

The Kibaki Administration

2002–2013

Detailed Evaluation Report

A Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact evaluation of Kenya's third presidency, with full annex pack

Field	Detail
Evaluation type	Summative, retrospective, desk-based; self-commissioned
Framework	SSII Framework™ version 2.2, CASA NEXUS Research
Evaluand tier	DONOR (the state as steward of public resources)
Evaluand status	CLOSED (Legacy Remediation Roadmap)
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, Nairobi
Reference	CASA/RES/SSII/KE-03/2026
Volume	3 of 5, The Kenya Presidencies Series
Composite result	SIS 52.80 (MODERATE on arithmetic) · ECI 77.80 (Substantiated)
Reportable band	LOW-MODERATE — capped by Safeguarding Veto
Protection Flag	RAISED — the cap is decisive in this volume
Comparability	Identical weights, anchors and evidence rules to Volumes 1 and 2
Date of issue	28 July 2026

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Contents

Contents.....	2
Tables.....	3
Figures.....	3
Acronyms	3
Executive summary.....	5
Chapter 1 · Introduction.....	7
1.1 The evaluand.....	7
1.2 Purpose and the decision this evaluation informs.....	7
1.3 Scope and boundaries	7
1.4 Intended users	7
1.5 Evaluation questions	7
1.6 Tier and status declaration	8
1.7 Topline conclusions.....	8
Chapter 2 · Background and literature review	9
2.1 The inheritance	9
2.2 Recovery and fracture, 2003 to 2007.....	9
2.3 Crisis and reconstruction, 2007 to 2013.....	9
2.4 The state of knowledge	9
2.5 Where this evaluation adds	10
Chapter 3 · Methodology, tools and limitations.....	11
3.1 The framework applied	11
3.2 Pillar weights.....	11
3.3 The Claim Licence.....	11
3.4 Evidence ladders	11
3.5 Coverage, the Dual-Subject Rule and the Safeguarding Veto.....	11
3.6 The contribution track.....	12
3.7 Declared adaptations	12
3.8 Evidence base, triangulation and tools	12
3.9 Limitations	12
Chapter 4 · Findings	13
4.0 Headline result and the pillar profile	13
4.1 PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment	14
4.2 IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance.....	15
4.3 IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity.....	16
4.4 PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy.....	18
4.5 CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value	20
4.6 Coverage and evidence gaps	20
4.7 Overlay results	20
Chapter 5 · Conclusions.....	22
5.1 EQ1 · Did the political settlement support or undermine the stated objectives?	22
5.2 EQ2 · Did institutions deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when tested?	22

5.3 EQ3 · What changed, and how much can be attributed?	22
5.4 EQ4 · Did the administration protect those it governed, and who was excluded?	22
5.5 EQ5 · Did the resources represent value, and what was foregone?	22
5.6 EQ6 · What does the period bequeath?	22
Chapter 6 · Recommendations	24
6.1 Legacy Remediation Roadmap.....	24
6.2 Recommendations to the commissioner.....	24
6.3 Primary-data recommendation	24
Annex pack.....	25
Part 1 · SSII framework working annexes	25
Part 2 · Reporting annexes for this evaluation	31
Bibliography	35

To populate: open in Word, select the field and press F9.

Tables

Table 1. Headline result and framework declarations

Table 2. Evaluation questions mapped to pillars

Table 3. Pillar weighting and reportability

Table 4. Evidence ladders applied

Table 5. Pillar scorecard

Table 6. PIAI dimension scoring

Table 7. IPGI dimension scoring

Table 8. IOII dimension scoring

Table 9. Rival explanations tested

Table 10. PILI dimension scoring

Table 11. CESVI dimension scoring

Table 12. Conclusions against evaluation questions

Table 13. Legacy Remediation Roadmap

Table 14. Score computation (Annex R1)

Table 15. Evidence and provenance ledger (Annex A3)

Table 16. Contested figure log (Annex A12)

Table 17. Three-volume series comparison (Annex R7)

Figures

Figure 1. Pillar performance against evidence confidence

Figure 2. The recovery: outcome reversal 2002–2013

Figure 3. Series comparison across three administrations

Acronyms

Acronym	Expansion
CC	Contribution Claim tier
CESVI	Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value Index
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (Waki Commission)

Acronym	Expansion
DEI	Diversity, Equity and Inclusion
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
ECI	Evidence Confidence Index
ESI	Evidence Strength Index
FPE	Free Primary Education
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOII	Impact and Outcome Integrity Index
IPGI	Institutional Performance and Governance Index
IPOA	Independent Policing Oversight Authority
IREC	Independent Review Commission on the 2007 elections (Kriegler Commission)
KIHBS	Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey
KNCHR	Kenya National Commission on Human Rights
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
PIAI	Political and Incentive Alignment Index
PILI	Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy Index
SIS	Strategic Integrity Score
SSII	Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya
WDI	World Development Indicators (World Bank)

Executive summary

SIS 52.80 · MODERATE on arithmetic

Reportable band: LOW-MODERATE · capped by Safeguarding Veto

ECI 77.80 · Substantiated

Claim Licence: Substantiated. Impact claims held at Indicative under contribution tier CC-2. Protection Flag RAISED and decisive. Tier DONOR. Status CLOSED. Volume 3 of 5.

This evaluation scores the executive government of Kenya under President Mwai Kibaki from 30 December 2002 to 9 April 2013, across the five pillars and twenty-five dimensions of the SSII Framework version 2.2, on the weight vector and anchors fixed at Volume 1 and unchanged since.

The composite of 52.80 is the highest arithmetic result in the series and falls inside the MODERATE band. Do No Harm Compliance scores 1, the Safeguarding Veto fires, and the reportable band is capped at LOW-MODERATE. This is the first volume in which the cap changes the published verdict rather than restating a band the arithmetic had already reached, and that fact is itself a finding.

The result the framework requires this report to lead with

The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence found 1,133 deaths in the violence following the December 2007 election, of which 405 were attributable to state security agencies. It found that those agencies failed institutionally to contain the violence and were complicit in gross acts of violence and human rights violations. At least 350,000 people were displaced, approximately 117,216 private properties and 491 government properties were destroyed, and the Commission recorded evidence that a substantial proportion of women raped during the violence were raped by police officers.

A UN Special Rapporteur, invited by this government and reporting in 2009, found that Kenyan police frequently execute individuals, that police death squads operated on the orders of senior officers, and that a climate of impunity prevailed. The government rejected the findings and protested to the United Nations. The Ministry of Internal Security separately acknowledged to the national human rights commission that police had killed 308 young people in 2008.

The Special Tribunal the Commission recommended, and which the President and Prime Minister agreed in December 2008 to establish, was defeated in Parliament twice during 2009. Reported murder convictions arising from the violence number two.

What the administration delivered

The material record is the strongest in the series. Life expectancy rose from 56.8 years in 2002 to 61.5 in 2012, recovering the entire loss of the preceding twenty-four years. Under-five mortality fell 40.8 per cent and infant mortality 29.5 per cent. Primary gross enrolment rose 22.2 points following fee abolition in January 2003, and secondary enrolment from 41.9 to 57.7 per cent following the free day secondary policy of 2008. HIV prevalence fell from 7.8 to 5.2 per cent. Real GDP per capita compounded at 1.77 per cent a year.

The Constitution promulgated on 27 August 2010, approved by approximately 67 per cent of voters at the referendum of 4 August, dismantled the concentrated executive this series has traced from Volume 1. It devolved power and revenue to forty-seven counties, established an enforceable Bill of Rights, and created independent oversight institutions including a reconstituted judiciary and electoral commission. The evidence supports treating this as the single largest positive institutional change in the fifty years the series covers so far.

Pillar scorecard

Pillar	Weight	Index	Band	Coverage	Evidence
PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment	0.20	48.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	ESI-4 (88)

Pillar	Weight	Index	Band	Coverage	Evidence
IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance	0.20	56.00	MODERATE	A	ESI-3/4 (82)
IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity	0.25	60.00	MODERATE	A	CC-2 (60)
PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy	0.20	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	ESI-3/4 (84)
CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value	0.15	60.00	MODERATE	C	ESI-3 (80)

Table 5 (repeated at Chapter 4). All pillars reportable; weights sum to 1.000. CESVI Coverage C anchors nothing.

The seven findings that matter most

1. The material reversal was real, large and durable, and it recovered the whole of the previous administration's decline.
2. The 2010 Constitution is the most consequential institutional act in the fifty years this series covers.
3. The protection failure caps the verdict where the arithmetic would not have.
4. The administration built genuine detection capacity and declined to convert findings into consequences.
5. Anglo Leasing shows partial correction under pressure, with five of eighteen contracts entered into under this administration.
6. Growth returned and its attribution is Indicative; external health financing and global conditions survive as rivals.
7. The exit was constitutional and completed Kenya's second consecutive peaceful transfer of executive power.

Series position

The PILI identity between Volumes 1 and 2, both at 28.00, does not hold. This volume scores 40.00, which establishes protection performance as a variable rather than a constant of the Kenyan state. All three administrations nonetheless report in the LOW-MODERATE band, and only two arrive there by arithmetic. The full comparison is at Annex R7.

Chapter 1 · Introduction

1.1 The evaluand

Mwai Kibaki became President of Kenya on 30 December 2002, following the general election of 27 December in which the National Rainbow Coalition defeated the party that had governed since independence. He left office on 9 April 2013 after two terms, a period of ten years and three months. The evaluand is the executive government he led: the Office of the President, the Cabinet, the ministries, the provincial administration and its successor structures, the security and intelligence services, and the parastatals through which the state acted.

Population rose from approximately 32.6 million in 2002 to approximately 45 million in 2013. The period divides in two. The National Rainbow Coalition government ran from December 2002 to the disputed election of December 2007. The Grand Coalition government, formed under the National Accord and Reconciliation Act of 2008 with Raila Odinga as Prime Minister, ran from April 2008 to the general election of March 2013. The administration is scored as one system, and phase differences are reported in the findings.

Its stated objectives, taken from the 2002 manifesto, the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003 to 2007, and Vision 2030 launched in 2008, were economic recovery and employment, universal primary education, the elimination of corruption, constitutional reform, and improved delivery of health and infrastructure. Those stated objectives form the scoring frame.

1.2 Purpose and the decision this evaluation informs

CASA NEXUS Limited commissioned and funds this evaluation. There is no client and no restriction on publication. It informs the same decision as the previous volumes: how Kenyans and Kenyan institutions should judge each post-independence administration against a consistent evidentiary standard, and what each period bequeathed to the constitutional order now in force. For this volume that second question is unusually direct, because the constitutional order now in force was created within the evaluand.

1.3 Scope and boundaries

- Temporal: 30 December 2002 to 9 April 2013. Events after that date enter only as evidence about the period.
- Institutional: the executive government of Kenya, including the Grand Coalition executive from April 2008. The office of Prime Minister created by the National Accord is treated as part of the executive under evaluation.
- Excluded: proceedings before the International Criminal Court arising from the 2007 to 2008 violence. Those proceedings concerned individual criminal responsibility, were not concluded against any accused, and this report makes no finding on individual culpability. The state's cooperation and non-cooperation with accountability processes is scored; the merits of any case are not.
- Excluded: the conduct of the successor administration and of non-state actors, save where the state's response is at issue.

1.4 Intended users

The executive reader takes the topline from the summary and this chapter. The policy reader works through Chapters 2 to 6. The commissioner audits the annex pack, where the evidence ledger, worked scoring and computation permit independent reproduction of the SIS and ECI.

1.5 Evaluation questions

#	Evaluation question	Pillars
EQ1	Did the political settlement the administration built support or undermine its own stated objectives?	PIAI
EQ2	Did the institutions of state deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when it was tested?	IPGI

#	Evaluation question	Pillars
EQ3	What changed in the lives of Kenyans, and how much of that change can be attributed to the administration?	IOII
EQ4	Did the administration protect the people it governed, and who was excluded from the gains?	PILI, IOII
EQ5	Did the resources deployed represent value, and what was foregone?	CESVI
EQ6	What does the period bequeath to Kenya's current constitutional and institutional order?	All five

Table 2. Questions identical to Volumes 1 and 2 by design. Full mapping at Annex R5.

1.6 Tier and status declaration

The tier is DONOR, inherited unchanged. The presidency is read as steward of national revenue and of the bodies it funded and directed. Downward safeguarding assurance is scored on whether the architecture detected and acted on failure among those it funded, evidenced by cases caught rather than by policy on paper. That test is unusually discriminating for this evaluand, because the architecture detected a great deal and acted on very little.

The status is CLOSED. The administration ended by constitutional term limit with a completed handover in April 2013. Legacy Remediation Roadmap applies and projection modelling is barred.

1.7 Topline conclusions

The evidence supports a finding that this administration reversed the material decline of its predecessor, rebuilt the constitutional order that three previous decades had dismantled, and failed to protect its citizens in the single deadliest episode of political violence in Kenya's post-independence history or to secure accountability for it afterwards.

The composite of 52.80 is the highest in the series. It reaches the MODERATE band on arithmetic and is capped at LOW-MODERATE by the Safeguarding Veto. The framework is explicit that strong performance elsewhere cannot offset a protection failure of this kind, and this report does not attempt the offset. It reports both numbers, states which governs publication, and leaves the reader to hold them together.

Chapter 2 · Background and literature review

2.1 The inheritance

Volume 2 established what this administration received: per capita output no higher than in 1978, life expectancy 1.4 years lower, primary enrolment 6.4 points lower, a normalised system of diversion through the public service, an unresolved displacement caseload from the organised violence of the 1990s, a judiciary a truth commission would later describe as complicit, and a land question compounded across two administrations. It also received a restored multiparty framework, a two-term presidential limit, and a functioning statistical apparatus.

The administration took office on an explicit anti-corruption and reform mandate, with a parliamentary majority and unusually high public expectation. The gap between that mandate and the accountability record is the central tension this evaluation scores.

2.2 Recovery and fracture, 2003 to 2007

Fee abolition for primary education took effect in January 2003, within weeks of the administration taking office. Gross enrolment moved from 89.2 per cent in 2002 to 103.9 per cent in 2003. Economic growth recovered from 0.55 per cent in 2002 to 6.85 per cent by 2007.

The coalition fractured over the constitutional question and over the memorandum of understanding that had preceded the 2002 election. A draft constitution was defeated at referendum on 21 November 2005 by the coalition led by the symbol of the orange, which subsequently became the Orange Democratic Movement. The President dissolved the Cabinet on 23 November 2005.

The Anglo Leasing matter ran in parallel. Eighteen security-sector contracts valued at approximately KSh 54 billion were entered into between 1997 and 2004, thirteen under the previous administration and five under this one. The Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics resigned in February 2005 and published a dossier in November of that year setting out ministerial attempts to stop his inquiries. Payments were suspended, a ministerial code of conduct was introduced, and three senior ministers left office in February 2006. Reported convictions arising from the matter number one.

2.3 Crisis and reconstruction, 2007 to 2013

The general election of 27 December 2007 was disputed. Violence followed through January and February 2008. Mediation under a Panel of Eminent African Personalities produced the National Accord of February 2008 and a Grand Coalition executive.

Two inquiries followed. The Independent Review Commission examined the conduct of the election. The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, chaired by Justice Philip Waki with two international commissioners, examined the violence and the conduct of state security agencies, and reported in October 2008. Its findings anchor the protection pillar of this evaluation.

The constitutional process resumed under the Accord. A committee of experts produced a draft that Parliament approved on 1 April 2010. The referendum of 4 August 2010 approved it with approximately 67 per cent in favour on a turnout of approximately 72 per cent. Promulgation followed on 27 August 2010.

The administration served its second term to the general election of 4 March 2013 and handed power in April 2013 under the new constitution.

2.4 The state of knowledge

Six bodies of inquiry establish what is known about this period, and five of them were created or invited by the administration under evaluation.

The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence reported in October 2008 to the President and to the Panel of Eminent African Personalities. It investigated the facts of the violence, the conduct of state security agencies and the culture of impunity, and recommended a Special Tribunal staffed by Kenyan and international judges.

The Independent Review Commission examined the 2007 electoral process and the conduct of the electoral commission, and its findings informed the constitutional and electoral reforms that followed.

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission was established under legislation of 2008 and reported in May 2013, covering independence to 2008. Its findings anchor Volumes 1 and 2 of this series and it was created within this evaluation.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land reported in June 2004 and was commissioned by this administration into the conduct of its predecessors.

The UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions visited Kenya from 16 to 25 February 2009 at the invitation of the government, conducted over one hundred witness interviews, and reported in May 2009 on killings by police, violence in Mount Elgon District, and killings in the post-election period.

The statistical record is the strongest in the series: demographic and health survey rounds in 2003 and 2008 to 2009, the Kenya Integrated Household Budget Survey of 2005 to 2006, the 2009 census, and the Kenya Open Data Initiative launched in 2011.

2.5 Where this evaluation adds

The existing assessments of this period divide cleanly and do not meet. The economic and development literature treats it as a recovery. The human rights literature treats it as a period of impunity. Both are correct and neither is complete. This evaluation scores the recovery and the impunity on one scale, at weights fixed before any of the three volumes were written, so that the question of how to judge the administration becomes a question of arithmetic and disclosed rules rather than of emphasis.

Chapter 3 · Methodology, tools and limitations

3.1 The framework applied

The method is identical to Volumes 1 and 2 and is restated so this report stands alone. Five pillars, twenty-five dimensions scored 1 to 5, pillar index as the mean of scored dimensions on a 0 to 100 scale, and two headline metrics at fixed weights: the Strategic Integrity Score for how the system performed, and the Evidence Confidence Index for how well that can be proven.

3.2 Pillar weights

Pillar	Weight	Applied because
PIAI	0.20	Series default, fixed at Volume 1
IPGI	0.20	Series default
IOII	0.25	The series asks what governance meant for people
PILI	0.20	Series default
CESVI	0.15	Series default
Total	1.00	All five pillars reportable; no redistribution

Table 3. No weight was adjusted for this evaluand. This matters more here than in previous volumes: this is the first administration whose composite would change band under a different vector, and holding the vector fixed is what makes that observation meaningful rather than constructed.

3.3 The Claim Licence

At ECI 77.80 the licence is Substantiated: contributed to, indicates, the evidence supports. Impact statements are held at the lower Indicative licence set by the contribution track: is associated with, suggests, consistent with. No verb in this report exceeds its licence.

3.4 Evidence ladders

Ladder	Tier	Rating	Where used
ESI-5 Adjudicated	Not claimed	100	No source accessed at full adjudicated tier
ESI-4 Primary official	Applied	90	CIPEV findings; UN Special Rapporteur report; World Bank WDI; referendum and election results of record; Constitution of Kenya 2010
ESI-3 Mixed primary and scholarly	Applied	80	Peer-reviewed and documentary analysis with at least one primary document and three provenance chains; established human rights reporting used in corroboration
CC-2 Contribution, hoop passed	Applied	60	Whole of IOII; rivals tested and not eliminated

Table 4. Access-tier cap applied throughout. The CIPEV, IREC, Ndung'u and TJRC reports were read in published summary or through documentary analysis of their findings and are rated ESI-4 rather than ESI-5.

3.5 Coverage, the Dual-Subject Rule and the Safeguarding Veto

Performance and coverage are scored separately. A score of 1 means the system failed and never means the record is silent. The record for this period is the densest in the series and the rule does correspondingly little work.

The Safeguarding Veto caps the reportable band at LOW-MODERATE where Do No Harm or Safeguarding Architecture scores 1 or 2, or PILI falls below 50. Two of the three conditions are met: Do No Harm scores 1 and Safeguarding Architecture scores 2. The PILI index of 40.00 is also below 50. The veto fires.

The consequence differs from the previous volumes and the reader should hold the distinction. In Volumes 1 and 2 the composite already sat in LOW-MODERATE, so the cap changed the reporting obligation and not the band. Here the composite of 52.80 sits in MODERATE and the cap moves the published band down one step. The framework provides no mechanism by which strong performance in other pillars lifts it, and this report does not construct one.

3.6 The contribution track

No counterfactual Kenya exists. Impact runs on the contribution track with a ceiling of 82 and a bar on causal language. Five rivals were tested and are set out at Chapter 4.3. The theory of change survives the hoop test and the rivals are not eliminated, placing the tier at CC-2 and the rating at 60, consistent with both previous volumes.

3.7 Declared adaptations

- Presidential evaluand outside the v2.2 design envelope. Public Institution Effectiveness configuration with process tracing, as registered at Volume 1.
- Contemporaneous-standard rule. Conduct scored against the law and norms in force at the time. For most of this evaluand that includes the 2010 Constitution, which the administration itself promulgated, so the later part of the period is scored against a standard the administration created.
- Coalition executive. The Grand Coalition executive from April 2008 is scored as part of the same system. Attributing conduct between the two principals is not possible on the available record and is not attempted.

3.8 Evidence base, triangulation and tools

Triangulation counts distinct upstream provenance chains. Twenty-eight are recorded, the most in the series. Every scored dimension met the three-chain requirement. The ledger is at Annex A3.

Tools: the SSII Evaluation Annex Workbook v2.2 scoring engine; World Bank World Development Indicators retrieved directly in July 2026; and independent computation of pillar indices, the SIS, the ECI and the compound growth rates in Chapter 4. Computation is reproducible from Annex R1 and the series are at Annex R2.

3.9 Limitations

- Coverage gap at CESVI. Cost per Outcome and the Cost-Consequence Matrix are Withheld. The pillar reports at Coverage C and anchors nothing. For this period the retrieval is materially easier than for Volumes 1 and 2 because the documents are largely published, and the gap reflects the boundary of this desk review rather than the state of the archive.
- Access-tier cap on all commission sources.
- DEI ceiling at Partial. Disaggregation is the best in the series. The PILI evidence rating of 84 sits below the Partial ceiling of 85, so no cap binds in this volume.
- Contribution ceiling. Impact runs at CC-2, rating 60. External health financing is not eliminated as a rival for the HIV and life expectancy gains.
- Maternal mortality. The World Bank modelled series shows a rise across the period, from approximately 182 to 214 per 100,000 live births, while national survey estimates place the level substantially higher. Direction and level are both contested. Neither is used as a scored quantity and both are logged at Annex A12.
- Individual criminal responsibility. Proceedings arising from the 2007 to 2008 violence concluded without conviction of any accused. This report makes no finding on individual culpability and scores only the state's conduct of accountability processes.
- Right of reply. Many individuals who held office in this administration are living. This report names no living individual in an adverse finding. The position is recorded at Annex A10.

Chapter 4 · Findings

4.0 Headline result and the pillar profile

SIS 52.80 · MODERATE on arithmetic

Reportable band LOW-MODERATE · capped by Safeguarding Veto

ECI 77.80 · Substantiated

Do No Harm Compliance scores 1 and Safeguarding Architecture scores 2. The PILI index of 40.00 is below the veto threshold of 50. The cap is decisive in this volume: it moves the published band down one step from where the arithmetic placed it.

Pillar	Weight	Perf. index	Band	Coverage	Scored	Evidence	SIS contrib.	ECI contrib.
PIAI	0.20	48.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	88.00	9.60	17.60
IPGI	0.20	56.00	MODERATE	A	5/5	82.00	11.20	16.40
IOII	0.25	60.00	MODERATE	A	5/5	60.00	15.00	15.00
PILI	0.20	40.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	84.00	8.00	16.80
CESVI	0.15	60.00	MODERATE	C	3/5	80.00	9.00	12.00
TOTAL	1.00	—	—	—	23/25	—	52.80	77.80

Table 5. Full arithmetic at Annex R1.




Figure 1. Pillar performance against evidence confidence. The gap at IOII is the contribution ceiling.

The profile is the most uneven in the series. Three pillars reach the MODERATE band and two do not, and the spread between highest and lowest is 20 points. That pattern indicates an administration performing genuinely well on delivery, institutions and value while failing on political alignment and protection. It is the profile of a competent government with a specific and severe defect, and it differs in kind from the flat low profile of Volume 2.

The evidence line runs above the performance line at PIAI and PILI and below it at IOII and CESVI. The administration's protection and political failures are documented to a higher standard than its achievements are attributable, which is the same asymmetry the two previous volumes displayed and for the same structural reason.

4.1 PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment

Performance index 48.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage A · Evidence ESI-4 (88)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Power Mapping	3	ESI-4	The administration misread its own coalition between 2003 and 2007: the pre-election memorandum of understanding was not honoured, the coalition fractured, and the constitutional draft was defeated at referendum in November 2005. It then managed the 2008 settlement and the 2010 constitutional process competently, building a cross-party coalition sufficient to carry a referendum at approximately 67 per cent. Poor early reading, strong later reading.
Stakeholder Incentives	2	ESI-3	The administration created a governance and ethics function at the centre of government and then did not protect it. The office holder resigned in February 2005 and published an account of ministerial attempts to stop his inquiries. Against this, a ministerial code of conduct barring ministers from business with their own departments was introduced and three senior ministers left office in February 2006.
Elite Capture Risk	2	ESI-4	Five of the eighteen Anglo Leasing contracts were entered into under this administration. Against this, it commissioned the public land inquiry that reported in June 2004 into the conduct of its predecessors, and payments on the security contracts were suspended once the matter surfaced.
Regulatory Feasibility	4	ESI-4	The highest single dimension score in the series to date. The Constitution promulgated 27 August 2010 devolved power and revenue to forty-seven counties, established an enforceable Bill of Rights, reconstituted the judiciary and the electoral commission, and dismantled the concentrated executive built between 1964 and 1969. Sectoral liberalisation, including in telecommunications, enabled the payments and mobile services expansion of the period.
Conflict Sensitivity	1	ESI-4	The violence following the December 2007 election produced 1,133 deaths, of which the Commission of Inquiry attributed 405 to state security agencies, and at least 350,000 displaced. The Commission found the agencies failed institutionally to contain the violence and were complicit in gross violations. The Mount Elgon operation of 2008 sits in the same record.

Table 6. Dimension scoring at Annex A4.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that this administration was capable of exceptional constitutional design and incapable of managing the political competition that design was meant to regulate. Regulatory Feasibility at 4 and Conflict Sensitivity at 1 sit in the same pillar, and the twenty-year gap between them is the pillar's finding rather than a scoring inconsistency.

The 2010 Constitution addresses, by design, every structural driver this series has identified across three volumes: the concentrated executive of Volume 1, the disabled accountability organs of Volume 2, the spatial concentration of Sessional Paper No. 10, and the land question compounded across both. Whether it works is a question for Volumes 4 and 5. That it was enacted is scored here.

Stakeholder Incentives at 2 rather than 1 records a real distinction from Volume 2. This administration created the whistleblowing function, and senior figures then obstructed it. Volume 2 records an administration with no such function to obstruct. Partial correction under pressure is a different failure mode from designed extraction, and the score separates them.

4.2 IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance

Performance index 56.00 · MODERATE · Coverage A · Evidence ESI-3/4 (82)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Leadership Accountability	2	ESI-4	The administration commissioned or invited five separate inquiries, including into its own conduct and into the conduct of the 2007 to 2008 violence. It then did not act on them. The Special Tribunal recommended by the Commission of Inquiry, and agreed by the President and Prime Minister in December 2008, was defeated in Parliament twice during 2009. Reported murder convictions arising from more than 1,133 killings number two. A UN report the government had invited was rejected and protested.
Financial Stewardship	3	ESI-3	Growth recovered from 0.55 per cent in 2002 to 6.85 per cent by 2007. Revenue mobilisation improved and aid dependency remained low relative to the previous decade. Budget and expenditure documentation improved through the medium-term expenditure framework. Against this, outstanding Anglo Leasing liabilities persisted for goods not delivered, and inflation reached 26.2 per cent in 2008.
Procurement Integrity	2	ESI-3	The Public Procurement and Disposal Act of 2005 was a genuine structural reform and remains the basis of the current regime. Against this, five Anglo Leasing contracts were entered into under this administration, and the accountability outcome across the whole matter was one reported conviction.
Data Governance	4	ESI-3	The strongest data record in the series: demographic and health survey rounds in 2003 and 2008 to 2009, the Integrated Household Budget Survey of 2005 to 2006, the 2009 census, and the Kenya Open Data Initiative launched in 2011 as one of the first such portals in the region. The 2010 Constitution created an enforceable right of access to information.
Decision-Making Velocity	3	ESI-3	Fee abolition was implemented within weeks of taking office in January 2003 and free day secondary education followed in 2008, both producing immediate measurable effect. Against this, the constitutional process took most of the decade and required a failed referendum and a national crisis before it completed.

Table 7. Dimension scoring at Annex A4.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that this administration built the institutional capacity to see clearly and declined to act on what it saw. That is the pillar's central result and it distinguishes this evaluand from both predecessors. Volume 1 found accountability capacity in Parliament that the executive overrode. Volume 2 found the capacity substantially disabled. Volume 3 finds capacity deliberately created, allowed to report, and then left without consequence.

The pattern is consistent across four inquiries. The public land commission reported in 2004 and its recommendations remain substantially unimplemented. The post-election violence commission reported in 2008 and its central recommendation was defeated in Parliament. The UN Special Rapporteur reported in 2009 and the government rejected the findings. The truth commission was created within this evaluand and reported in May 2013, weeks after the administration left office, to a successor that did not implement it either.

Data Governance at 4 is the highest institutional score in the series and it is earned. An administration that commissioned surveys, ran a census, opened public data and created a constitutional right of access to information generated much of the evidence by which this report assesses it, and by which Volumes 1 and 2 assess its predecessors.

4.3 IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity

Performance index 60.00 · MODERATE · Coverage A · Contribution tier CC-2 (60)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Outcome Performance	4	CC-2	The strongest outcome record in the series. Life expectancy 56.8 (2002) to 61.5 (2012), recovering the entire loss of the previous administration. Under-five mortality 85.6 to 50.7 per 1,000, a fall of 40.8 per cent. Infant mortality 58.3 to 41.1, a fall of 29.5 per cent. Primary GER 89.2 to 111.4 per cent. Secondary GER 41.9 to 57.7 per cent. HIV prevalence 7.8 to 5.2 per cent. Real GDP per capita CAGR 1.77 per cent.
Contribution Analysis	3	CC-2	Vision 2030 established a monitored delivery framework from 2008, and the survey and census programme generated outcome data at national and county level. The administration ran no counterfactual assessment, and the external financing that supported the health gains was not separately accounted for in its own performance reporting.
Unintended Consequences	2	CC-2	Fee abolition outran teaching and infrastructure capacity, producing large class sizes and a documented movement of better-off households into low-cost private schooling. The rapid expansion is associated with quality pressure that the administration recognised late.
Systemic Spillovers	2	CC-2	The displacement caseload from 2007 to 2008 persisted well beyond the period and compounded the unresolved caseload inherited from the 1990s. Against this, devolution created positive spillovers that began to appear only after the evaluand closed.
Sustainability Probability	4	CC-2	The 2010 Constitution outlived the administration and constrains every successor. Health and education gains sustained beyond the period. Two consecutive peaceful transfers of executive power are now on the record. This is the highest sustainability score in the series.

Table 8. IOII evidence is rated on the contribution track.

Figure 2. The recovery: outcome reversal under the Kibaki administration. Source: World Bank WDI, retrieved July 2026.




Figure 2. The recovery. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, retrieved July 2026.

Rival explanations tested

The contribution track requires rivals to be tested rather than acknowledged. Five were tested.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
Large external health financing explains the HIV and life expectancy gains	Major multilateral and bilateral HIV programmes scaled in Kenya from 2003, funding antiretroviral treatment at a scale the national budget could not have carried	Not excluded, and strong. This is the principal rival for the health gains. The administration's contribution lies in absorbing and distributing that financing, which is a real but lesser claim than the outcome data alone suggests.
Favourable global conditions explain the growth recovery	Global expansion to 2008; commodity and tourism cycles; regional recovery	Not excluded for 2003 to 2007. Partially excluded for 2009 to 2012, when growth continued through a global contraction.
Private-sector expansion, particularly in mobile telephony and payments, explains the income gains	Rapid adoption of mobile money from 2007 transformed transaction costs	Not excluded. The administration's contribution is the liberalising and permissive regulatory posture that allowed it, which is scored at Regulatory Feasibility rather than claimed as an outcome.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
Base effects explain the apparent recovery	The starting point in 2002 was the trough of a twenty-four year stagnation	Partially excluded. Base effects explain the rate of recovery. They do not explain the level reached, which exceeded the 1978 starting point on every human development measure.
The education gains reflect enrolment recording rather than real access	Gross enrolment ratios above 100 per cent indicate over-age enrolment	Excluded as an explanation of the change. Over-age enrolment is itself evidence of previously excluded children entering school, and the secondary-level movement from 2008 corroborates real access expansion.

Table 9. Four of five rivals survive in whole or part. The theory of change survives the hoop test and rivals are not eliminated, placing the claim at CC-2 (rating 60, Indicative).

Findings

The outcome record is the strongest in the series and the licence permits it to be stated as association. Kenyans lived approximately 4.8 years longer at the end of this administration than at the start, and roughly 35 fewer children per thousand died before their fifth birthday. Both movements reversed the direction of the previous twenty-four years within a decade.

One causal link is materially stronger than the aggregate, as in both previous volumes. Primary gross enrolment moved from 89.2 per cent in 2002 to 103.9 per cent in 2003, immediately following fee abolition in January of that year, and the secondary ratio moved sharply from 2008 following the free day secondary policy. No rival explanation accounts for step changes of that size at those dates. The pillar is rated as a whole and carries the weaker tier.

The health gains require more care than the education gains and the report gives it. Large external financing for antiretroviral treatment scaled in Kenya across this period at a level the national budget could not have carried alone. That financing is not attributable to the administration. What is attributable is the decision to accept, absorb and distribute it, and the contrast with the previous administration's fifteen-year delay in national response is the relevant comparison. The claim this report makes is that the administration is associated with the gains through its delivery posture, not that its policies produced them.

Sustainability at 4 is the highest such score in the series and rests on the constitutional bequest rather than on the economic one. Growth rates of this period were not sustained at the same level afterwards. The Constitution was.

4.4 PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy

Performance index 40.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage A · Evidence 84 (below the DEI ceiling of 85)

Protection Flag

Do No Harm Compliance scores 1 and Safeguarding Architecture scores 2. The PILI index of 40.00 is below the veto threshold of 50. The veto fires and the reportable band is capped at LOW-MODERATE. In this volume the cap is decisive: the composite of 52.80 sits in MODERATE and the cap moves the published band down one step. No performance in another pillar lifts it.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Do No Harm Compliance	1	ESI-4	The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence found 1,133 deaths following the December 2007 election, of which 405 were attributable to state security agencies, and found those agencies failed institutionally to contain the violence and were complicit in gross acts of violence and human rights violations. At least 350,000 people were displaced. Separately, a UN Special Rapporteur invited by the government found that police frequently execute individuals and that death squads operated on senior command, and the Ministry of Internal Security acknowledged that police killed 308 young people in 2008.
Safeguarding Architecture	2	ESI-3	Genuine detection capacity was built. The administration established the post-election violence and electoral review commissions, created the truth commission by statute, commissioned the public land inquiry, invited the UN Special Rapporteur, and legislated the Independent Policing Oversight Authority in 2011. Under the DONOR tier assurance rule this scores above 1 because failures were in fact detected. It does not score above 2 because detection produced almost no consequence: the recommended Special Tribunal was defeated twice, the UN findings were rejected, and reported convictions across all of it are in single figures.
Gender-Transformative Impact	3	ESI-3	The 2010 Constitution created an enforceable equality guarantee, the two-thirds gender principle, and forty-seven county seats reserved for women. The Sexual Offences Act of 2006 preceded it. Girls' access rose at both education levels. Against this, the two-thirds principle was not implemented within the period, and maternal outcomes did not improve on the available series.
Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	ESI-4	The Commission recorded evidence that a substantial proportion of women raped during the post-election violence were raped by police officers. No member of the security forces was charged with election-related sexual assault. Resettlement and compensation of the displaced were slow, contested and incomplete at the close of the period.
Community Trust & Accountability	3	ESI-3	Legitimacy was destroyed in December 2007 and substantially rebuilt by August 2010. The referendum passed peacefully at approximately 67 per cent on a turnout of approximately 72 per cent, and the 2013 transfer was peaceful. Press freedom and civil society space expanded across the period. Against this, human rights defenders who supplied information to the UN mission were harassed, and two prominent advocates were killed in Nairobi in March 2009.

Table 10. Raw pillar evidence 84.00, below the DEI Partial ceiling of 85, so no cap binds. Veto counter-sign at Annex A5.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding of severe protection failure concentrated in a defined period and compounded by a sustained failure of accountability afterwards. The distinguishing feature against both previous volumes is not the scale of the harm. It is that the state investigated itself, established what had happened, and then declined to act on its own findings.

Safeguarding Architecture at 2 rather than 1 carries the whole of that distinction and the report is explicit about why. Volume 2 recorded architecture built to prevent examination. This volume records architecture built to enable it. The framework rewards that difference by one point and no more, because assurance that detects without consequence protects nobody. The 405 deaths attributed to state security agencies produced no security-force conviction. The recorded police killings of 2008 produced no prosecution of command. A tribunal agreed at the highest level was defeated by the legislature twice in one year.

PILI at 40.00 breaks the identity observed between Volumes 1 and 2, which both scored 28.00. Protection performance in Kenya is a variable, not a constant. This administration moved it by twelve points and did not move it far enough to clear the veto. That is a more useful finding for the series than either a claim of permanent failure or a claim of steady improvement.

Community Trust at 3 is the highest in the series and records something the composite hides. Legitimacy collapsed completely in January 2008 and was substantially rebuilt within thirty-one months by constitutional referendum. The evidence indicates Kenyans rebuilt it, through a mediated settlement, a committee of experts, a parliamentary process and a vote, and that the administration was a participant in that reconstruction rather than its sole author.

4.5 CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value

Performance index 60.00 · MODERATE · Coverage C · Evidence ESI-3 (80)

Coverage C. This pillar is indicative only and anchors no headline claim or recommendation.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Cost per Outcome	Withheld	—	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population was not triangulated within this desk review. The documents are largely published for this period, so the gap reflects the boundary of this review rather than the state of the archive. Retrieval route at Annex R4.
Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	—	Full cost mapping against intended and unintended consequences requires the same retrieval.
Portfolio Efficiency	3	ESI-3	The education expansions produced large access gains at comparatively modest fiscal cost, and the health gains were achieved substantially with external financing the administration absorbed rather than raised. Against this, outstanding liabilities persisted for security-sector goods not delivered.
Counterfactual Cost Modelling	3	ESI-3	Vision 2030 and the medium-term expenditure framework established costed scenarios and sector ceilings, and the Economic Recovery Strategy set out a costed programme with targets. No independent counterfactual modelling of the strategy against alternatives was produced.
Opportunity Cost Mapping	3	ESI-3	The medium-term expenditure framework made sector trade-offs explicit and published them. The framework was applied and the trade-offs were visible, which is a material advance on both previous volumes.

Table 11. Two dimensions Withheld; coverage log at Annex A11; gate check at Annex R4.

Findings

The three scored dimensions each reach 3, the most consistent value performance in the series. The medium-term expenditure framework made trade-offs explicit and published, which is the first time in three volumes that opportunity cost was both mapped and disclosed.

The pillar carries Coverage C and anchors nothing. A defensible verdict on value for money in this period requires the retrieval at Annex R4, and for this evaluand that retrieval is straightforward because the documents are published.

4.6 Coverage and evidence gaps

Twenty-three of twenty-five dimensions are scored. Both Withheld dimensions sit in CESVI. Four pillars carry Coverage A. No redistribution was triggered and the reportable weights sum to 1.000.

4.7 Overlay results

Overlay	Status	Result
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame as a condition of the evaluand's own objectives.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	Assessment of this period divides by literature rather than by decade: the development literature treats it as a recovery, the human rights literature as a period of impunity. Both are supported by the evidence and this evaluation scores both within one weighted frame. The divergence is explained by scope, not by dispute over facts.
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially engaged	Counter-terrorism cooperation shaped external tolerance of security-sector conduct across the period. The overlay is declared so the reader can weigh it. It does not shift the scoring frame and is not treated as excusing domestic conduct.
Exit harm	Assessed, none arising	Constitutional exit under the two-term limit, with a peaceful transfer completed in April 2013 under the constitution the administration had promulgated. This is Kenya's second consecutive peaceful transfer.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Both directions are present. Conflict Sensitivity and Do No Harm score low for failure of control in 2007 to 2008, when the state did not contain violence it was obliged to contain, and for excess of control in the policing operations the UN Special Rapporteur examined.

Full overlay detail at Annex R3.

Chapter 5 • Conclusions

These conclusions synthesise Chapter 4. They introduce no new findings and each is stated in the language the Claim Licence permits.

5.1 EQ1 • Did the political settlement support or undermine the stated objectives?

It did both, in sequence. The evidence supports a finding that the administration governed a fractured settlement badly between 2003 and 2007 and rebuilt a durable one between 2008 and 2010. The pre-election understanding was not honoured, the coalition split, and a constitutional draft was defeated at referendum. The settlement that followed the 2008 crisis produced the most significant constitutional reform since independence. The same pillar that records the failure records the recovery.

5.2 EQ2 • Did institutions deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when tested?

Institutions delivered and accountability did not. The evidence supports a finding that this administration built the capacity to establish facts about itself and declined to convert those facts into consequences. Five inquiries were commissioned or invited. A Special Tribunal agreed at the highest level was defeated in Parliament twice. A UN report the government had requested was rejected and protested. Reported convictions arising from more than 1,133 killings number two, and from the Anglo Leasing matter, one.

5.3 EQ3 • What changed, and how much can be attributed?

A great deal changed for the better and the attribution is Indicative. Life expectancy rose 4.8 years, under-five mortality fell 40.8 per cent, primary enrolment rose 22.2 points and secondary enrolment 15.8 points, HIV prevalence fell by a third, and per capita output grew at 1.77 per cent a year. The education links survive testing closely. The health links do not: large external financing for treatment is not eliminated as a rival and is the principal explanation for the HIV and life expectancy gains, with the administration's contribution lying in absorption and delivery rather than in causation.

5.4 EQ4 • Did the administration protect those it governed, and who was excluded?

It did not protect them in the period that mattered most, and the exclusion was political and regional. The evidence supports a finding of severe protection failure in 2007 and 2008, with 405 of 1,133 deaths attributed to state security agencies and at least 350,000 people displaced, compounded by a documented pattern of extrajudicial killing outside that period. Exclusion followed the electoral geography of the crisis, and survivors of sexual violence and the displaced remained substantially without remedy at the close of the evaluation.

5.5 EQ5 • Did the resources represent value, and what was foregone?

This conclusion is indicative only, because CESVI carries Coverage C. On the available evidence, the period shows the most consistent value performance in the series: large access gains at modest fiscal cost, and published trade-offs through a functioning expenditure framework. A defensible verdict requires the retrieval at Annex R4, which for this period is straightforward.

5.6 EQ6 • What does the period bequeath?

Five inheritances are traceable into the present order. Three are assets and two are liabilities, which inverts the balance of both previous volumes.

- The Constitution of 2010, with devolution to forty-seven counties, an enforceable Bill of Rights, independent commissions and a reconstituted judiciary. This is the largest single institutional asset in the fifty years the series covers.
- Recovered human development levels, sustained beyond the period, and an education access base at both primary and secondary level.

- A second consecutive peaceful transfer of executive power, establishing the practice rather than the exception.
- An unresolved accountability deficit for the 2007 to 2008 violence, including the unimplemented recommendations of the commission and the displacement caseload.
- An institutional habit of commissioning inquiry without implementation, now traceable across four commissions within a single administration and inherited by its successors.

EQ	Conclusion in one line	Licence	Chapter
EQ1	A settlement governed badly, then rebuilt into the most significant reform since independence.	Substantiated	4.1
EQ2	Capacity to establish facts was built; consequences were withheld.	Substantiated	4.2
EQ3	Large, durable gains; attribution Indicative, with external health financing surviving as the principal rival.	Indicative	4.3
EQ4	Severe protection failure in 2007 to 2008, compounded by unaccountable policing.	Substantiated	4.4
EQ5	Most consistent value performance in the series; verdict awaits retrieval.	Indicative only	4.5
EQ6	Three assets and two liabilities, inverting the balance of both previous volumes.	Substantiated	5.6

Table 12. Full traceability at Annex R5.

Chapter 6 · Recommendations

The status is CLOSED, so the roadmap variant is Legacy Remediation. These recommendations address what the period left in force.

6.1 Legacy Remediation Roadmap

#	Recommendation	Addressed to	From	Sequence
1	Publish a consolidated status report on accountability for the 2007 to 2008 violence, stating case by case what was investigated, charged, discontinued and on what grounds, so that the record of action and inaction is itself on the record.	Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney-General	4.2, 4.4	Immediate
2	Complete resettlement and compensation of the displacement caseload originating in 2007 to 2008, and publish outstanding numbers against the commission's findings.	Ministry responsible for interior; National Treasury	4.4	Immediate
3	Resource the Independent Policing Oversight Authority to the level its founding statute assumed and secure prosecutorial cooperation, reporting annually on cases referred against cases charged.	Parliament; National Police Service; DPP	4.4	Short term
4	Implement the two-thirds gender principle in Article 27(8), outstanding since promulgation and now across three administrations.	Parliament	4.4, 5.6	Short term
5	Resolve outstanding Anglo Leasing liabilities and publish a reconciliation of amounts paid, amounts withheld and goods received.	National Treasury; Auditor-General	4.1, 4.2	Medium term
6	Establish a standing implementation-tracking obligation for commissions of inquiry, requiring a published government response within a fixed period and an annual status report thereafter.	Parliament; Cabinet	4.2, 5.6	Medium term
7	Protect devolution and the independent commissions created in 2010, and treat erosion of either as a reversal of the largest institutional gain the series has recorded.	Parliament; Council of Governors; the electorate	4.1, 5.6	Standing

Table 13. Recommendation 6 is new to this volume and arises from a pattern rather than a single finding: four commissions within one administration, none substantially implemented. The series has now recorded the same failure mode under three consecutive administrations.

6.2 Recommendations to the commissioner

8. Publish the fixed release schedule for all five volumes before broadcast. This action has been open since Volume 1 and is now overdue across three volumes. This volume carries the highest electoral salience of the three and the exposure is correspondingly greater.
9. Commission the documentary retrieval at Annex R4 across all three completed volumes together. For this evaluand the material is largely published and the marginal cost is low.
10. Hold the weight vector and anchors unchanged for Volumes 4 and 5. Three volumes are now comparable, and this volume is the first whose reported band depends on the veto rather than on the composite, which makes stability of the rule set more consequential rather than less.
11. Commission a second-rater review of all three volumes before any series composite is published. Each is a single-rater desk evaluation and none claims an inter-rater agreement gate.

6.3 Primary-data recommendation

The confidence gate is passed for CESVI alone. The instrument is documentary retrieval, not fieldwork. For this evaluand the sources are published and accessible, so the retrieval is a matter of analytical time rather than archival access. The remaining four pillars did not pass the gate.

Annex pack

Part 1 carries the SSII framework working annexes. Part 2 carries the reporting annexes for this evaluation, including the three-volume series comparison at Annex R7.

Part 1 · SSII framework working annexes

Annex A1 · Design Selection Memo

Design element	Registered position	Basis
Evaluand	Executive government of Kenya under President Mwai Kibaki, 30 Dec 2002 to 9 Apr 2013, including the Grand Coalition executive from April 2008	Chapter 1.1
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, self-commissioned	Chapter 1.2
Evaluand tier	DONOR	Inherited unchanged from Volume 1
Evaluand status	CLOSED	Two-term limit; transfer completed April 2013; Legacy Remediation Roadmap; projection barred
Counterfactual decision	Contribution track	No counterfactual exists; ceiling 82; five rivals tested
Funder mandate	None	No Mandate Compliance overlay
Prior official score	Present, literature-divergent	Reconciliation overlay active
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially declared	Counter-terrorism cooperation shaped external tolerance of security conduct
Pillar weights	Default 0.20 / 0.20 / 0.25 / 0.20 / 0.15	Unchanged; no adjustment for this evaluand
DEI completeness level	Partial (ceiling 85)	Best disaggregation in the series; PILI evidence 84 sits below the ceiling so no cap binds
Declared adaptation	Coalition executive scored as one system; attribution between principals not attempted	Logged at Annex A6
Exclusion	International criminal proceedings and individual culpability	Chapter 1.3
Sign-off	CASA NEXUS Research, 28 July 2026	Reversible on commissioner instruction

Annex A2 · Strategic Hypotheses Log

#	Hypothesis tested	Result
H1	Protection performance in Kenya is structurally constant across administrations, as suggested by the Volume 1 and 2 identity at 28.00.	Not supported. This volume scores 40.00. Protection performance is a variable.
H2	A reformist administration that commissions inquiries into itself will act on their findings.	Not supported. Four commissions, minimal implementation, two reported convictions from over 1,133 killings.
H3	The health gains of the period are attributable to the administration's health policy.	Not supported at causal level. Large external treatment financing is not eliminated as the principal rival.
H4	The education gains are explained by enrolment recording rather than real access.	Not supported. Secondary-level movement from 2008 corroborates real access expansion.
H5	A strong composite score can offset a protection failure under this framework.	Not supported by design. The veto caps the band and this volume is the first where the cap is decisive.
H6	Kenyan governance improves monotonically across administrations.	Not supported. Volume 2 falls below Volume 1 on every pillar; Volume 3 exceeds both on four of five. The trajectory is reversible.

Annex A3 · Evidence, Provenance and Triangulation Ledger

Chains counted by distinct upstream origin. Every scored dimension met the three-chain requirement.

Chain	Source	Type	Access tier	Pillars served
K1	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (Waki), October 2008	Commission of inquiry with international commissioners	ESI-4 (findings via published record)	PILI, PIAI, IPGI, IOII
K2	UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, mission to Kenya Feb 2009, report A/HRC/11/2/Add.6	UN special procedure; 100+ witness interviews	ESI-4	PILI, IPGI
K3	Independent Review Commission on the 2007 elections (Kriegler)	Commission of inquiry	ESI-3	PIAI, IPGI
K4	Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung'u), 2004	Commission of inquiry	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI
K5	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, established 2008, reported May 2013	Commission of inquiry	ESI-4	PILI, PIAI
K6	Constitution of Kenya 2010; referendum result of 4 August 2010	Constitutional instrument and electoral record	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI, PILI, IOII
K7	World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya, retrieved July 2026	Official statistics	ESI-4	IOII
K8	Kenya DHS 2003 and 2008–09; KIHBS 2005–06; 2009 Population and Housing Census	Official statistics and household surveys	ESI-3	IOII, PILI, IPGI
K9	Governance and ethics dossier of November 2005 and associated documentary record on Anglo Leasing	Primary official account with corroborating recordings	ESI-3	PIAI, IPGI, CESVI
K10	Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005; ministerial code of conduct	Statute and executive instrument	ESI-4	IPGI
K11	Economic Recovery Strategy 2003–2007; Vision 2030; MTEF documentation	Government strategy and budget documents	ESI-3	CESVI, IOII
K12	Established international human rights reporting on policing and civic space, 2009–2011	NGO reporting, used in corroboration only	ESI-3	PILI
K13	National Accord and Reconciliation Act 2008	Statute	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI
K14	Peer-reviewed analysis of the Anglo Leasing affair and of Kenya's constitutional reform process	Scholarly	ESI-3	PIAI, IPGI

Table 15. Fourteen principal chains listed; fourteen further chains supporting single dimensions are held in the working ledger. Total distinct upstream chains: 28. K12 is used only in corroboration and never as a sole basis for a scored dimension.

Annex A4 · Sub-Indicator Scoring, Coverage and Reconciliation Worksheet

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
1	PIAI	Power Mapping	3	Scored	ESI-4
2	PIAI	Stakeholder Incentives	2	Scored	ESI-3
3	PIAI	Elite Capture Risk	2	Scored	ESI-4
4	PIAI	Regulatory Feasibility	4	Scored	ESI-4
5	PIAI	Conflict Sensitivity	1	Scored	ESI-4
6	IPGI	Leadership Accountability	2	Scored	ESI-4
7	IPGI	Financial Stewardship	3	Scored	ESI-3
8	IPGI	Procurement Integrity	2	Scored	ESI-3
9	IPGI	Data Governance	4	Scored	ESI-3
10	IPGI	Decision-Making Velocity	3	Scored	ESI-3
11	IOII	Outcome Performance	4	Scored	CC-2
12	IOII	Contribution Analysis	3	Scored	CC-2

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
13	IOII	Unintended Consequences	2	Scored	CC-2
14	IOII	Systemic Spillovers	2	Scored	CC-2
15	IOII	Sustainability Probability	4	Scored	CC-2
16	PILI	Do No Harm Compliance	1	Scored	ESI-4
17	PILI	Safeguarding Architecture	2	Scored	ESI-3
18	PILI	Gender-Transformative Impact	3	Scored	ESI-3
19	PILI	Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	Scored	ESI-4
20	PILI	Community Trust & Accountability	3	Scored	ESI-3
21	CESVI	Cost per Outcome	—	Withheld	—
22	CESVI	Cost-Consequence Matrix	—	Withheld	—
23	CESVI	Portfolio Efficiency	3	Scored	ESI-3
24	CESVI	Counterfactual Cost Modelling	3	Scored	ESI-3
25	CESVI	Opportunity Cost Mapping	3	Scored	ESI-3

Reconciliation: single-rater desk evaluation. No inter-rater agreement gate applies and none is claimed.

Annex A5 • Safeguarding Veto Counter-Sign

Veto condition	Threshold	Observed	Triggered
Do No Harm Compliance	Score of 1 or 2	1	Yes
Safeguarding Architecture	Score of 1 or 2	2	Yes
PILI performance index	Below 50	40.00	Yes
Cross-tier offset applied	Not permitted	None	—
Composite band on arithmetic	—	MODERATE (52.80)	—
Band cap imposed	LOW-MODERATE	LOW-MODERATE	Yes
Is the cap decisive?	—	YES — first volume in the series where it moves the band	—
Protection finding leads report	Required	Yes, at Chapter 4.4 and in the summary	Yes
Lift condition	Re-collected evidence above threshold at the triggering tier	Not met	—

The decisiveness of the cap in this volume is recorded here and reported in every product, so that no reader encounters the composite without the cap or the cap without the composite.

Annex A6 • Documented Degradation Log

Change	Type	Effect on comparability
Coalition executive from April 2008 scored as one system; attribution between principals not attempted.	Scoring boundary declaration	None. No rule changed.
International criminal proceedings and individual culpability excluded from scope.	Scope declaration	None. The state's conduct of accountability processes remains scored.
Weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders, contemporaneous-standard rule, veto thresholds	No change	Volumes 1, 2 and 3 are directly comparable.

Annex A7 • Electoral Salience Independence Flag

Test	Position
Salience trigger	Fired, and higher than in Volumes 1 and 2. Several individuals who held office in this administration or contested its elections are active in the 2027 cycle, and the events of 2007 and 2008 remain the subject of live political contest.
Named living persons	None in any adverse finding. The report restates institutional findings from commissions before which affected parties had the opportunity to appear, and makes no finding on individual culpability.
Excluded from scope	International criminal proceedings arising from the 2007 to 2008 violence, which concluded without conviction of any accused.
Client	None. Self-commissioned; no publication-delay right applies.
Controls	Findings determined by evidence; fixed schedule; Evaluation Independence Protocol invoked automatically on any documented attempt to time findings for electoral advantage.
Status at issue	Schedule still not published. Open action across three volumes and materially overdue. Recorded as Recommendation 6.2(1).

Annex A8 · Legacy Remediation Roadmap

Full roadmap at Table 13. Four classes of inheritance are addressed, and for the first time in the series the asset class is larger than the liability class.

- Constitutional asset: devolution, the Bill of Rights, the independent commissions and the reconstituted judiciary. Remediation here is protection rather than repair.
- Accountability liability: unimplemented commission recommendations and an unresolved caseload from 2007 to 2008. Remediation is disclosure, prosecution or reasoned refusal.
- Human liability: survivors of the violence and the displaced, substantially without remedy at the close of the period. Remediation is reparation and resettlement.
- Institutional habit: commissioning inquiry without implementation, now observed across three consecutive administrations. Remediation is a standing statutory obligation to respond and report.

Annex A9 · Evaluation Sign-Off Sheet

#	Quality checkpoint	Status
1	All 25 dimensions carry a performance score or an explicit Withheld flag	Certified
2	SIS and ECI reported together with bands in every product	Certified
3	Composite band and capped reportable band both disclosed wherever either appears	Certified — specific to this volume
4	Claim Licence applied; no verb exceeds the ECI band	Certified
5	Contribution track applied; five rivals tested	Certified
6	Access-tier cap applied to every source	Certified
7	Triangulation counted by upstream provenance chain (28 chains)	Certified
8	Dual-Subject Rule applied	Certified
9	Coverage flags assigned and the Pillar Coverage Rule checked	Certified
10	Safeguarding Veto checked and counter-signed; decisiveness recorded	Certified
11	DEI completeness assessed; ceiling checked and found not binding	Certified
12	Weight redistribution checked; reportable weights sum to 1.000	Certified
13	Overlays assessed; inapplicable ones marked	Certified
14	Primary-data gate run per pillar and disclosed	Certified
15	Contested figures carried at both values, never averaged	Certified
16	Electoral salience test run; controls stated	Certified with one overdue action
17	Right of reply recorded; no living person named adversely; no finding on individual culpability	Certified
18	Inter-rater reconciliation	Not applicable to a single-rater desk evaluation

Annex A10 · Right of Reply Register

Party	Status	Position
Individuals who held office in this administration	Many living	No living individual is named in an adverse finding. The report restates institutional findings from commissions before which affected parties had the opportunity to appear and be represented, and makes no finding on individual criminal responsibility.
Persons subject to international criminal proceedings arising from 2007–2008	Living; proceedings concluded without conviction	Expressly excluded from scope at Chapter 1.3. This report draws no inference from the existence, conduct or termination of those proceedings.
National Police Service and Kenya Defence Forces	Extant institutions	Findings restate those of a commission of inquiry and a UN special procedure, before both of which the institutions had the opportunity to respond.
Office of the President	Extant	No allegation against any serving officeholder. Conduct scored in a closed period.
Power-asymmetry channel	Not required	No funder-to-partner relationship exists in a self-commissioned historical evaluation.

Annex A11 · Coverage Log

Dimension	Flag	Why it cannot be scored	Retrieval route	Owner
CESVI · Cost per Outcome	Withheld	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population not triangulated within this desk review	Economic Surveys 2003–2013; MTEF sector papers and budget policy statements; Appropriation Accounts and Auditor-General reports; published public expenditure reviews. Largely available online for this period.	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI · Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	Full cost mapping requires the same retrieval	As above, plus sector expenditure disaggregation	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI pillar	Coverage C	Three of five dimensions scored	Closing either dimension moves the pillar to B; both to A	CASA NEXUS Research

For this evaluand the gap reflects the boundary of the desk review rather than the state of the archive. The retrieval is a matter of analytical time.

Annex A12 · Contested Figure Log

Both values carried in every product. No contested figure is averaged.

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
Post-election violence deaths	1,133	Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence	“1,133 or more”	Subsequent human rights analysis of the same finding	Both carried. The commission figure is used and the open-ended formulation is disclosed.
Deaths attributable to state security agencies	405 of 1,133	Commission of Inquiry	approximately one third	Same finding, expressed as a proportion	Both carried; they are the same quantity expressed two ways.
Displacement 2007–2008	at least 350,000	Contemporaneous humanitarian reporting	up to 600,000 in wider usage	Secondary usage	Value A used. Definitions of displacement and reference periods differ and the higher figure is not traced to a primary finding in this review.
2010 referendum approval	approximately 67 per cent (6,799,663 yes)	Electoral commission returns of record	68.6 per cent	Secondary compilations	Both carried. The report uses “approximately 67 per cent” throughout.
Anglo Leasing contract value	approximately KSh 54 billion, 18 contracts	Parliamentary statement of record	approximately KSh 50 billion in other reporting	Contemporaneous press	Both carried. Neither used as a scored quantity.
Maternal mortality ratio	182 (2002) rising to 214 (2012) per 100,000	World Bank modelled series	substantially higher levels in national survey estimates	Kenya DHS	Both carried. Direction and level are both contested. Not used as a scored quantity. Verify against a primary release before external citation.

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
Police killings 2008	308 young people	Ministry of Internal Security letter to the national human rights commission, February 2009	—	—	Single-source official acknowledgement. Carried as such and used in narrative, not as a scored quantity.

Part 2 · Reporting annexes for this evaluation

Annex R1 · Score computation

The SIS and ECI are reproducible from this annex alone.

Pillar	Dimension scores	Mean	Index	Weight	SIS contribution	Evidence	ECI contribution
PIAI	3, 2, 2, 4, 1	2.40	48.00	0.20	9.60	88.00	17.60
IPGI	2, 3, 2, 4, 3	2.80	56.00	0.20	11.20	82.00	16.40
IOII	4, 3, 2, 2, 4	3.00	60.00	0.25	15.00	60.00	15.00
PILI	1, 2, 3, 1, 3	2.00	40.00	0.20	8.00	84.00	16.80
CESVI	3, 3, 3 (2 Withheld)	3.00	60.00	0.15	9.00	80.00	12.00
TOTAL	—	—	—	1.000	52.80	—	77.80

Table 14. Pillar index = (mean performance across scored dimensions ÷ 5) × 100. All pillars reportable; weights sum to 1.000; no redistribution.

Adjustment	Applied	Effect
DEI completeness ceiling on PILI evidence	Checked, not binding	Level Partial, ceiling 85. Raw pillar evidence 84.00 sits below it, so no cap applies. First volume in the series where this is the case.
Contribution track on IOII evidence	Yes	Tier CC-2 = 60.00 in place of a per-dimension ESI mean; ceiling 82
Access-tier cap	Yes	All commission sources held at ESI-4 rather than ESI-5
Pillar Coverage Rule	Checked, not triggered	CESVI has 3 scored dimensions, at the threshold
Weight redistribution	Not required	—
Safeguarding Veto	Fired and DECISIVE	Composite 52.80 sits in MODERATE. Band capped at LOW-MODERATE. This is the first volume in which the cap moves the reported band rather than restating it.
Rounding	Two decimal places	Unrounded SIS 52.80; unrounded ECI 77.80

Annex R2 · The worked dataset

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya, retrieved directly in July 2026. Compound rates computed by the evaluation team from the annual growth series.

Year	GDP growth %	GDP per cap growth %	Life exp.	IMR /1,000	U5MR /1,000	Primary GER %	Secondary GER %	HIV prev. %	Inflation %
2002	0.55	-2.57	56.8	58.3	85.6	89.2	41.9	7.8	2.0
2003	2.93	-0.19	57.4	55.5	80.8	103.9	43.6	7.4	9.8
2004	5.10	1.89	57.9	52.6	76.1	103.7	47.1	6.9	11.6
2005	5.91	2.70	58.5	49.5	71.2	103.6	47.3	6.5	10.3
2006	6.47	3.28	59.1	47.0	66.8	101.2	48.8	6.2	14.5
2007	6.85	3.67	59.4	45.0	62.9	107.6	50.9	6.0	9.8
2008	0.23	-2.76	60.0	42.6	58.0	107.1	57.0	5.8	26.2
2009	3.31	0.23	60.5	42.1	55.2	107.9	57.7	5.6	9.2
2010	8.06	4.97	60.9	41.5	53.1	-	-	5.5	4.0
2011	5.12	2.27	61.3	41.0	51.7	-	-	5.3	14.0
2012	4.57	1.88	61.5	41.1	50.7	111.4	-	5.2	9.4
2013	3.80	1.26	61.7	40.7	49.4	-	-	5.0	5.7

Computation	Period	Result	Method
GDP compound annual growth	2003–2007	5.44%	Product of (1+g), nth root, minus 1
GDP compound annual growth	2008–2012	4.23%	Same method
GDP compound annual growth	2003–2012	4.83%	Same method, 10 observations
GDP per capita compound annual growth	2003–2007	2.26%	Same method
GDP per capita compound annual growth	2008–2012	1.29%	Same method
GDP per capita compound annual growth	2003–2012	1.77%	Same method, 10 observations
Life expectancy change	2002–2012	+4.7 years	61.5 minus 56.8; 61.7 by 2013
Under-five mortality change	2002–2012	–40.8%	(50.7 – 85.6) ÷ 85.6
Infant mortality change	2002–2012	–29.5%	(41.1 – 58.3) ÷ 58.3
Primary GER change	2002–2012	+22.2 points	111.4 minus 89.2; single-year 2002–03 movement +14.7 points
Secondary GER change	2002–2009	+15.8 points	57.7 minus 41.9
HIV prevalence change	2002–2012	–33.3%	(5.2 – 7.8) ÷ 7.8
Peak inflation	2008	26.2%	Post-election crisis year

Annex R3 · Overlay detail

Overlay	Status	Detail
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame as a condition of the evaluand's stated objectives.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	Assessment of this period divides by literature rather than by decade. Development and economic assessments treat it as a recovery and reform period. Human rights assessments treat it as a period of impunity. Both are supported by the evidence base used here. This evaluation scores both within one weighted frame and does not dispute either. The divergence arises from scope, not from contested facts.
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially engaged	Counter-terrorism cooperation shaped external tolerance of security-sector conduct across the period, and the UN Special Rapporteur's findings on policing did not produce the external consequence that comparable findings might have attracted in other contexts. The overlay is declared so the reader can weigh it and does not shift the scoring frame.
Exit harm	Assessed; none arising	Constitutional exit under the two-term limit, transfer completed April 2013 under the constitution the administration promulgated. Kenya's second consecutive peaceful transfer. Recorded as a positive finding at Sustainability.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Both directions present in the same evaluand. Failure of control in December 2007 to February 2008, when the state did not contain violence it was obliged to contain. Excess of control in the policing operations the UN Special Rapporteur examined and in the Mount Elgon operation of 2008.

Annex R4 · Primary-data gate and instruments

Pillar	Evidence	Coverage	Gate passed	Reason
PIAI	88.00	A	No	Adjudicated-equivalent range with full coverage.
IPGI	82.00	A	No	Substantiated band with full coverage.
IOII	60.00	A	No	Indicative band, above the Provisional threshold of 54, full coverage. Sufficient for association claims.
PILI	84.00	A	No	Substantiated band with full coverage. A poor score on adequate evidence is a finished finding.
CESVI	80.00	C	YES	Coverage C. Two Withheld dimensions; the pillar cannot license a cost-effectiveness judgement in either direction.

Primary Data Request — CESVI

Element	Position
Pillar and dimensions	CESVI: Cost per Outcome (21) and Cost-Consequence Matrix (22)
Why the gate was passed	Coverage C. Unit cost and full cost-consequence data were not triangulated within this desk review.
Current licence	Indicative only. CESVI anchors no headline claim or recommendation; Conclusion 5.5 is expressly qualified.
Method proposed	Documentary retrieval and analysis, not fieldwork. No Phase 5 instruments are generated.
Specific increment sought	Economic Surveys 2003–2013; MTEF sector papers and budget policy statements; Appropriation Accounts and Auditor-General reports; published public expenditure reviews for education, health and infrastructure; county-level allocation data from 2010 where available.
Distinguishing feature of this volume	For this evaluand the sources are largely published and accessible. The constraint is analytical time, not archival access, which is not true of Volumes 1 and 2.
Evidence rating if successful	CESVI moves from Coverage C to Coverage A at an estimated ESI-4, and could then anchor a value-for-money conclusion and a recommendation.
Effect on the headline	The three scored dimensions are not expected to move materially. The effect is on what the pillar may say. The composite would not change band, and the reportable band would remain capped by the veto in any event.
Decision required	Approve, narrow, or decline and accept the stated limits. Carried as Recommendation 6.2(2).

Annex R5 • Evaluation questions matrix

EQ	Pillars	Dimensions	Principal chains	Findings	Conclusion
EQ1	PIAI	1–5	K1, K4, K6, K9, K13, K14	4.1	5.1
EQ2	IPGI	6–10	K1, K2, K3, K5, K8, K9, K10	4.2	5.2
EQ3	IOII	11–15	K6, K7, K8, K11	4.3	5.3
EQ4	PILI, IOII	16–20, 14	K1, K2, K5, K6, K12	4.4	5.4
EQ5	CESVI	21–25	K7, K11	4.5	5.5
EQ6	All five	All 25	All chains	4.1–4.5	5.6

Annex R6 • Sources and access tiers

Source	Type	Accessed at	What it evidences
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence, October 2008	Commission of inquiry	Published record of findings	Deaths, attribution to state security agencies, displacement, property destruction, sexual violence, institutional failure, Special Tribunal recommendation
UN Special Rapporteur report A/HRC/11/2/Add.6, May 2009	UN special procedure	Published UN document record	Police killings, death squads, impunity, intimidation of human rights defenders
Independent Review Commission on the 2007 elections	Commission of inquiry	Documentary reporting of findings	Conduct of the 2007 electoral process and of the electoral commission
Commission of Inquiry into Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, June 2004	Commission of inquiry	Scholarly analysis of findings	Land allocation across preceding administrations; commissioned within this evaluand
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, reported May 2013	Commission of inquiry	Published summary	Independence-to-2008 findings; established by statute within this evaluand
Constitution of Kenya 2010 and referendum returns	Constitutional instrument and electoral record	Published text and results of record	Devolution, Bill of Rights, independent commissions, approval margin and turnout
World Bank WDI, Kenya	Official statistics	Direct retrieval, July 2026	Growth, per capita growth, life expectancy, child mortality, enrolment, HIV prevalence, inflation
Kenya DHS 2003 and 2008–09; KIHBS 2005–06; 2009 census	Official statistics	Published survey and census record	Disaggregated health, education and welfare outcomes
Governance and ethics dossier, November 2005	Primary official account	Published dossier and corroborating recordings	Anglo Leasing chronology and ministerial obstruction
Public Procurement and Disposal Act 2005	Statute	Published statute	Procurement reform of the period

No source is rated above the tier at which it was actually accessed.

Annex R7 · Series comparison, three volumes

All three evaluations apply the same weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders, contribution track, veto thresholds and contemporaneous-standard rule. The comparison is a comparison of evidence, not of method.

Figure 3. Series comparison across three administrations, identical weights and anchors




Figure 3. Three administrations on identical weights, anchors and evidence rules.

Pillar	Vol. 1 Kenyatta	Vol. 2 Moi	Vol. 3 Kibaki	Reading
PIAI	40.00	28.00	48.00	Capture moves from designed-in, to constructed extraction, to partial correction under pressure alongside the series' best regulatory achievement.
IPGI	48.00	32.00	56.00	Accountability moves from present-but-overridden, to disabled, to deliberately created and left without consequence.
IOII	52.00	36.00	60.00	Rising welfare on flat institutions; falling welfare on deteriorating ones; recovered welfare on rebuilt ones.
PILI	28.00	28.00	40.00	The Volume 1 and 2 identity does not hold. Protection performance is a variable. It moved twelve points and still did not clear the veto.
CESVI	40.00	33.33	60.00	A windfall absorbed; public funds extracted for no output; access gains at modest cost with published trade-offs.
SIS composite	42.20	31.60	52.80	Volume 3 is the only composite to reach MODERATE.
Reportable band	LOW-MODERATE	LOW-MODERATE	LOW-MODERATE	All three report in the same band. Only Volumes 1 and 2 arrive there by arithmetic.
Veto decisive?	No	No	YES	The distinguishing feature of Volume 3.
ECI	76.70	79.30	77.80	All three Substantiated. Documentation quality does not track governance quality.

Table 17. Three observations for the series, none assumed before scoring. First, protection performance is a variable and not a structural constant. Second, all three administrations report in the same band while differing by 21.2 points on the composite, which is a property of the veto and is disclosed rather than concealed. Third, the trajectory is not monotonic: Volume 2 falls below Volume 1 on every pillar and Volume 3 exceeds both on four of five. Kenyan governance across fifty years is better described as reversible than as improving or declining.

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Distinct from Annex A3, which logs provenance and tier, and Annex R6, which logs access.

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Verification note

Three items are flagged for verification against a primary source before external release: the maternal mortality series, where the modelled estimate and the national survey estimate diverge on both level and direction; the displacement figure for 2007 to 2008, where wider usage exceeds the figure traced to a primary finding in this review; and the Anglo Leasing contract total, reported at approximately KSh 54 billion in a parliamentary statement and at approximately KSh 50 billion elsewhere. None is used as a scored quantity and no finding turns on any of them. All are logged at Annex A12.