tool, not the fiscal system itself; it sits downstream of the Budget Policy Statement, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework, and sector ceilings set months earlier.

Debt service absorbed about 69 per cent of ordinary revenue in FY 2024/25, several times above the IMF Debt Sustainability Framework thresholds for low-income countries, which range from 14 to 23 per cent. At the margin, new revenue is servicing debt rather than expanding productive capital. The analysis closes with targeted recommendations for Treasury, Parliament, the Controller of Budget, civic actors, development partners, and the Central Bank.

Fiscal policyRevenue mobilisationDebt sustainabilityKenya18 pages
Policy & EvaluationBaselineMarch 2026

Kenya NIF: What the Evidence Shows

The first independent evaluation of the National Infrastructure Fund, completed on the day the Act was signed into law. Scores the Fund at 53 out of 100 on the SSII instrument, sets out where the design is strong and where it leaks, and introduces an SROI tracking architecture that did not previously exist in the Kenyan policy debate on the Fund.

Infrastructure financeSovereign fundsSSIISROIOpen access
Policy NexusAnalytical Review

The INGO Reckoning: A Post-Trump Adaptation. Save Lives or Shape Out

A critical policy review of humanitarian actor strategies at the convergence of conflict, climate, and compounding crisis. Its position statement is blunt: the international humanitarian system is at a reckoning that is not merely a funding crisis, and not merely a political rupture, but a structural failure. Written for INGO leadership teams deciding what their organisation is actually for in the next funding era.

Humanitarian strategyINGO adaptationAid financeLocalisation
CASA ResearchThesis2025

The Aesthetics Trap: Why the Gen-Z Entrepreneurial Ethic Is a Structural Risk to Real Growth in Emerging Economies

A Kenya case study. Kenya’s Gen-Z cohort is the most digitally native generation in the country’s history, and potentially its most economically misaligned. The thesis argues that a dominant entrepreneurial ethic anchored on social media virality, platform aesthetics, TikTok commerce, and influencer identity carries consequences for productive capacity that the growth statistics have not yet caught up with.

Youth economyDigital commerceProductivityKenya
How the research is organised

Four standing series

I

Independent Evaluation Series

Full-length Detailed Evaluation Reports on evaluands that no one has commissioned us to examine, scored against the SSII Framework on a weight vector fixed at the first volume and held constant thereafter. The Kenya Presidencies is the current programme in this series: five volumes covering the executive government of Kenya from independence to the present, of which four are issued. Comparability across volumes is the point of the series, so the instrument is registered before the first score and never adjusted to suit a later result.

II

Policy & Evaluation Series

Independent evaluations of public instruments: funds, acts, and national programmes, scored against the SSII Framework and published open access. This is the series that produced the NIF baseline. We publish these on our own initiative, without commission, when the decision is consequential and public enough to warrant it.

III

White Paper Series

Numbered analytical papers on the structural questions underneath the headlines: fiscal architecture, revenue and expenditure credibility, growth composition, and macroeconomic constraint. Each paper closes with recommendations addressed to named institutions rather than to no one in particular.

IV

Policy Nexus Analytical Review

Strategy reviews written for organisational leadership rather than for the policy record: what a shift in the funding, political, or climate environment means for how an institution should be built. The INGO Reckoning is the current review in this series.

The SSII Framework™

The Strategic Systems Integrity & Impact Framework

A performance score on its own is an unfalsifiable assertion. An evidence score on its own is a methods note.

Developed and maintained by CASA NEXUS Research Proprietary intellectual property of CASA NEXUS Limited. SSII Framework™, KIPI registration pending under Nice Classifications 35, 41 and 42. Built for humanitarian, development and peace programming in Africa and applied globally, from a national fund to a single grassroots programme.

Conventional evaluation in this region carries three structural faults. It is written for compliance rather than for a decision. It splits the analysis across criteria that never speak to one another. And it describes a problem where a Minister or a board needed a course of action, a cost, and a risk.

SSII starts from a different premise: programmes succeed or fail on five interacting system layers, political, institutional, programmatic, protective and economic. Those layers are read simultaneously rather than in sequence, because a programme can be exemplary on one and failing on another, and only the whole picture supports advice.

What comes out is not a rating. It is a pair of numbers, a coverage grade for what the record could carry, a set of costed reform scenarios, and an explicit licence governing what the evaluation is permitted to claim.

Dual-metric reporting

Neither number is ever published without the other

SIS

Strategic Integrity Score

How well did the system work?

The weighted performance of the five pillars, on a scale of 0 to 100. No evidence multiplier touches it, so the number answers one question and one question only. It carries a rating band from Critical through to High Integrity, and each band carries a stated decision consequence: suspend, restructure, reform, monitor, or scale.

SIS = (PIAI × W1) + (IPGI × W2) + (IOII × W3) + (PILI × W4) + (CESVI × W5)
ECI

Evidence Confidence Index

How well can we prove it?

The strength of the record behind the finding, on the same weights and the same scale. The impact pillar draws on the EQI ladder, which rates counterfactual strength; the other four draw on the ESI ladder, which rates documentary provenance from a single uncorroborated source up to an adjudicated one. Disaggregation completeness caps the protection term.

ECI = (EPIAI × W1) + (EIPGI × W2) + (EIOII × W3) + (EPILI × W4) + (ECESVI × W5)

Reported together, in the same sentence or the same visual field: Moderate–High (SIS 77.7) · Substantiated (ECI 78.8). The earlier SSII composite folded evidence quality into a single figure as a multiplier, which meant a well-run programme evaluated with a modest design was reported as though it had performed worse. Separating the two questions removed that distortion, so scores carried over from the earlier composite are not directly comparable with these.

The five pillars

Twenty-five dimensions · Simultaneous lenses, not sequential steps

PIAIWeight 0.20

Political & Incentive Alignment

Who holds power over this programme, what are they actually rewarded for, and does the reform survive contact with that arithmetic? Political economy analysis runs at every stage, with a coalition stability index that deducts up to fifteen points where the coalition carrying a reform is fragile.

  • Power mapping
  • Stakeholder incentives
  • Elite capture risk
  • Regulatory feasibility
  • Conflict sensitivity
IPGIWeight 0.20

Institutional Performance & Governance

Whether the machinery can carry what has been promised. Institutional diagnostics, process tracing and governance benchmarking against CHS, Sphere, the Grand Bargain and OECD standards, plus a digital governance integrity score and a measure of how fast the institution can actually change its mind.

  • Leadership accountability
  • Financial stewardship
  • Procurement integrity
  • Data governance
  • Decision-making velocity
IOIIWeight 0.25

Impact & Outcome Integrity

Whether the result happened, and whether this programme is why. The counterfactual is pre-registered in the design memo before any data moves. A ripple effects scan is mandatory, because a programme that hits its own targets while destabilising the market around it has not succeeded.

  • Outcome performance
  • Contribution analysis
  • Unintended consequences
  • Systemic spillovers
  • Sustainability probability
PILIWeight 0.20

Protection, Inclusion & Legitimacy

Do no harm compliance, safeguarding architecture, and whether the people the programme exists for regard it as legitimate. Survivor-centred protocols, perception surveys and an intersectionality analysis across six identity dimensions. This is the pillar that carries the veto.

Carries the safeguarding veto
  • Do no harm compliance
  • Safeguarding architecture
  • Gender-transformative impact
  • Survivor-centred integrity
  • Community trust & accountability
CESVIWeight 0.15

Cost-Effectiveness & Strategic Value

Cost per outcome against the counterfactual cost, and what else the same money could have bought. Value for money on the four Es plus a fifth, ethics; social return modelled dynamically over a ten-year horizon; portfolio attribution on fully-loaded rather than headline cost.

  • Cost per outcome
  • Cost-consequence matrix
  • Portfolio efficiency
  • Counterfactual cost modelling
  • Opportunity cost mapping

The weights above are the default vector. They shift by context and the shift is declared before scoring begins: a government reform evaluation lifts institutional performance to 0.30, a humanitarian emergency lifts impact and protection to 0.30 each, an ODI-grade policy evaluation lifts political alignment and institutional performance to 0.25. The vector must sum to 1.00 and is fixed at Sprint 0, which is what makes a series such as The Kenya Presidencies comparable volume to volume rather than four separate opinions.

The Claim Licence

What the evidence permits the evaluation to say

Most frameworks handle weak evidence by quietly discounting the score. SSII does the opposite. The score stands, and the Evidence Confidence Index instead fixes the strongest verb the evaluation may use, in every product it touches: the report, the dashboard, the executive memo, the policy brief, the broadcast script, the social post.

A verb stronger than the licence permits is a quality assurance failure and blocks release, whatever the evidence appears to show. It is the reason our published evaluations say contributed to where a consultancy report would say caused, and the reason we will occasionally publish a finding as an evidence gap rather than a result.

Source: SSII Framework™ Master Methodology Manual, Part III §3.3. The band is set by the Evidence Confidence Index, not by the performance score. A finding in the Insufficient band is not suppressed; it is reported as an evidence gap with the retrieval route that would close it.
ECI Band Strongest permitted verb What that means in practice
85–100 Adjudicated demonstrates · caused · established Causal language is on the table. Reached by experimental or strong quasi-experimental design, or by an adjudicated documentary record.
70–84 Substantiated contributed to · indicates · the evidence supports The finding is documented rather than alleged. Attribution is defensible; causation is not asserted.
55–69 Indicative is associated with · suggests · consistent with A pattern is visible in the record. Rival explanations have not all been excluded.
40–54 Provisional the available record shows Descriptive only. No attribution of any kind is permitted.
0–39 Insufficient Not reportable Cannot be published as a scored finding. Reported as an evidence gap, with a named retrieval route and an owner.
Four rules that do most of the work

Where the framework overrides the arithmetic

I

The safeguarding veto

A do no harm or safeguarding dimension scored 1 or 2, or a protection pillar below 50, caps the reportable band at Low–Moderate whatever the composite says. It cannot be waived by a client. It is why Volume III of The Kenya Presidencies publishes as Low–Moderate on an arithmetic of 52.80.

II

Performance is not coverage

A dimension score of 1 must mean the system failed. It may never mean the record is silent. Silence is logged separately as a coverage grade, so a programme that delivered poor value for money is never conflated with one whose value for money nobody ever computed.

III

The evaluand tier

Before anything is scored, the evaluation declares what it is scoring: a donor as steward, an intermediary channelling funds, an implementer delivering to people, or a chain of all three. A chain is reported as a tier matrix. It is never blended into one number, because a weakness has to be locatable.

IV

Three independent chains

Triangulation is counted by upstream origin, not by document count. Six publications tracing back to one commission of inquiry are one chain, not six. A dimension that cannot reach the standard is withheld on the authority of the QA lead, with the route that would close the gap named in writing.

SSII is crosswalked to the standards our clients are already accountable to: the six OECD-DAC evaluation criteria, the UNEG Norms and Standards that govern UN country team work, and the AfrEA African Evaluation Principles, whose Made in Africa commitments are closest to how the framework was designed in the first place. For each engagement the crosswalk is extended to the commissioning institution's own accountability framework, so the evaluation speaks the client's language and not only the sector's.

Commission the same standard

The method behind these papers is the method we bring to your programme.

The NIF evaluation and a capacity assessment of a single county-level organisation run on the same framework. The scale changes; the standard does not.