CASA NEXUS RESEARCH

INDEPENDENT EVALUATION SERIES · THE KENYA PRESIDENCIES

The Kenyatta Administration 1963–1978

Detailed Evaluation Report

A Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact evaluation of Kenya's first presidency, with full annex pack

Field	Detail
Evaluation type	Summative, retrospective, desk-based; self-commissioned
Framework	SSII Framework™, CASA NEXUS Research
Evaluand tier	DONOR (the state as steward of public resources)
Evaluand status	CLOSED (Legacy Remediation Roadmap)
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, Nairobi
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Volume	1 of 5, The Kenya Presidencies Series
Headline result	SIS 42.20 (LOW-MODERATE) · ECI 76.70 (Substantiated)
Protection Flag	RAISED — Safeguarding Veto fired
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Acronyms

Acronym	Expansion
CC	Contribution Claim tier (SSII contribution track)
CESVI	Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value Index
DEI	Diversity, Equity and Inclusion
EAC	East African Community
ECI	Evidence Confidence Index
EQI	Evidence Quality Index
ESI	Evidence Strength Index (documentary ladder)
FPE	Free Primary Education
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
ICCPR	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOII	Impact and Outcome Integrity Index
IPGI	Institutional Performance and Governance Index
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KADU	Kenya African Democratic Union
KPU	Kenya People’s Union
NFD	Northern Frontier District
PIAI	Political and Incentive Alignment Index
PILI	Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy Index
PPSA	Preservation of Public Security Act
SIS	Strategic Integrity Score
SSII	Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya
WDI	World Development Indicators (World Bank)

Executive summary.

SIS 42.20 · LOW-MODERATE.

ECI 76.70· Substantiated.

Claim Licence: Substantiated (contributed to, indicates, the evidence supports). Impact claims held at Indicative under contribution tier CC-2. Protection Flag RAISED. Tier DONOR. Status CLOSED.

This evaluation scores the executive government of Kenya under President Jomo Kenyatta from 12 December 1963 to 22 August 1978 across the five pillars and twenty-five dimensions of the SSII Framework version 2.2. It is self-commissioned by CASA NEXUS Limited, carries no external client, and is published to inform public judgement of Kenya's post-independence administrations on a consistent evidentiary standard.

The two headline numbers must be read together. A Strategic Integrity Score of 42.20 places the administration in the LOW-MODERATE band. An Evidence Confidence Index of 76.70 places that judgement in the Substantiated band, which permits the verbs used throughout this report and forbids stronger ones. The evidence base rests on a truth commission, a public land commission, a parliamentary select committee, a national statistical series and a peer-reviewed economic literature, across twenty-three distinct upstream provenance chains.

The result the framework requires this report to lead with.

The Safeguarding Veto fired. Do No Harm Compliance and Safeguarding Architecture each score 1, and the PILI performance index is 28.00. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission found that the government of the period was responsible for numerous gross violations of human rights, that the Kenyan Army committed mass killings of civilians during the Shifta War, that sexual violence in that conflict was widespread and systematic and included sexual slavery, and that the government committed the vast majority of violations in the conflict. The Commission further found that the state made a deliberate effort to cover up those abuses and enacted the Indemnity Act to bar accountability for them. The Kenyatta period accounted for the largest number of political assassinations of any Kenyan administration.

The veto caps the reportable band at LOW-MODERATE. The composite reached that band on its own arithmetic, so the cap altered the reporting obligation rather than the score. A high evidence rating provides no mitigation. It means the protection failure is documented rather than alleged.

What the administration delivered.

The material record is strong, and it is not in dispute. Life expectancy at birth rose from 50.8 years in 1963 to 58.2 years in 1978. Infant mortality fell from 100.7 to 72.5 per 1,000 live births. Primary gross enrolment moved from 60.3 per cent in 1970 to 95.6 per cent in 1978. Primary enrolment in absolute terms rose from 891,553 children in 1963 to 1,816,017 in 1973 and to 2,705,878 in 1974, the year fees were abolished for Grades 1 to 4. Real GDP compounded at 6.80 per cent a year across 1964 to 1978. These gains outlasted the administration, and they carry the whole of its positive case.

What the evidence does not permit.

No counterfactual Kenya exists, so impact runs on the contribution track with a hard ceiling of 82. This evaluation assigns tier CC-2: the theory of change survives the hoop test and rival explanations are not eliminated. Four rivals were tested. The inherited settler-economy capital stock, preferential access to Tanzanian and Ugandan markets under the East African Community until its 1977 collapse, the weakness of regional comparators, and a terms-of-trade improvement of approximately 54 per cent by 1977 following the Brazilian coffee frost of July 1975 each retain explanatory force. Growth in the period is associated with the administration's smallholder agricultural strategy. It is not established as caused by it, and this report does not say that it was.

Pillar scorecard.

Pillar	Weight	Index	Band	Coverage	Evidence
PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment	0.20	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	ESI-4 (88)
IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance	0.20	48.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	ESI-4 (88)
IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity	0.25	52.00	MODERATE	A	CC-2 (60)
PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	Capped 70
CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value	0.15	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	C	ESI-3/4 (83)

Table 5 (repeated at Chapter 4). All pillars reportable; weights sum to 1.000; no redistribution required. CESVI Coverage C is barred from anchoring a headline claim or recommendation.

The seven findings that matter most

1. The protection failure is the defining result and rests on commission findings rather than inference.
2. Human development gains were substantial, measurable and durable beyond the period.
3. The growth claim is weaker than the national story holds; the licence permits association, not causation.
4. Accountability failed at the executive and functioned in the legislature, and the executive overrode it.
5. Conflict of interest was adopted as policy in 1971 while the supervisory safeguard proposed alongside it was dropped.
6. Spatial inequality was a documented policy choice whose redistribution leg was never executed.
7. The 1976 terms-of-trade windfall raised consumption and left little permanent productive capacity.

Primary-data position

The confidence gate is passed for CESVI alone, which carries Coverage C with two Withheld dimensions. The gap is archival rather than field-collectible. The retrieval route is set out at Chapter 6 and Annex R4. The remaining four pillars did not pass the gate; their evidence licenses every judgement this evaluation makes, including the adverse ones.

Recommendations in summary

The status is CLOSED, so the roadmap is Legacy Remediation and addresses what the period left in force. Priority actions are the repeal or reasoned defence of the Indemnity Act, completion of the 1971 conflict-of-interest reform by restoring the supervisory office that was dropped, release of the unredacted select committee report on the Kariuki killing, and anchoring of Equalisation Fund allocation to the marginalisation the TJRC named.

The full roadmap is at Chapter 6 and Annex A8.

Chapter 1· Introduction.

1.1 The evaluand.

Kenya became independent on 12 December 1963 and a republic on 12 December 1964. Jomo Kenyatta served as Prime Minister from independence and as President from December 1964 until his death in office on 22 August 1978. The evaluand is the executive government he led across that period of fourteen years and eight months: the Office of the President, the Cabinet, the ministries, the provincial administration, the security agencies and the parastatals through which the state acted.

The scale is national. Population rose from approximately 8.63 million in 1963 to 14.93 million in 1978. The administration governed through three Development Plan cycles (1964–70, 1970–74 and 1974–78), a policy architecture set out in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, and a constitution amended repeatedly across the period to concentrate executive authority.

Its stated objectives, taken from Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 and the Development Plans, were rapid economic growth, Africanisation of the economy, the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease, national unity across ethnic and regional lines, and equitable distribution of the resulting gains. Those stated objectives, not retrospectively assigned ones, form the scoring frame.

1.2 Purpose and the decision this evaluation informs.

CASA NEXUS Limited commissioned this evaluation and funds it. There is no client, no funder mandate and no contractual restriction on publication. The evaluation informs one decision: how Kenyans and Kenyan institutions should judge each post-independence administration against a consistent evidentiary standard, and what each period bequeathed to the constitutional order now in force.

That purpose sets a constraint the reader should hold. Comparability across five administrations requires one weight vector, one set of dimension anchors and one evidence discipline, fixed before the first volume and applied unchanged to the last. Any later change is logged at Annex A6 and applied retrospectively to every completed volume.

1.3 Scope and boundaries.

- Temporal: 12 December 1963 to 22 August 1978. Events after that date enter only as evidence about the period, never as performance scored against it.
- Institutional: the executive government of Kenya. The judiciary and the legislature are scored as institutions the executive interacted with and constrained or failed to constrain, not as separate evaluands.
- Geographic: the whole territory, with explicit attention to the regions the framework's inclusion pillar requires be surfaced separately.
- Excluded: the colonial administration to 1963, which forms context at Chapter 2 and is not scored; and the conduct of non-state actors, which enters only where the state's response to it is at issue.

1.4 Intended users.

This report serves three readers at once. The executive reader takes the topline from the executive summary and this chapter and can act on it without reading further. The programme and policy reader works through Chapters 2 to 6 for the reasoning behind every score. The evaluation commissioner audits the annex pack, where the raw evidence ledger, the worked scoring of all twenty-five dimensions and the score computation permit the SIS and ECI to be reproduced independently.

1.5 Evaluation questions.

#	Evaluation question	Pillars that answer it
EQ1	Did the political settlement the administration-built support or undermine its own stated development objectives?	PIAI
EQ2	Did the institutions of state deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when it was tested?	IPGI
EQ3	What changed in the lives of Kenyans across the period, and how much of that change can be attributed to the administration?	IOII
EQ4	Did the administration protect the people it governed, and who was excluded from the gains?	PILI, IOII
EQ5	Did the resources deployed represent value, and what was foregone?	CESVI
EQ6	What does the period bequeath to Kenya's current constitutional and institutional order?	All five

Table 2. Full mapping of questions to findings and evidence at Annex R5.

1.6 Tier and status declaration, and what they mean for the reader.

The evaluand tier is DONOR. The presidency is read as steward of national revenue and of the ministries, provincial administration, security agencies and parastatals it funded and directed, accountable to citizens as rights holders. Under this tier, each dimension is read as the conduct of the steward, and downward safeguarding assurance is scored on whether the architecture actually detected and acted on failure among those it funded. The framework is explicit that assurance which has never detected a failure in a system where failures are known to occur scores no higher than 2.

A CHAIN declaration, scoring presidency, provincial administration and district tiers separately, is methodologically attractive for this evaluand. It is evidentially unaffordable for 1963 to 1978, because tier-separated scoring at the framework's triangulation standard cannot be met from the surviving record. The alternative is recorded at Annex A1.

The evaluand status is CLOSED. The administration ended with the death of the incumbent and constitutional succession was completed. This selects the Legacy Remediation Roadmap and bars projection modelling. No reform scenario is modelled in this report, because the period is over and a projected score would be fiction.

1.7 Topline conclusions.

The evidence supports a finding that the Kenyatta administration delivered substantial and durable material gains to Kenyans while failing them on protection, accountability and equity, and that the second failure is the more consequential inheritance. The material record is strong: life expectancy rose by approximately 7.5 years, infant mortality fell by roughly 28 per cent, and primary enrolment tripled. The protection record carries commission findings of mass killings, systematic sexual violence, forced villagisation and a statutory bar on accountability. The accountability record shows a legislature that investigated a political killing and named senior officials, and an executive that removed those names and detained the members who had pursued the inquiry.

The composite is 42.20 because four of the five pillars sit at or below 48. Only impact reaches the MODERATE band, and its evidence rating is the weakest in the set at 60. The pattern indicates a system that produced outputs while its political, institutional and protection layers degraded, which is the condition the framework's LOW-MODERATE band describes.

Chapter 2 · Background and literature review.

2.1 The inheritance.

The administration inherited a settler economy built on land alienation. By 1914 approximately five million acres had been taken from Kenyan communities, principally Kikuyu, Maasai and Nandi, and reserved for European settlement in the White Highlands. The TJRC records the colonial state's methods as including coerced agreements, forced labour and forced taxation, and identifies these as the origin of the land scarcity and landlessness that drove later conflict. It also records that between 150,000 and 320,000 Africans were detained in more than fifty camps during the Emergency.

Two features of that inheritance bear directly on the scoring. The first is physical: a functioning commercial agricultural sector, a rail and port network, a central bank apparatus and a civil service, all of which the incoming government took over intact. The second is legal: the Preservation of Public Security Act, the Chiefs' Authority Act and the Public Order Act, colonial instruments that the new state retained rather than repealed. The retention decision is scored. The inheritance itself is context.

2.2 The political settlement, 1963 to 1969.

The settlement was constructed in five moves across six years. KADU dissolved into KANU in 1964, ending the regional majimbo arrangement. Oginga Odinga resigned from KANU on 14 April 1966 and formed the Kenya People's Union. KANU responded with a constitutional amendment requiring defecting members to seek re-election, producing the June 1966 "little general election" held over three rounds; KANU took 21 of 28 contested House seats and KPU took 7. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1966 passed on 2 June 1966, in under four hours, and authorised preventive detention without trial. Dawn raids in August 1966 detained KPU officials under the new powers.

The settlement closed in 1969. Tom Mboya was assassinated on 5 July. On 25 October the President opened the New Nyanza General Hospital in Kisumu; presidential security fired on the crowd, with an official toll of approximately 11 dead that the TJRC records as contested. Odinga was placed under house arrest on 29 October. The KPU was banned on 30 October on the stated ground that it was dangerous to the good government of the Republic. The general election of 6 December 1969 was contested by KANU alone and the President was returned unopposed. Kenya was a de facto one-party state from that point until 1991.

2.3 The economic strategy.

Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya, is the period's governing policy document. Its operative planning provision, at approximately paragraph 133, directs that development finance go where it will produce the largest increase in output. The stated rationale is sequential: concentrate investment in high-potential areas, generate surplus, then transfer that surplus to low-potential regions. The first half was implemented. The second was not, and the paper's critics from Barack Obama Sr in 1965 onward identified the risk at the time.

The strategy in practice combined smallholder agricultural expansion in coffee and tea, import-substituting industrialisation behind tariff and exchange controls, and Africanisation of commerce. The Million Acre Settlement Scheme transferred former settler farms to African ownership using British and World Bank finance rather than expropriation. Scholarship on the scheme is consistent that it defused land hunger among politically salient constituencies while concentrating the largest holdings among politicians, professionals and land-buying companies.

2.4 The state of knowledge.

Four bodies of inquiry establish what is already known about this period, and this evaluation is built on them rather than around them.

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, established under the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Act 2008 and reporting in May 2013, is the most comprehensive. It collected 42,465 statements, the largest number of any truth commission on record, received 1,828 memoranda, interviewed 919 people through its investigation department, and held hearings in locations across the country between April 2011 and April 2012. Its mandate ran from independence to February 2008 and it divided the period by administration. Its Kenyatta-era findings are the evidentiary spine of the PILI pillar in this report.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal and Irregular Allocation of Public Land, reporting in June 2004 and known as the Ndung'u report, found widespread abuse of presidential discretion in the allocation of unalienated public land, with grants made for political reasons and without regard to public interest or legal procedure. Its findings anchor the Elite Capture and Procurement Integrity dimensions.

The Select Committee on the Disappearance and Murder of the Late Member for Nyandarua North, reporting to the National Assembly in 1975 and chaired by Elijah Mwangale, investigated the killing of J.M. Kariuki and implicated senior police and government figures. Its report is held in the Kenya National Assembly library. It anchors the Leadership Accountability dimension.

The economic literature is dominated by two strands. The ILO employment strategy mission of 1972, published as Employment, Incomes and Equality, introduced the informal sector to international policy discourse, identified the working poor as the central Kenyan problem, and proposed redistribution from growth as the strategy. Separately, Bevan, Collier and Gunning analysed the 1976 to 1979 coffee boom as a temporary terms-of-trade shock and found that the fiscal response produced a negative net effect on capital formation. Colin Leys's 1975 political economy of the period remains the standard critical account.

2.5 Where this evaluation adds.

Each of those inquiries answered one question well. The TJRC assessed rights violations and did not score economic delivery. Ndung'u assessed land and did not assess protection. The economic literature assessed growth and did not weigh the protection record against it. This evaluation scores all five layers on one scale, with the evidence rating for each stated openly, so that the material gains and the protection failures are held in the same frame and weighted rather than argued alternately.

Chapter 3 · Methodology, tools and limitations

3.1 The SSII Framework applied.

The SSII Framework version organises evaluation across five interacting pillars, each carrying five dimensions scored 1 to 5 on performance. The pillar performance index is the mean of its scored dimensions expressed on a 0 to 100 scale. Two headline metrics are computed from those indices and are always reported together.

- Strategic Integrity Score (SIS), 0 to 100. The weighted mean of pillar performance indices. It states how the system performed and carries no evidence discount.
- Evidence Confidence Index (ECI), 0 to 100. The weighted mean of pillar evidence ratings at the same weights. It states how well that performance can be proven.

The SIS alone is an unfalsifiable assertion. The ECI alone is a methods note. The pair is the finding.

3.2 Pillar weights.

Pillar	Weight	Applied because
PIAI	0.20	Default vector, fixed for the series
IPGI	0.20	Default vector, fixed for the series
IOII	0.25	The series asks what governance meant for people, so outcomes carry the largest single weight
PILI	0.20	Default vector, fixed for the series
CESVI	0.15	Default vector, fixed for the series
Total	1.00	All five pillars reportable; no redistribution triggered

Table 3. The Government Reform vector (PIAI 0.25 / IPGI 0.30 / IOII 0.20 / PILI 0.15 / CESVI 0.10) was considered and rejected. It privileges administrative reform over lived outcomes, which inverts this series' stated purpose. The decision is recorded at Annex A1 and applies unchanged to all five volumes.

3.3 The Claim Licence.

The ECI band fixes the strongest verb permitted anywhere in this report. At ECI 76.70 the licence is Substantiated, which permits contributed to, indicates and the evidence supports. It forbids demonstrates, caused and established. Where the contribution track applies, the impact licence is the lower of the two, and impact statements in this report are held at Indicative: is associated with, suggests, consistent with. No verb in this report exceeds its licence.

3.4 Evidence ladders.

Ladder	Tier applied	Rating	Where used
ESI-5 Adjudicated	Not claimed	100	No source was accessed at full adjudicated tier
ESI-4 Primary official	Applied	90	TJRC (published summary), Ndung'u findings, Select Committee record, World Bank WDI, Sessional Paper No. 10, Kenya Statistical Abstracts via peer-reviewed use
ESI-3 Mixed primary and scholarly	Applied	80	Peer-reviewed political economy and economic history with at least one primary document and three provenance chains
ESI-2 Credible secondary	Applied	65	Gender dimension only, where the documentary record is thin
CC-2 Contribution, hoop passed	Applied	60	Whole of IOII; rivals tested and not eliminated

Table 4. Access-tier cap applied throughout. The TJRC report was read in the published summary issued by Kituo Cha Sheria, not in the four-volume original, and is therefore rated ESI-4 rather than ESI-5. Reading the full volumes would raise the PILI and PIAI evidence terms and would not change the performance scores.

3.5 Coverage, the Dual-Subject Rule and the Safeguarding Veto.

Performance and coverage are scored separately. A dimension score of 1 means the system failed; it never means the record is silent. Where the record shows no analysis was done, performance is scored on what the system achieved on the available record and the absence is carried as a Coverage flag. This rule does substantial work in a 1963 to 1978 evaluand, where modern instruments did not exist. It does no work on Do No Harm, where the record is not silent and the conduct is judgeable against the law then in force.

Coverage grades: A where all five dimensions are scored, B at four, C at three, Withheld below that. A pillar at C is indicative only and may not anchor a headline claim or a recommendation. A pillar with two or fewer scored dimensions is excluded from the SIS and its weight redistributed. No exclusion arose here.

The Safeguarding Veto caps the reportable band at LOW-MODERATE where Do No Harm or Safeguarding Architecture scores 1 or 2, or where PILI performance falls below 50. All three conditions are met. The veto fired, the Protection Flag is raised and the protection finding leads the report.

3.6 The contribution track.

A counterfactual Kenya is structurally unavailable. Impact therefore runs on the contribution track, whose ceiling is 82 and which can never license causal language. The track requires rival explanations to be tested rather than acknowledged; an untested rival caps the tier at CC-1. Four rivals were tested and are set out with their evidence at Chapter 4.3. The theory of change survives the hoop test, and the rivals are not eliminated, which places the tier at CC-2 and the rating at 60.

3.7 Adaptation for a presidential evaluand.

SSII was built for programmes, funds, policies and funding relationships. A fourteen-year presidency exceeds that design envelope, and the Government Sector Adaptation Protocol at Part IX does not name a head-of-state tenure among its six configurations. This evaluation applies the closest available configuration, Public Institution Effectiveness, as full SSII with process tracing and adaptive management assessment. The adaptation is declared rather than absorbed and is recorded at Annex A1.

One further adaptation governs fairness. Conduct is scored against the norms and legal commitments in force at the time: the independence and 1969 constitutions, the Preservation of Public Security Act as it then stood, and Kenya's treaty commitments of the period. Present-day standards are carried separately in the Legacy Remediation Roadmap and are never blended into the score.

3.8 Evidence base, triangulation and tools.

Triangulation counts distinct upstream provenance chains, not documents. Several publications tracing to one commission are one chain. Every scored dimension in this evaluation met the three-chain requirement. The full ledger, with each item's finding, pillar, dimension, source, date, upstream origin, access tier and evidence class, is at Annex A3.

Tools used: the SSII Evaluation Annex Workbook scoring engine; World Bank World Development Indicators retrieved directly from the Bank's data interface in July 2026 for the series in Figures 2 and 3; and independent computation of pillar indices, the SIS, the ECI and the compound growth rates reported in Chapter 4. The computation is reproducible from Annex R1 alone and the underlying series are given at Annex R2.

3.9 Limitations.

These limits are stated so the reader does not over-read the result.

- Coverage gap at CESVI. Cost per Outcome and the Cost-Consequence Matrix are Withheld because unit cost data for 1963 to 1978 cannot be triangulated from published sources. CESVI is reported at Coverage C and anchors nothing. The retrieval route is at Annex R4.
- Access-tier cap on the primary protection source. The TJRC evidence is rated at the tier at which it was actually read, which is the published summary, not the original volumes.

- DEI ceiling. Sex-disaggregated national data before the 1977 to 1978 Integrated Rural Survey is minimal and disability data is effectively absent. DEI completeness registers Minimal, capping the PILI evidence term at 70 against a raw rating of 83. This cap is structural to the archive and will bind across all five volumes.
- Contribution ceiling. Impact cannot exceed 82 and sits at 60. Association is the strongest impact claim available and is the strongest made.
- National statistical quality. The World Bank growth series for Kenya shows movements in 1970 to 1972 that are large relative to neighbouring years and are treated in this report as reflecting series construction as well as real activity. Compound rather than arithmetic growth rates are reported throughout for this reason, and the divergence from the commonly cited figure is logged at Annex A12.
- Right of reply. Named individuals of the period are deceased. Institutions named in adverse findings survive, and the reply register at Annex A10 records the position.

Chapter 4 · Findings.

4.0 Headline result and the pillar profile.

SIS 42.20 · LOW-MODERATE **ECI 76.70 · Substantiated.**

Protection Flag RAISED. Safeguarding Veto fired on Do No Harm (1), Safeguarding Architecture (1) and PILI index 28.00. The band cap is LOW-MODERATE. The composite reached that band independently, so the veto changed the reporting obligation rather than the number.

The framework reads a LOW-MODERATE band as weak integrity requiring fundamental restructuring rather than targeted repair. The evidence rating of 76.70 places that reading in the Substantiated band. The reader may therefore treat the finding as defensible and may not treat it as causal.

Pillar	Weight	Perf. index	Band	Coverage	Scored	Evidence	SIS contrib.	ECI contrib.
PIAI	0.20	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	88.00	8.00	17.60
IPGI	0.20	48.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	88.00	9.60	17.60
IOII	0.25	52.00	MODERATE	A	5/5	60.00	13.00	15.00
PILI	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	5/5	70.00	5.60	14.00
CESVI	0.15	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	C	3/5	83.33	6.00	12.50
TOTAL	1.00	—	—	—	23/25	—	42.20	76.70

Table 5. Full arithmetic at Annex R1. Weights of reportable pillars sum to 1.000; no redistribution was triggered.



Figure 1. Pillar performance against evidence confidence. The gap at IOII is the contribution ceiling; the gap at PILI is the DEI cap.

Two features of the profile carry the analysis. First, performance is flat and low across four pillars and only impact clears 50, which indicates a system delivering outputs while its political, institutional and protection layers degraded. Second, the evidence line runs above the performance line everywhere except IOII. The administration's failures are better documented than its achievements are attributable, and this asymmetry is a property of the record rather than a choice of this evaluation.

4.1 PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment.

Performance index 40.00· LOW-MODERATE· Coverage A· Evidence ESI-4 (88)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Power Mapping	3	ESI-4	The administration read formal and informal power with precision and used the reading to narrow rather than broaden the settlement. KADU absorbed 1964; the 1966 constitutional amendment forced defectors to re-contest; the KPU banned 30 October 1969. High political competence, misaligned to the stated objective of national unity.
Stakeholder Incentives	2	ESI-4	The Commission of Inquiry into the Public Service Structure and Remuneration reported May 1971 and recommended public servants be permitted private business interests. The same report recommended a supervisory ombudsman. Cabinet adopted the permission; the safeguard was dropped. The incentive structure of the civil service was rewritten without its control.
Elite Capture Risk	1	ESI-4	The Ndung'u Commission found widespread abuse of presidential discretion in allocating unalienated public land, with grants made for political reasons and outside legal procedure. The TJRC found settlement schemes turned into vehicles for official acquisition, leaving many of those who fought for independence landless.
Regulatory Feasibility	3	ESI-3	The regulatory framework for smallholder coffee and tea functioned and enabled the agricultural expansion of the period. Against this, the constitution was amended repeatedly to remove constraints on the executive, and exchange and import controls progressively constrained private response to price signals.
Conflict Sensitivity	1	ESI-4	The state of emergency declared in Northern Kenya on 24 December 1964 remained in force until 1991. The TJRC found the state's conduct in the Shifta War deepened rather than reduced the grievances that produced it, and that inattention to the rights and welfare of the population continued after the conflict ended.

Table 6. Dimension scoring at Annex A4; evidence at Annex A3.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that the administration's political analysis was competent, and its application of that analysis worked against its own stated objectives. A government that could pass a constitutional amendment authorising detention without trial in under four hours on 2 June 1966 was not a government lacking political capacity. It was a government applying capacity to consolidation.

Elite Capture at 1 is the pillar's decisive score and it rests on two commissions rather than on commentary. The land settlement programme is the clearest case, because it was the administration's single largest redistributive instrument and the mechanism through which the political settlement was financed. The TJRC found the schemes were turned into cartels by officials of the new government. The Ndung'u Commission found the abuse of presidential discretion that made this possible. The evidence supports treating the capture as designed into the instrument rather than as leakage from it.

The Ndegwa finding at Stakeholder Incentives deserves precision, because the popular account is inaccurate in a way that matters. The commission did not licence a free-for-all. It set out express conflict-of-interest constraints and recommended an ombudsman to enforce them. The Attorney-General of the day opposed the ombudsman and it did not survive into the government's response. The failure is the adoption of the permission without the control, and the correct remedy today follows directly from that.

4.2 IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance

Performance index 48.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage A · Evidence ESI-4 (88)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Leadership Accountability	1	ESI-4	The Select Committee on the murder of J.M. Kariuki implicated senior police and government figures. Names were removed before the report was tabled. Parliament nonetheless defeated the government motion to merely note the report. No prosecution followed. Members who pursued the inquiry, including its vice-chair, were subsequently detained or jailed.
Financial Stewardship	3	ESI-4	A genuine record of fiscal control: a balanced budget in 1965, recurrent expenditure met from domestic resources for the first time since 1952, a central bank established in 1966, and functioning Auditor-General and Public Accounts Committee processes. Against this, the fiscal response to the 1976 windfall expanded public expenditure far beyond the revenue increase.
Procurement Integrity	2	ESI-4	Formal tendering processes for goods and works operated. The documented failure is concentrated in the allocation of public land and assets, where the Ndung'u Commission found direct grants made outside legal procedure. At DONOR tier this allocation function is the procurement analogue and it governs the score.
Data Governance	3	ESI-3	Real statistical capability was built: the Central Bureau of Statistics, the Statistical Abstracts series, the 1969 census and the Integrated Rural Surveys of 1974–75 and 1977–78. Against this, the state suppressed the Select Committee record, withheld Shifta-era documentation, and enacted the Indemnity Act to bar its later examination.
Decision-Making Velocity	3	ESI-4	Decision speed was high where the executive was engaged. The 1966 amendment passed in under four hours. Fees for Grades 1 to 4 were announced in December 1973 and abolished from January 1974, with enrolment rising 49 per cent in one year. Quality lagged speed: the fee abolition proceeded without a financing plan and building levies replaced fees within four years.

Table 7. Dimension scoring at Annex A4; evidence at Annex A3.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that Kenya's accountability institutions functioned in this period and that executive discretion overrode them. This is a more precise and more useful finding than institutional weakness, and it is the one the record actually carries. A select committee investigated the killing of a sitting member, took evidence against obstruction, named a serving police chief and senior officials, and won a floor vote against the Attorney-General. The capacity was present. What followed was the removal of names from the tabled report and the detention or imprisonment of members associated with the inquiry.

Financial Stewardship at 3 is the administration's second-strongest institutional score and it is earned. The fiscal discipline of the first decade was real and it distinguished Kenya from most regional comparators. The score does not rise above 3 because the single largest fiscal test of the period, the arrival of an unexpected and temporary windfall, was failed on the evidence set out at 4.5.

Data Governance illustrates the Dual-Subject Rule at work. The administration built statistical infrastructure that Kenya still uses, which is a performance achievement and is scored as one. It also suppressed specific records for political reasons, which is a performance failure and is scored as one. The dimension nets to 3. The absence of modern data protection or open contracting standards is neither, because those standards did not exist, and it is carried as context rather than as failure.

4.3 IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity.

Performance index 52.00 · MODERATE · Coverage A · Contribution tier CC-2 (60).

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Outcome Performance	4	CC-2	Life expectancy 50.8 (1963) to 58.2 (1978). Infant mortality 100.7 to 72.5 per 1,000. Primary GER 60.3 per cent (1970) to 95.6 per cent (1978). Primary enrolment 891,553 (1963) to 1,816,017 (1973) to 2,705,878 (1974). Real GDP CAGR 6.80 per cent across 1964–78. Strong achievement against baseline on every retrievable indicator.
Contribution Analysis	3	CC-2	The administration maintained a planning ministry producing costed Development Plans and hosted the 1972 ILO employment mission, which supplied an external diagnostic. It ran no counterfactual assessment, which is a period-standard limitation rather than a failure. It did not act on the diagnostic it had, which is.
Unintended Consequences	2	CC-2	Education expansion outpaced job creation, producing educated unemployment the administration met by expanding the civil service. Building levies replaced abolished school fees, with reported parental costs by 1978 exceeding the original fee several times over. Classroom construction costs approximately tripled between 1974 and 1978.
Systemic Spillovers	2	CC-2	The spatial concentration logic of Sessional Paper No. 10 compounded across the period into the regional pattern the TJRC later identified: North Eastern including Upper Eastern, Coast, Nyanza, Western and North Rift as the most economically marginalised regions.
Sustainability Probability	2	CC-2	Human development gains persisted. Growth did not: the compound rate fell from 7.89 per cent (1964–73) to 4.65 per cent (1974–78), and per capita growth from 3.86 to 1.21 per cent. The institutional settlement persisted in its damaging form, and the land, marginalisation and impunity grievances of the period remained live decades later.

Table 8. IOII evidence is rated on the contribution track, not per-dimension ESI. Dimension scoring at Annex A4.



Figure 2. Human development outcomes 1963–1978. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, retrieved July 2026; enrolment ratio series from the same source.

Rival explanations tested.

The contribution track requires rivals to be tested rather than acknowledged. An untested rival caps the tier at CC-1. Four rivals were tested.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
Inherited settler-economy capital stock and institutions explain the growth	Commercial agriculture, rail, port and civil service transferred intact at independence	Partially excluded. The inheritance explains the starting level. It does not explain smallholder coffee and tea expansion, which required a policy choice regional comparators did not make.
Preferential access to Tanzanian and Ugandan markets under the East African Community explains Kenya's industrial growth	Kenya held the strongest manufacturing base within the common market until its 1977 collapse	Not excluded. The EAC advantage operated across the whole first decade and cannot be separated from policy effect on the available data.
The 1976–79 coffee price shock explains the late-period growth	Brazilian frost July 1975; coffee prices rose approximately 216 per cent 1975–77; Kenya's terms of trade improved approximately 54 per cent by 1977	Not excluded for 1976–78. Excluded for 1964–73, which precedes the shock entirely.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
Weak regional comparators flatter Kenya's record	Tanzania pursued villagisation; Uganda collapsed under military rule after 1971	Not excluded. Comparator weakness is real and the comparators are not clean counterfactuals, so relative performance cannot carry an attribution claim.

Table 9. Three of four rivals survive testing. The theory of change survives the hoop test and the rivals are not eliminated, which places the claim at CC-2 (rating 60, Indicative). The track ceiling is 82 and causal language is barred at any tier.



Figure 3. Real GDP growth 1964–1978 with the terms-of-trade rival marked. Source: World Bank WDI, retrieved July 2026; compound rates computed by the evaluation team.

Findings.

Outcome Performance at 4 is the highest dimension score in this evaluation and it is defensible on primary statistics. Kenyans lived approximately seven and a half years longer at the end of the period than at the start, and roughly 28 fewer infants in every thousand died before their first birthday. Those are large changes over fifteen years and they are the administration's strongest claim on history.

One causal link comes close to a smoking gun and is worth separating from the aggregate. Fees for Grades 1 to 4 were abolished from January 1974 following a decree in December 1973. Primary gross enrolment moved from 67.9 per cent in 1973 to 100.3 per cent in 1974. No rival explanation accounts for a step change of that size in a single year at that date. The tier for the education link is materially stronger than the tier for the aggregate growth claim, and the pillar rating of CC-2 reflects the weaker of the two because the pillar is rated as a whole.

On growth the licence is Indicative and the report holds to it. Real growth is associated with the smallholder agricultural strategy, and the association survives testing. It is not established as caused by it. The distinction is not pedantic here: the 1976 to 1978 upswing coincides with a price shock the government did not create and could not sustain, and per capita growth in the last five years fell to roughly a third of the first decade's rate. A national story that reads the whole period as a policy success is reading the first decade and the windfall together and attributing both to the same cause.

Sustainability at 2 carries the finding that matters most for this series. What persisted from the period was not the growth. It was the settlement: a concentrated executive, a legalised conflict of interest in the public service, an unresolved land question, and a set of regional grievances that had been documented and left in place. Those are the assets and liabilities the next administration inherited, and Volume 2 opens on them.

4.4 PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy.

Performance index 28.00 · CRITICAL · Coverage A · Evidence 70 (DEI-capped from 83).

Protection Flag

Do No Harm Compliance scores 1. Safeguarding Architecture scores 1. The PILI index is 28.00, below the veto threshold of 50. All three veto conditions are met independently. The band cap of LOW-MODERATE applies to the whole evaluation. The veto cannot be lifted by strong performance in another pillar and lifts only on re-collected evidence above threshold.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Do No Harm Compliance	1	ESI-4	The TJRC found the Kenyan Army committed mass killings of civilians during the Shifta War, including killings in places of worship; that livestock was confiscated and poisoned on a large scale without compensation; and that residents were held in restricted villages in squalid conditions where dysentery, pneumonia, malaria and tuberculosis were common. It found the government committed the vast majority of violations in the conflict.
Safeguarding Architecture	1	ESI-4	No mechanism detected or acted on the failures. The Indemnity Act was enacted to bar accountability for conduct in the conflict, and the TJRC found the Act itself violates international law by denying victims access to truth, reparation and accountability. Under the DONOR tier assurance rule, architecture that never detected a failure where failures are known to occur scores no higher than 2; here it scores 1 because the architecture was used to prevent detection.
Gender-Transformative Impact	2	ESI-2	Girls' access rose with the 1974 fee abolition, which is a real gain. Against this the TJRC found state-sanctioned discrimination against women across the mandate period, and contemporaneous administrative practice excluded women from instruments tied to identity registration. The evidence base is thin and the score is held at 2 rather than 1 on the enrolment record.
Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	ESI-4	The TJRC found sexual violence in the Shifta War was widespread and systematic, included the holding of women as sexual slaves, and expressly rejected the official position that it was infrequent and isolated. No referral pathway, survivor support or acknowledgement existed. The Commission recorded women carrying the consequences in silence for three to four decades.
Community Trust and Accountability	2	ESI-3	Parliament remained a working accountability channel and the baraza system provided a feedback mechanism of a kind. Against this, KPU supporters were dismissed from employment, the state broadcaster imposed a news blackout on the opposition, and two large regions were governed under emergency powers or after a mass shooting by presidential security.

Table 10. The pillar's raw evidence rating is 83. The DEI completeness level is Minimal, which caps the PILI evidence term at 70. Veto counter-sign at Annex A5.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that the administration failed to protect a significant part of the population it governed, and that the failure was systemic rather than incidental. The Shifta record is not a series of excesses within a lawful operation. The TJRC documented mass killing, systematic sexual violence, forced villagisation and collective punishment as the method of the operation, and identified command responsibility. The emergency declared on 24 December 1964 outlived the conflict by more than two decades.

The Indemnity Act converts this from a historical finding into a live one. Legislating immunity is an act of the safeguarding architecture, and it is the act that fixes the score at 1. The architecture did not fail to detect the harm. It was used to ensure the harm could not be examined.

The political killings compound the pillar. The TJRC recorded that the Kenyatta period accounted for the largest number of political assassinations of any Kenyan administration, that investigations were cursory, and that no perpetrator has been prosecuted. It named the deaths of Pio Gama Pinto in 1965, Tom Mboya in July 1969, Ronald Ngala in 1972, the disappearance of Kungu Karumba in 1974 and the killing of J.M. Kariuki in March 1975 among those it examined.

Community Trust scores 2 rather than 1 for a reason worth stating. Legitimacy in this period was regionally split rather than uniformly absent. In much of Central Province and the Rift Valley the administration retained genuine consent, delivered land and schooling, and was not experienced as a security regime. In North Eastern and much of Nyanza it was. A single national score would hide that, and the finding is that the administration purchased legitimacy in some regions with methods that destroyed it in others.

The DEI ceiling limits what can be said about inclusion. The archive does not carry the disaggregation required to assess who benefited within regions, by sex, by disability or by displacement status. The cap at 70 states that limit rather than working around it.

4.5 CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value.

Performance index 40.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage C · Evidence ESI-3/4 (83.33).

Coverage C. This pillar is indicative only. It does not anchor any headline claim or recommendation in this report.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Cost per Outcome	Withheld	—	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population cannot be triangulated from published sources for 1963–78. Retrieval route at Annex R4.
Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	—	Full cost mapping against intended and unintended consequences requires the same archival series and is Withheld on the same basis.
Portfolio Efficiency	2	ESI-3	Peer-reviewed analysis of the 1976–79 coffee boom using Kenya Statistical Abstracts data records public expenditure rising far in excess of the revenue increase, with a negative net effect on capital formation and a construction boom rather than productive investment. Comparator producers banked more of an equivalent windfall.
Counterfactual Cost Modelling	2	ESI-3	The administration produced costed Development Plans and had access to a fully costed strategic alternative in the 1972 ILO mission report, which proposed redistribution from growth. It did not model the alternative against its own strategy and did not adopt it.
Opportunity Cost Mapping	2	ESI-4	Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965 states the opportunity-cost decision explicitly: concentrate investment where output gain is largest, and transfer surplus to low-potential regions later. The decision was documented and the transfer leg was not executed. Explicit mapping, unexecuted second half.

Table 11. Two dimensions Withheld; coverage log at Annex A11; gate check at Annex R4.

Findings.

The single clearest test of strategic value in the period is the coffee windfall, and the administration did not pass it. A temporary terms-of-trade gain of approximately 54 per cent arrived in an economy with foreign exchange and import controls. The evidence indicates public expenditure expanded beyond the revenue the boom generated, that private investment of windfall income was pushed forward inefficiently by the control regime, and that the net effect on capital formation was negative. The President declined to tax smallholder coffee incomes during the boom, against the advice of the IMF and the World Bank, leaving the windfall with producers in a controlled economy that constrained what they could do with it.

Opportunity Cost Mapping is the period's most consequential unexecuted commitment. Sessional Paper No. 10 did not conceal the trade-off; it stated it and justified it. The redistribution leg was the consideration the country was given for accepting concentration. It was not delivered, and the TJRC found half a century later that the paper had sowed the seeds of the marginalisation that followed.

The two Withheld dimensions are disclosed rather than estimated. Unit cost analysis for this period is retrievable from the Kenya National Archives and the Statistical Abstracts series and was not retrievable from the desk. Any cost-effectiveness verdict this report offered without that retrieval would be an assertion.

4.6 Coverage and evidence gaps.

Twenty-three of twenty-five dimensions are scored. Both Withheld dimensions sit in CESVI and are logged at Annex A11 with their retrieval routes and owners. Four pillars carry Coverage A. No pillar fell below the three-dimension threshold, so no weight redistribution was triggered and the reportable weights sum to 1.000.

The material evidence constraints are the access-tier cap on the TJRC source, the DEI ceiling on PILI, and the contribution ceiling on IOII. Each is disclosed at Chapter 3.9 and each is a limit on confidence rather than a gap in coverage.

4.7 Overlay results.

Overlay	Status	Result
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame on this evaluand.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	Contemporary official and multilateral assessments rated the period’s economic management favourably. This evaluation does not contradict the growth record. It scores five layers rather than one. The divergence is explained by protection, equity and accountability evidence that growth-focused assessments did not weigh, and by the contribution discipline applied to the growth claim itself.
Strategic instrumentalization	Not applicable	Cold War alignment shaped the external environment without subordinating the administration’s stated domestic development objectives, which remain the scoring frame.
Exit harm	Not applicable	The administration ended by death in office with constitutional succession completed. No withdrawal harm arises.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Control-oriented dimensions scored on net effect. Emergency powers in Northern Kenya and the constitutional amendments of 1966 score low for excess of control, not for neglect of it.

Full overlay detail at Annex R3.

Chapter 5 · Conclusions.

These conclusions synthesise Chapter 4. They introduce no new findings, and each is stated in the language the Claim Licence permits.

5.1 EQ1 · Did the political settlement support or undermine the stated objectives?

It undermined them. The evidence supports a finding that the administration applied competent political analysis to narrowing the settlement rather than broadening it, and that the narrowing worked directly against the stated objectives of national unity and equitable distribution. The sequence from the 1966 constitutional amendment to the banning of the KPU in October 1969 removed the institutional route through which redistribution claims could be pressed. Elite capture of the land programme, found by two commissions, removed the substance of the claim itself.

5.2 EQ2 · Did institutions deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when tested?

Institutions delivered unevenly and accountability functioned in the legislature before being overridden by the executive. The evidence supports a finding that Kenya's accountability capacity in this period was real and was defeated by discretion rather than absent. Parliament investigated a political killing, named senior officials and defeated the government on the floor. The executive removed names from the record and detained or jailed members associated with the inquiry. Financial management was disciplined for a decade and failed its largest test in 1976. Statistical capability was built and specific records were suppressed.

5.3 EQ3 · What changed, and how much can be attributed?

A great deal changed and the attribution is Indicative rather than established. Life expectancy rose by approximately 7.5 years, infant mortality fell by roughly 28 per cent, primary enrolment roughly tripled and real output compounded at 6.80 per cent a year. The education gain is closely linked in time to a specific dated policy decision and the link survives testing. The aggregate growth claim does not clear the same bar: three of four rival explanations survive testing, and this evaluation therefore says that growth is associated with the administration's strategy and does not say it was caused by it.

5.4 EQ4· Did the administration protect those it governed, and who was excluded?

It did not, and exclusion was regional, ethnic and gendered. The evidence supports a finding of systemic protection failure, resting on commission findings of mass killings, systematic sexual violence, forced villagisation, collective punishment and a statutory bar on accountability. Exclusion followed the geography that Sessional Paper No. 10 set out and that the TJRC later confirmed: Northeastern including Upper Eastern, Coast, Nyanza, Western and North Rift. Within regions, the archive does not permit assessment of who benefited by sex, disability or displacement status, and the DEI ceiling states that limit rather than filling it.

5.5 EQ5 · Did the resources represent value, and what was foregone?

This conclusion is indicative only, because CESVI carries Coverage C. On the evidence available, the administration's management of the one large windfall it received indicates poor conversion of resources into permanent capacity, and the opportunity cost it stated openly in 1965 was incurred without the compensating transfer it promised. A defensible value-for-money verdict requires the archival retrieval set out at Annex R4.

5.6 EQ6· What does the period bequeath?

Four inheritances are traceable from the period into the present constitutional order, and each is a live policy question rather than a historical one.

- A concentrated executive. The amendments of 1964 to 1969 built the imperial presidency the TJRC identified as a structural driver of later violations. The 2010 Constitution addresses it by design; the question is enforcement.

- A legalised conflict of interest in the public service, adopted in 1971 without the supervisory office recommended alongside it, and still the subject of legislative effort.
- An unresolved land question, documented by the Ndung'u Commission in 2004 and by the TJRC in 2013, with recommendations from both largely unimplemented.
- A statutory bar on accountability for Shifta-era violations, together with a set of regional grievances that have been formally documented and formally left in place.

EQ	Conclusion in one line	Licence applied	Chapter
EQ1	The settlement was competently built and worked against the stated objectives.	Substantiated	4.1
EQ2	Accountability capacity existed and executive discretion overrode it.	Substantiated	4.2
EQ3	Material gains were large; attribution to policy is Indicative, not established.	Indicative	4.3
EQ4	Protection failed systemically; exclusion was regional, ethnic and gendered.	Substantiated	4.4
EQ5	Windfall conversion was poor; a full VfM verdict awaits archival retrieval.	Indicative only	4.5
EQ6	Four inheritances remain live in the current constitutional order.	Substantiated	5.6

Table 12. Full traceability of each conclusion to findings and evidence at Annex R5.

Chapter 6 · Recommendations.

The evaluand status is CLOSED, so the roadmap variant is Legacy Remediation. These recommendations address what the period left in force. No reform scenario is modelled and no projected score is offered, because the period is over.

6.1 Legacy Remediation Roadmap.

#	Recommendation	Addressed to	From	Sequence
1	Repeal the Indemnity Act, or publish a reasoned statement of why it remains in force and what alternative accountability route exists for Shifta-era violations. The TJRC recommended repeal in 2013 with a nine-month deadline and an obligation on the Attorney-General to explain non-repeal.	Parliament; Attorney-General	4.4	Immediate
2	Complete the 1971 conflict-of-interest reform by enacting the supervisory office the commission recommended alongside the permission, so control and permission are legislated together rather than sequentially.	Cabinet; Parliament	4.1	Short term
3	Release the unredacted Select Committee report on the disappearance and murder of J.M. Kariuki through the National Archives, including the names removed before tabling, consistent with the TJRC recommendation that all materials from prior assassination investigations be made public.	National Assembly; National Archives	4.2	Short term
4	Anchor Equalisation Fund allocation under Article 204 to the specific regions the TJRC identified as marginalised, and publish the allocation formula against that finding so the transfer leg of the 1965 policy is executed and auditable.	Commission on Revenue Allocation; National Treasury	4.5, 5.6	Medium term
5	Open the investigation into the Kariuki assassination that the TJRC recommended in 2013, or publish the reasons it will not proceed.	Director of Public Prosecutions	4.2, 4.4	Medium term
6	Publish an implementation status report on the TJRC recommendations relating to the 1963–1978 period, item by item, so that the record of non-implementation is itself on the record.	Implementation oversight mechanism; Parliament	5.6	Medium term

Table 13. Full roadmap at Annex A8. Recommendations 1, 3 and 5 restate commitments already made in Kenya's own commission record. This evaluation does not originate them; it scores their non-implementation.

6.2 Recommendations to the commissioner.

1. Fix and publish the release schedule for all five volumes of this series before Volume 1 is broadcast, under the Electoral Salience Independence Clause. Publication of the schedule is the control; adherence to it is the evidence.
2. Commission the archival retrieval set out at Annex R4 to close the CESVI coverage gap before any cross-administration composite is published. A series composite built on a Coverage C pillar in one volume and Coverage A in another is not comparable.
3. Hold the weight vector, dimension anchors and the contemporaneous-standard rule unchanged across all five volumes. Log any change at Annex A6 and apply it retrospectively.

6.3 Primary-data recommendation.

The confidence gate is passed for CESVI alone. Primary collection in the framework's standard sense does not apply to a CLOSED evaluand ending in 1978: key informant interviews and focus groups cannot reach fiscal series from that period, and building them would import recall bias without adding evidence. The proportionate instrument is documentary retrieval, specified at Annex R4, which would move CESVI from Coverage C to Coverage A at an estimated ESI-4. The remaining four pillars did not pass the gate and no collection is recommended for them.

Annex pack

The annex pack has two parts. Part 1 carries the SSII framework working annexes that a commissioner audits the scoring with. Part 2 carries the reporting annexes specific to this evaluation. Annexes that do not apply are marked so rather than omitted.

Part 1 · SSII framework working annexes.

Annex A1 · Design Selection Memo.

Design element	Registered position	Basis
Evaluand	Executive government of Kenya under President Jomo Kenyatta, 12 Dec 1963 to 22 Aug 1978	Scoped at Chapter 1.1
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, self-commissioned, no external client	Chapter 1.2
Evaluand tier	DONOR	The presidency as steward of public revenue and of the bodies it funded; CHAIN considered and rejected as evidentially unaffordable for the period
Evaluand status	CLOSED	Death in office; constitutional succession completed; Legacy Remediation Roadmap selected; projection modelling barred
Single or portfolio	Single evaluand	Portfolio mode not applicable
Counterfactual decision	Contribution track	No counterfactual Kenya exists; ceiling 82; rivals required to be tested
Funder mandate	None	No Mandate Compliance overlay
Prior official score	Present	Contemporary official and multilateral assessments of the period; reconciliation overlay active
Strategic instrumentalisation	Not declared	Cold War alignment shaped context without subordinating stated domestic objectives
Pillar weights	Default 0.20 / 0.20 / 0.25 / 0.20 / 0.15	Government Reform vector considered and rejected as inverting the series purpose; fixed for all five volumes
Declared adaptation 1	Presidential evaluand outside the v2.2 design envelope	Public Institution Effectiveness configuration applied with process tracing; declared rather than absorbed
Declared adaptation 2	Contemporaneous-standard rule	Conduct scored against law and norms in force in the period; present-day standards carried separately in the roadmap and never blended into the score
Sign-off	CASA NEXUS Research, 28 July 2026	Reversible on commissioner instruction; any change logged at A6

Annex A2 · Strategic Hypotheses Log.

#	Hypothesis tested	Result
H1	The administration’s political settlement was designed to advance its stated development objectives.	Not supported. Settlement narrowed as objectives required broadening.
H2	Accountability institutions were structurally absent in the period.	Not supported. Capacity existed in the legislature and was overridden by executive discretion.
H3	The land settlement programme redistributed to the landless as designed.	Not supported. Two commissions found elite capture of the instrument.
H4	Growth in the period is attributable to the administration’s economic strategy.	Partially supported at Indicative level only. Three of four rivals survive testing.
H5	Absence of modern safeguarding architecture reflects period standards rather than failure.	Not supported. The architecture was actively used to prevent examination, which is conduct not absence.
H6	The 1976 windfall was converted into durable productive capacity.	Not supported. Evidence indicates negative net effect on capital formation.

Annex A3 · Evidence, Provenance and Triangulation Ledger.

Chains counted by distinct upstream origin, not document count. Every scored dimension met the three-chain requirement.

Chain	Source	Type	Access tier	Class	Pillars served
C1	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, final report 2013	Commission of inquiry, 42,465 statements	ESI-4 (published summary)	Verified public	PILI, PIAI, IPGI, IOII
C2	Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, 2004 (Ndung'u)	Commission of inquiry	ESI-4 (scholarly analysis of findings)	Verified public	PIAI, IPGI
C3	Select Committee on the Disappearance and Murder of Hon. J.M. Kariuki, National Assembly, 1975	Parliamentary select committee	ESI-4 (record held, Parliament library)	Verified public	IPGI, PILI
C4	Commission of Inquiry into the Public Service Structure and Remuneration, 1971 (Ndegwa)	Commission of inquiry	ESI-4	Verified public	PIAI, IPGI
C5	Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965	Government policy paper	ESI-4	Verified public	PIAI, IOII, CESVI
C6	World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya series, retrieved July 2026	Official statistics	ESI-4	Verified public	IOII
C7	Kenya Ministry of Education enrolment statistics via Commonwealth Secretariat analysis	Official statistics, secondary use	ESI-3	Verified public	IOII
C8	ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality, Geneva 1972	Multilateral mission report	ESI-4	Verified public	IOII, CESVI, PILI
C9	Bevan, Collier and Gunning, coffee boom analyses (World Bank Economic Review; Journal of African Economies)	Peer-reviewed economics on Kenya Statistical Abstracts data	ESI-3	Verified public	CESVI, IOII
C10	Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1966; Preservation of Public Security Act	Statute	ESI-4	Verified public	PIAI, PILI
C11	Peer-reviewed constitutional and legal history of Kenya's emergency powers 1959–1969	Scholarly	ESI-3	Verified public	PIAI, IPGI
C12	Kenya election record 1963–1978 (electoral administration compilations)	Official/secondary	ESI-3	Verified public	PIAI
C13	Scholarly literature on the Million Acre Settlement Scheme and land settlement 1962–2016	Peer-reviewed	ESI-3	Verified public	PIAI, IOII
C14	Coffee sector production and price history, peer-reviewed	Peer-reviewed	ESI-3	Verified public	IOII, CESVI
C15	Kenyan press archive of record on the Kariuki inquiry and the 1969 Kisumu events	Journalism, multiple independent outlets	ESI-2	Reported	IPGI, PILI

Table 15. Fifteen principal chains are listed. Eight further chains supporting single dimensions are held in the working ledger and are available on request. Total distinct upstream chains: 23. C15 is used only in corroboration and never as a sole basis for a scored dimension.

Annex A4 · Sub-Indicator Scoring, Coverage and Reconciliation Worksheet

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
1	PIAI	Power Mapping	3	Scored	ESI-4
2	PIAI	Stakeholder Incentives	2	Scored	ESI-4
3	PIAI	Elite Capture Risk	1	Scored	ESI-4
4	PIAI	Regulatory Feasibility	3	Scored	ESI-3
5	PIAI	Conflict Sensitivity	1	Scored	ESI-4
6	IPGI	Leadership Accountability	1	Scored	ESI-4
7	IPGI	Financial Stewardship	3	Scored	ESI-4

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
8	IPGI	Procurement Integrity	2	Scored	ESI-4
9	IPGI	Data Governance	3	Scored	ESI-3
10	IPGI	Decision-Making Velocity	3	Scored	ESI-4
11	IOII	Outcome Performance	4	Scored	CC-2
12	IOII	Contribution Analysis	3	Scored	CC-2
13	IOII	Unintended Consequences	2	Scored	CC-2
14	IOII	Systemic Spillovers	2	Scored	CC-2
15	IOII	Sustainability Probability	2	Scored	CC-2
16	PILI	Do No Harm Compliance	1	Scored	ESI-4
17	PILI	Safeguarding Architecture	1	Scored	ESI-4
18	PILI	Gender-Transformative Impact	2	Scored	ESI-2
19	PILI	Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	Scored	ESI-4
20	PILI	Community Trust and Accountability	2	Scored	ESI-3
21	CESVI	Cost per Outcome	—	Withheld	—
22	CESVI	Cost-Consequence Matrix	—	Withheld	—
23	CESVI	Portfolio Efficiency	2	Scored	ESI-3
24	CESVI	Counterfactual Cost Modelling	2	Scored	ESI-3
25	CESVI	Opportunity Cost Mapping	2	Scored	ESI-4

Reconciliation: this is a single-rater desk evaluation. No inter-rater agreement gate applies and none is claimed. Independent re-scoring by a second rater is recommended before the series composite is published, and the position is recorded here rather than implied.

Annex A5 · Safeguarding Veto Counter-Sign

Veto condition	Threshold	Observed	Triggered
Do No Harm Compliance	Score of 1 or 2	1	Yes
Safeguarding Architecture	Score of 1 or 2	1	Yes
PILI performance index	Below 50	28.00	Yes
Cross-tier offset applied	Not permitted	None applied	—
Band cap imposed	LOW-MODERATE	LOW-MODERATE	Yes
Composite band absent the veto	—	LOW-MODERATE (42.20)	Cap not decisive
Protection finding leads report	Required	Yes, at Chapter 4.4 and in the summary	Yes
Lift condition	Re-collected evidence above threshold at the triggering tier	Not met	—

All three conditions triggered independently. Counter-signed by CASA NEXUS Research, 28 July 2026.

Annex A6 · Documented Degradation Log.

No post-registration change to the design was made. The design registered at Annex A1 is the design executed. Any future change to the weight vector, dimension anchors or the contemporaneous-standard rule will be logged here and applied retrospectively to every completed volume in the series.

Annex A7 · Electoral Salience Independence Flag.

Test	Position
Salience trigger	Fired. The clause triggers on foreseeable electoral salience regardless of client type or whether a client exists.
Basis	A series ranking Kenya's post-independence administrations, published into the approach to the 2027 general election, is foreseeably salient. Political heirs of figures central to this period are active actors.
Client	None. Self-commissioned, no government co-client, no publication-delay right under the Data Sovereignty Protocol.
Control 1	Findings determined by evidence and released on a fixed schedule. No product held, advanced or amended to affect an electoral outcome.
Control 2	The publication schedule for all five volumes is fixed in advance and published before Volume 1 is released.
Control 3	The Evaluation Independence Protocol is invoked automatically on any documented attempt to time findings for electoral advantage, and may include public disclosure of the attempt.
Status at issue	Schedule not yet published. This is an open action on the commissioner and is carried as Recommendation 6.2(1).

Annex A8 · Legacy Remediation Roadmap.

The full roadmap is at Table 13, Chapter 6.1. The variant is Legacy Remediation because the evaluand status is CLOSED. No projection is modelled. The roadmap addresses three classes of inheritance.

- Statutory inheritance: the Indemnity Act, and the conflict-of-interest doctrine adopted in 1971 without its safeguard. Remediation is legislative.
- Record inheritance: the unreleased Select Committee report and the unimplemented commission recommendations. Remediation is disclosure.
- Distributional inheritance: the unexecuted transfer leg of the 1965 policy. Remediation is fiscal, through the Equalisation Fund allocation formula.

Annex A9 · Evaluation Sign-Off Sheet.

#	Quality checkpoint	Status
1	All 25 dimensions carry a performance score or an explicit Withheld flag	Certified
2	SIS and ECI reported together with bands in every product	Certified
3	Claim Licence applied; no verb exceeds the ECI band	Certified
4	Contribution track applied where no counterfactual exists	Certified
5	Rival explanations tested rather than acknowledged	Certified
6	Access-tier cap applied to every source	Certified
7	Triangulation counted by upstream provenance chain	Certified
8	Dual-Subject Rule applied; silence recorded as coverage, not failure	Certified
9	Coverage flags assigned and the Pillar Coverage Rule checked	Certified
10	Safeguarding Veto checked and counter-signed	Certified
11	DEI completeness assessed and the PILI ceiling applied	Certified
12	Weight redistribution checked; reportable weights sum to 1.000	Certified
13	Overlays assessed; inapplicable ones marked rather than omitted	Certified
14	Primary-data gate run per pillar and the result disclosed	Certified
15	Contested figures carried at both values, never averaged	Certified
16	Electoral salience test run and controls stated	Certified with one open action
17	Right of reply position recorded	Certified
18	Inter-rater reconciliation	Not applicable to a single-rater desk evaluation; second-rater review recommended before series composite

Annex A10 · Right of Reply Register.

Adverse findings in this report name individuals who are deceased and institutions that survive. The register records the position taken.

Party named	Status	Position
Individuals named in adverse findings	All deceased	No reply channel available. Findings rest on commission and parliamentary records in which the parties or their representatives had opportunity to respond at the time.
Office of the President	Extant institution	No reply sought before publication. The report makes no allegation against any serving officeholder and scores conduct in a closed period.
Kenya Defence Forces and National Police Service	Extant successor institutions	Findings restate those of the TJRC, before which these institutions had opportunity to appear. No new allegation is made.
Parliament of Kenya	Extant institution	Findings are favourable to the institution's conduct in the period and adverse to the executive's treatment of it.
Power-asymmetry channel	Not required	No funder-to-partner relationship exists in a self-commissioned historical evaluation, so the asymmetry provision at Section 6.5 does not engage.

Annex A11 · Coverage Log.

Dimension	Flag	Why it cannot be scored	Retrieval route that would close it	Owner
CESVI · Cost per Outcome	Withheld	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population is not retrievable from published sources for 1963–78	Kenya National Archives and KNBS: Statistical Abstracts 1964–79; Development Plan expenditure tables 1964–70, 1970–74, 1974–78; Appropriation Accounts with Auditor-General reports	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI · Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	Full cost mapping against intended and unintended consequences requires the same series	As above, plus sector expenditure disaggregation by province where held	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI pillar	Coverage C	Three of five dimensions scored	Closing either Withheld dimension moves the pillar to Coverage B; closing both moves it to A	CASA NEXUS Research

QA authorisation: recorded as an open action on the commissioner. Coverage C bars this pillar from anchoring any headline claim or recommendation, and that bar is applied throughout this report.

Annex A12 · Contested Figure Log.

Both values are carried in every product. No contested figure is averaged.

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
Shifta War deaths	approx. 2,000	Official figure recorded by the TJRC	approx. 7,000	Unofficial estimates recorded by the TJRC	Both carried. The TJRC assessed the true figure as possibly much higher than the official one. Neither used as a scored quantity; the finding rests on the character of the violations, not the count.
Deaths at Kisumu, 25 October 1969	approx. 11	Official figure	Higher, unspecified	Witness accounts before the TJRC, which recorded the official figure as contested	Both carried. Not used as a scored quantity.
Real GDP growth 1963–73	6.6 per cent per year	Widely cited figure in economic histories of Kenya	7.89 per cent CAGR 1964–73	Computed by this evaluation from World Bank WDI constant-price series	Both carried. The divergence reflects differing base years and arithmetic versus compound method. Compound rates are used throughout this report and the method is stated wherever a rate appears.
Kenya WDI growth series 1970–72	−4.66, +22.17, +17.08 per cent	World Bank WDI	—	—	Flagged. These movements are large relative to neighbouring years and are treated as reflecting series construction as well as real activity. Compound rather than arithmetic rates are reported

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
					for this reason. Scored under IPGI Data Governance.
Date of Tom Mboya’s assassination	5 July 1969	Contemporary record and multiple independent accounts	5 July 1975	A published summary of the TJRC report	Value A used. Value B is assessed as a transcription error in the summary and is logged here rather than silently corrected.

Table 16. One further figure requires verification before publication: Kenya’s date of accession to the ICCPR, understood to fall in 1972 and not verified against the UN treaty depositary for this issue. It is not used as a scored quantity. The contemporaneous-standard rule at Annex A1 rests on Kenya’s own constitutional and statutory framework, which is verified, so the finding does not turn on it.

Part 2 · Reporting annexes for this evaluation.

Annex R1· Score computation.

The SIS and ECI are reproducible from this annex alone.

Pillar	Dimension scores	Mean	Index (mean/5×100)	Weight	SIS contribution	Evidence rating	ECI contribution
PIAI	3, 2, 1, 3, 1	2.00	40.00	0.20	8.00	88.00	17.60
IPGI	1, 3, 2, 3, 3	2.40	48.00	0.20	9.60	88.00	17.60
IOII	4, 3, 2, 2, 2	2.60	52.00	0.25	13.00	60.00	15.00
PILI	1, 1, 2, 1, 2	1.40	28.00	0.20	5.60	70.00	14.00
CESVI	2, 2, 2 (2 Withheld)	2.00	40.00	0.15	6.00	83.33	12.50
TOTAL	—	—	—	1.000	42.20	—	76.70

Table 14. Pillar index = (mean performance across scored dimensions ÷ 5) × 100. CESVI mean is taken over its three scored dimensions per the framework rule. All five pillars are reportable (≥3 scored dimensions), so no weight redistribution was triggered and the reportable weights sum to 1.000.

Adjustment	Applied	Effect
DEI completeness ceiling on PILI evidence	Yes	Level Minimal; raw pillar evidence 83.00 capped to 70.00; reduces ECI by 2.60 points
Contribution track on IOII evidence	Yes	Tier CC-2 = 60.00 in place of a per-dimension ESI mean; track ceiling is 82
Access-tier cap	Yes	TJRC held at ESI-4 (published summary) rather than ESI-5; reduces the PIAI and PILI evidence terms
Pillar Coverage Rule	Checked, not triggered	CESVI has 3 scored dimensions, at or above the threshold of 3
Weight redistribution	Not required	—
Safeguarding Veto	Fired	Band capped at LOW-MODERATE; composite 42.20 already in that band, so the cap is not decisive on the number
Rounding	Two decimal places	Unrounded SIS 42.20; unrounded ECI 76.70

Annex R2 · The worked dataset.

The quantitative series on which Chapter 4 and Figures 2 and 3 are built. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya, retrieved directly from the Bank's data interface in July 2026, except the primary gross enrolment ratio, which is the same source at series SE.PRM.ENRR. Compound growth rates are computed by the evaluation team from the annual growth series.

Year	GDP growth %	GDP per capita growth %	Life expectancy	Infant mortality per 1,000	Population (m)	Primary GER %	Inflation %
1963	8.78	4.63	50.8	100.7	8.63	-	0.7
1964	4.96	0.92	51.3	97.9	8.97	-	-0.1
1965	2.01	-1.97	51.9	95.7	9.34	-	3.6
1966	14.73	10.25	52.4	94.0	9.72	-	5.0
1967	3.36	-0.66	52.8	92.4	10.11	-	1.8
1968	7.98	3.80	53.3	90.8	10.52	-	0.4
1969	7.96	3.81	53.7	89.2	10.94	-	-0.2
1970	-4.66	-8.25	54.1	87.6	11.37	60.3	2.2
1971	22.17	17.82	54.5	86.0	11.79	61.7	3.8
1972	17.08	13.08	55.0	84.3	12.21	65.2	5.8

Year	GDP growth %	GDP per capita growth %	Life expectancy	Infant mortality per 1,000	Population (m)	Primary GER %	Inflation %
1973	5.90	2.30	55.5	82.5	12.63	67.9	9.3
1974	4.07	0.60	56.0	80.6	13.07	100.3	17.8
1975	0.88	-2.41	56.6	78.7	13.51	102.9	19.1
1976	2.15	-1.11	57.2	76.6	13.96	99.2	11.4
1977	9.45	5.88	57.7	74.6	14.43	98.9	14.8
1978	6.91	3.30	58.2	72.5	14.93	95.6	16.9

Computation	Period	Result	Method
GDP compound annual growth	1964–1973	7.89%	Product of (1+g) over 10 observations, tenth root, minus 1
GDP compound annual growth	1974–1978	4.65%	Same method, 5 observations
GDP compound annual growth	1964–1978	6.80%	Same method, 15 observations
GDP per capita compound annual growth	1964–1973	3.86%	Same method
GDP per capita compound annual growth	1974–1978	1.21%	Same method
GDP growth standard deviation	1964–1978	6.57 points	Population standard deviation of the annual series
Life expectancy change	1963–1978	+7.48 years	58.23 minus 50.76
Infant mortality change	1963–1978	−28.0%	(72.5 − 100.7) ÷ 100.7
Primary GER change	1973–1974	+32.4 points	100.3 minus 67.9, the largest single-year movement in the series

Enrolment counts cited in Chapter 4 (891,553 in 1963; 1,816,017 in 1973; 2,705,878 in 1974) come from Kenya Ministry of Education statistical data as compiled in Commonwealth Secretariat analysis of Kenya's universal primary education initiatives, and are a separate chain from the World Bank ratio series.

Annex R3 · Overlay detail

Overlay	Status	Detail
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame. The overlay is not scored and no compliance axis is reported.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	The period carries a favourable prior verdict in contemporary official planning documents and in the growth-focused literature. This evaluation records it, scores independently, and explains divergence by evidence. Two sources of divergence. First, scope: prior assessments weighted output and did not weigh protection, equity or accountability, which together carry 0.60 of the weight vector here. Second, method: the growth claim itself is held to the contribution track, which the prior assessments did not apply. This evaluation neither defers to the prior verdict nor reflexively contradicts it, and it does not dispute the growth data.
Strategic instrumentalisation	Not declared	Cold War alignment shaped Kenya's external environment and its access to finance. The evidence does not support a finding that stated domestic development objectives were subordinated to an external strategic interest in a way that constrained what the administration could attempt domestically. The stated objectives are held as the scoring frame.
Exit harm	Not applicable	The administration ended by the death of the incumbent on 22 August 1978, with constitutional succession completed. No funder withdrawal, no stranded beneficiaries, no transition harm to score.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Applied to the control-oriented dimensions. Regulatory Feasibility, Conflict Sensitivity, Community Trust and Data Governance were scored on the net effect of control on delivery. In each case the low score reflects excess of control rather than neglect: emergency powers sustained beyond the conflict, exchange and import controls constraining private response to the windfall, a news blackout on the opposition, and suppression of specific records.

Annex R4 · Primary-data gate and instruments.

Pillar	Evidence rating	Coverage	Gate passed	Reason
PIAI	88.00	A	No	Evidence in the Adjudicated-equivalent range with full coverage. Judgement is defensible in either direction.
IPGI	88.00	A	No	As above.
IOII	60.00	A	No	Indicative band, above the Provisional threshold of 54, with full coverage. Sufficient to license association claims, which is all this report makes.
PILI	70.00	A	No	Substantiated band with full coverage. A poor score on adequate evidence is a finished finding and is not sent to the field to be confirmed.
CESVI	83.33	C	YES	Coverage C. Two Withheld dimensions mean the pillar cannot license a defensible cost-effectiveness judgement in either direction.

Primary Data Request — CESVI

Element	Position
Pillar and dimensions	CESVI: Cost per Outcome (dimension 21) and Cost-Consequence Matrix (dimension 22)
Why the gate was passed	Coverage C. Unit cost and full cost-consequence data for 1963–78 could not be triangulated from published sources during the desk review. The pillar cannot support a claim that could be stood behind, favourable or unfavourable.
Current licence	Indicative only. CESVI does not anchor any headline claim or recommendation in this report, and Conclusion 5.5 is expressly qualified.
Method proposed	Documentary retrieval, not fieldwork. Key informant interviews and focus groups cannot reach fiscal series from a period ending in 1978, and would import recall bias without adding evidence. The framework's standard Phase 5 instruments do not fit a CLOSED historical evaluand and none are generated here.
Specific increment sought	Kenya National Archives and Kenya National Bureau of Statistics: Statistical Abstracts 1964–1979 (sector expenditure and output tables); Development Plan expenditure tables for 1964–70, 1970–74 and 1974–78; Appropriation Accounts and the associated Auditor-General reports; Ministry of Education and Ministry of Health recurrent and development expenditure by province where held.
Evidence rating if successful	CESVI moves from Coverage C to Coverage A at an estimated ESI-4. The pillar would then be able to anchor a value-for-money conclusion and a recommendation.
Effect on the headline	The performance scores of the three currently scored CESVI dimensions are not expected to move materially. The effect is on what the pillar is licensed to say, not on the composite.
Decision required	Approve, narrow, or decline and accept the stated limits. The decision rests with CASA NEXUS Limited and is carried as Recommendation 6.2(2).

Annex R5 · Evaluation questions matrix.

EQ	Pillars	Dimensions that answer it	Principal evidence chains	Findings	Conclusion
EQ1	PIAI	1–5	C1, C2, C4, C10, C11, C12	4.1	5.1
EQ2	IPGI	6–10	C1, C2, C3, C4, C6, C15	4.2	5.2
EQ3	IOII	11–15	C6, C7, C8, C9, C13, C14	4.3	5.3
EQ4	PILI, IOII	16–20, 14	C1, C3, C5, C8	4.4	5.4
EQ5	CESVI	21–25	C5, C8, C9	4.5	5.5
EQ6	All five	All 25	All chains	4.1–4.5	5.6

Every evaluation question traces to a scored pillar, an evidence chain, a finding and a conclusion. EQ5 is answered at Indicative level only, per the CESVI coverage flag.

Annex R6 · Sources and access tiers.

Source	Type	Accessed at	What it evidences
TJRC final report 2013	Commission of inquiry	Published summary (Kituo Cha Sheria)	Gross violations 1963–78; Shifta conduct; assassinations; economic marginalisation; land injustice
Ndung'u Commission report 2004	Commission of inquiry	Scholarly analysis of the findings	Abuse of presidential discretion in public land allocation
Mwangale Select Committee report 1975	Parliamentary record	Record of holding and contemporaneous reporting	Implication of senior officials; executive interference with the tabled report
Ndegwa Commission report, May 1971	Commission of inquiry	Contemporaneous and scholarly reporting of contents	Conflict-of-interest recommendation and the dropped ombudsman safeguard
Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965	Government policy paper	Held, Kenya National Assembly library; contents via primary and scholarly sources	The spatial concentration decision and its stated redistribution leg
World Bank WDI, Kenya	Official statistics	Direct retrieval, July 2026	Growth, per capita growth, life expectancy, infant mortality, population, enrolment ratio, inflation
ILO, Employment, Incomes and Equality, 1972	Multilateral mission report	Bibliographic record and scholarly analysis	The working poor diagnosis; the redistribution-from-growth alternative
Bevan, Collier and Gunning on the coffee boom	Peer-reviewed economics	Published abstracts and the World Bank working version	Fiscal response to the windfall; negative net effect on capital formation
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act No. 17 of 1966	Statute	Scholarly legal history citing the instrument	Authorisation of preventive detention; speed of passage
Kenya emergency powers legal history 1959–1969	Peer-reviewed	Journal article	Continuity of colonial emergency law into the independent state

No source is rated above the tier at which it was actually accessed. Where a report was read in summary or through scholarly analysis of its findings, the tier reflects that and not the tier of the original document.

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Distinct from Annex A3, which logs provenance and tier, and from Annex R6, which logs access. This list is the reference trail a reader follows to the sources themselves.

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Verification notes.

Two items in this report are flagged as requiring verification against a primary source before external release: Kenya’s date of accession to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, understood to fall in 1972 and not checked against the UN treaty depositary for this issue; and the current statutory status of the Indemnity Act, which the TJRC recommended for repeal in 2013. Neither is used as a scored quantity, and no finding turns on either. Both are logged at Annex A12.