

The Moi Administration

1978–2002

Detailed Evaluation Report

A Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact evaluation of Kenya's second presidency, with full annex pack

Field	Detail
Evaluation type	Summative, retrospective, desk-based; self-commissioned
Framework	SSII Framework™ version , CASA NEXUS Research
Evaluand tier	DONOR (the state as steward of public resources)
Evaluand status	CLOSED (Legacy Remediation Roadmap)
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, Nairobi
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Headline result	SIS 31.60 (LOW-MODERATE) · ECI 79.30 (Substantiated)
Protection Flag	RAISED — Safeguarding Veto fired
Comparability	Identical weights, dimension anchors and evidence rules to Volume 1
Date of issue	28 July 2026

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Acronyms

Acronym	Expansion
CC	Contribution Claim tier (SSII contribution track)
CESVI	Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value Index
DEI	Diversity, Equity and Inclusion

Acronym	Expansion
DHS	Demographic and Health Survey
ECI	Evidence Confidence Index
EQI	Evidence Quality Index
ESI	Evidence Strength Index (documentary ladder)
FORD	Forum for the Restoration of Democracy
GER	Gross Enrolment Ratio
IOII	Impact and Outcome Integrity Index
IPGI	Institutional Performance and Governance Index
KANU	Kenya African National Union
NACC	National AIDS Control Council
NARC	National Rainbow Coalition
NCCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
PIAI	Political and Incentive Alignment Index
PILI	Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy Index
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
SIS	Strategic Integrity Score
SSII	Strategic Systems Integrity and Impact
TJRC	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya
WDI	World Development Indicators (World Bank)

Executive summary

SIS 31.60 · LOW-MODERATE

ECI 79.30 · Substantiated

Claim Licence: Substantiated (contributed to, indicates, the evidence supports). Impact claims held at Indicative under contribution tier CC-2. Protection Flag RAISED. Tier DONOR. Status CLOSED. Volume 2 of 5.

This evaluation scores the executive government of Kenya under President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi from 22 August 1978 to 30 December 2002, across the five pillars and twenty-five dimensions of the SSII Framework version 2.2. It applies the weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders and contemporaneous-standard rule registered for Volume 1 and unchanged since. The score is comparable to Volume 1 by construction.

A Strategic Integrity Score of 31.60 places the administration 1.60 points above the CRITICAL band. An Evidence Confidence Index of 79.30 is the higher of the two volumes issued, because this period was examined by a judicial commission into Goldenberg, a judicial commission into the ethnic clashes, a parliamentary select committee, a public land commission, a truth commission and a household survey programme that had no equivalent under the previous administration. The weak result rests on the stronger record.

The result the framework requires this report to lead with

The Safeguarding Veto fired. Do No Harm Compliance and Safeguarding Architecture each score 1 and the PILI index is 28.00. Two pillars sit in the CRITICAL band. The Volume 1 finding was that the safeguarding architecture failed to detect harm and was then used to bar its examination. The finding here is stronger. Basement rooms in a government office block completed in 1983 were altered during construction to function as detention and interrogation chambers. Survivor testimony collected by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission described conditions consistent with that design, including prolonged confinement in flooded cells. The state spent public capital on a capability to harm its own citizens.

What the period produced

Real GDP per capita compounded at minus 0.11 per cent a year across 1979 to 2002, and at minus 1.05 per cent across 1991 to 2002. Life expectancy at birth was 58.2 years in 1978, peaked at 60.9 in 1985 and stood at 56.8 in 2002. Primary gross enrolment was 95.6 per cent in 1978, reached 118.2 per cent in 1983 and fell to 89.2 per cent by 2002. Against this, infant mortality fell from 72.5 to 58.3 per 1,000 live births and under-five mortality from 117.8 to 85.6. Child survival improved while adult life expectancy fell.

The governance record

The Bosire Commission found approximately KSh 158.3 billion of Goldenberg money transacted with 487 companies and individuals, in a scheme widely estimated at around ten per cent of annual GDP, running through the Central Bank with the director of the Special Branch as a company director. Twenty-three senior judges resigned as evidence of judicial involvement emerged. The President was named before the Commission as a beneficiary by nominee and was never called to give evidence. The Akiwumi Commission, appointed by the President in 1998, found the clashes of 1991 to 1994 caused more than 800 deaths and displaced approximately 130,000 people, and named serving ministers for investigation. The administration withheld that report for approximately three years.

The exit

The administration legislated a two-term presidential limit in 1992, was bound by it in 2002, contested an election judged largely free and fair, lost by a decisive margin and handed power to the opposition on 30 December 2002. That was the first transfer of power to an opposition in Kenya's history. It is scored within Sustainability and Regulatory Feasibility, it is reported as the period's strongest single item, and it does not offset twenty-four years.

Pillar scorecard

Pillar	Weight	Index	Band	Coverage	Evidence
PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	ESI-4 (88)
IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance	0.20	32.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	ESI-4 (86)
IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity	0.25	36.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	CC-2 (60)
PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	Capped 85
CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value	0.15	33.33	LOW-MODERATE	C	ESI-3/4 (83)

Table 5 (repeated at Chapter 4). All pillars reportable; weights sum to 1.000. CESVI Coverage C anchors nothing.

The seven findings that matter most

1. Twenty-four years produced net decline on per capita output, life expectancy and primary enrolment.
2. Resource diversion operated as a mechanism of political maintenance rather than as leakage from one.
3. The violence of the 1990s was organised, and two official inquiries documented it at the time.
4. The safeguarding architecture was purpose-built for harm rather than merely absent.
5. The response to the epidemic came approximately fifteen years late and the delay was a policy choice.
6. Accountability capacity migrated out of the state and was rebuilt by churches, lawyers, the press and the opposition.
7. The constitutional exit of 2002 is the period's strongest item and its durable positive bequest.

Primary-data position

The confidence gate is passed for CESVI alone, which carries Coverage C with two Withheld dimensions on the same archival basis as Volume 1. The retrieval route is at Annex R4. The remaining four pillars did not pass the gate.

Series position

Volume 2 scores 10.60 points below Volume 1 on identical method. PILI is identical in both volumes at 28.00, which indicates continuity of protection failure across thirty-nine years rather than deterioration within it. The full comparison is at Annex R7.

Chapter 1 · Introduction

1.1 The evaluand

Daniel Toroitich arap Moi became President of Kenya on 22 August 1978 following the death in office of his predecessor, and left office on 30 December 2002. The evaluand is the executive government he led across twenty-four years and four months: the Office of the President, the Cabinet, the ministries, the provincial administration, the security and intelligence services, and the parastatals through which the state acted.

Population rose from approximately 14.93 million in 1978 to 32.63 million in 2002. The period divides into three phases. Consolidation ran from 1978 to 1982 and ended with the constitutional amendment of June 1982 that made Kenya a de jure one-party state. Single-party rule ran from 1982 to the repeal of Section 2A in December 1991. Contested multiparty competition ran from 1992 to 2002 across two general elections the administration won and one it lost.

The administration is scored as one system. The executive, the ruling party and the security architecture were continuous across all three phases, and the framework scores a governing system rather than a legislative term. The phases are treated separately in the findings wherever performance differed materially between them.

1.2 Purpose and the decision this evaluation informs

CASA NEXUS Limited commissioned and funds this evaluation. There is no client, no funder mandate and no restriction on publication. It informs the same decision as Volume 1: how Kenyans and Kenyan institutions should judge each post-independence administration against a consistent evidentiary standard, and what each period bequeathed to the constitutional order now in force.

Comparability is the operative constraint. This volume applies the weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders and contemporaneous-standard rule registered at Annex A1 of Volume 1. Nothing was adjusted for this evaluand. Any difference in score between volumes is a difference in evidence.

1.3 Scope and boundaries

- Temporal: 22 August 1978 to 30 December 2002. Events after that date enter only as evidence about the period.
- Institutional: the executive government of Kenya. The judiciary and the legislature are scored as institutions the executive constrained or failed to constrain.
- Excluded: the conduct of the successor administration, including its commissions of inquiry, which enter as evidence about this period and are not scored against it.
- Excluded: the conduct of non-state actors, entering only where the state's response or sponsorship is at issue.

1.4 Intended users

The report serves the executive reader through the summary and this chapter, the policy reader through Chapters 2 to 6, and the evaluation commissioner through the annex pack, where the evidence ledger, worked scoring and computation permit independent reproduction of the SIS and ECI.

1.5 Evaluation questions

#	Evaluation question	Pillars
EQ1	Did the political settlement the administration built support or undermine its own stated development objectives?	PIAI
EQ2	Did the institutions of state deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when it was tested?	IPGI
EQ3	What changed in the lives of Kenyans across the period, and how much of that change can be attributed to the administration?	IOII

#	Evaluation question	Pillars
EQ4	Did the administration protect the people it governed, and who was excluded from whatever gains there were?	PILI, IOII
EQ5	Did the resources deployed represent value, and what was foregone?	CESVI
EQ6	What does the period bequeath to Kenya's current constitutional and institutional order?	All five

Table 2. The questions are identical to Volume 1 by design. Full mapping at Annex R5.

1.6 Tier and status declaration

The tier is DONOR. The presidency is read as steward of national revenue and of the bodies it funded and directed, accountable to citizens as rights holders. Downward safeguarding assurance is scored on whether the architecture detected and acted on failure among those it funded, evidenced by cases caught rather than by policy on paper.

The status is CLOSED. The administration ended by constitutional term limit and electoral defeat, with a completed handover. This selects the Legacy Remediation Roadmap and bars projection modelling. The manner of the ending is itself scored, at Regulatory Feasibility and Sustainability, and is reported at Chapter 4.

1.7 Topline conclusions

The evidence supports a finding that this administration presided over net material decline for the population it governed while degrading the institutions that might have corrected it, and that it nonetheless ended in a manner that repaired part of the constitutional damage it had done. Per capita output was flat to negative across twenty-four years. Life expectancy ended below where it began. Two commissions of inquiry established organised violence and large-scale fraud at the centre of the state. The same administration legislated a term limit in 1992, was bound by it in 2002, and handed power to an opposition that defeated it.

The composite of 31.60 sits 1.60 points above CRITICAL because four of five pillars fall below 34 and two sit in the CRITICAL band on their own arithmetic. The pattern indicates system failure across political, institutional and protection layers simultaneously, with impact following rather than leading.

Chapter 2 · Background and literature review

2.1 The inheritance

Volume 1 established what this administration received: a concentrated executive built by constitutional amendment between 1964 and 1969, a de facto one-party state since October 1969, a legalised conflict of interest in the public service adopted in 1971 without the supervisory office recommended alongside it, an unresolved land question, a statutory bar on accountability for security operations in the north, and a set of documented regional grievances. It also received a functioning statistical apparatus, a disciplined fiscal tradition and human development gains that were still rising in 1978.

The distinction matters for scoring. The instruments this administration used were largely inherited. The decision to extend rather than dismantle them is scored here.

2.2 Consolidation and single-party rule, 1978 to 1991

The early period carried genuine liberalising signals, including the release of political detainees. The attempted coup of August 1982 ended them. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission recorded an official death toll of 159 from the coup and its suppression, against speculation ranging from 600 to 1,800. In June 1982 Parliament amended the constitution to make KANU the sole lawful party, converting a de facto arrangement into a de jure one.

The apparatus that followed is documented in survivor testimony and in the physical record. Nyayo House was completed in 1983; basement rooms were altered during construction and used by the Special Branch for detention and interrogation. The crackdown on the Mwakenya network from 1986 and the suppression of pro-democracy activism to 1991 were the principal applications. The Wagalla massacre of February 1984 in Wajir sits in the same period and in the same pattern of security operations in northern Kenya that Volume 1 examined for the previous administration.

2.3 Contested multiparty competition, 1991 to 2002

Section 2A was repealed in December 1991 under combined domestic and donor pressure, following the Saba Saba protests of July 1990 and the suspension of balance-of-payments support. The two general elections that followed, in 1992 and 1997, were accompanied by organised violence. A parliamentary select committee reported in 1992 that attacks were centrally coordinated, frequently occurred in the presence of local administration and security officers, and that arrested attackers were often released without charge. A judicial commission appointed in July 1998 reached compatible conclusions.

The Goldenberg scheme ran through the same period. Export compensation was paid on gold and diamond shipments that Kenya could not have produced in the quantities claimed. Inflation reached 46.0 per cent in 1993. Donor support was suspended in 1991 and again in 1997.

The administration ended by holding an election on 27 December 2002 which it lost decisively, with the opposition coalition taking the presidency by a wide margin and a large parliamentary majority. Power was handed over on 30 December 2002.

2.4 The state of knowledge

Six bodies of inquiry establish what is known about this period, and this evaluation is built on them.

The Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair, chaired by Justice Samuel Bosire, sat from March 2003 to February 2005 and reported in February 2006. It heard 102 witnesses, received 188 exhibits, generated a transcript exceeding 18,000 pages and found approximately KSh 158.3 billion transacted with 487 companies and individuals.

The Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya, chaired by Justice Akilano Akiwumi, was appointed in July 1998, took testimony from more than 200 witnesses over eleven months and reported in 1999. It found more than 800 deaths and approximately 130,000 people displaced between 1991 and 1994 and named

politicians, administration officials and police officers for investigation. The government withheld it until October 2002.

The parliamentary select committee on ethnic clashes, chaired by Kennedy Kiliku, reported to the National Assembly in 1992 and was rejected by the House. Its findings on central coordination were subsequently corroborated by the Akiwumi Commission and by contemporaneous international human rights documentation.

The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission reported in May 2013. Its Moi-era findings record that political activists were routinely detained and tortured, that security agencies committed systematic atrocities, that the judiciary became an accomplice in the perpetuation of violations, that Parliament was reduced to an instrument of the executive, and that illegal and irregular allocation of land became institutionalised and normalised.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land reported in June 2004 and found abuse of presidential discretion across both post-independence administrations, with the practice intensifying in this period.

The statistical record is materially better than for Volume 1. Census rounds ran in 1979, 1989 and 1999. The Demographic and Health Survey programme began in 1989 and supplies the sex-disaggregated data that lifts the DEI completeness level from Minimal to Partial for this volume.

2.5 Where this evaluation adds

Each inquiry answered one question. Bosire assessed a fraud. Akiwumi assessed violence. The TJRC assessed rights violations. None weighed the economic outcome record against the governance record on a single scale, and none scored the constitutional exit of 2002 alongside the conduct that preceded it. This evaluation holds all of it in one frame, on the same weights applied to the previous administration, so the two periods can be compared rather than argued.

Chapter 3 · Methodology, tools and limitations

3.1 The framework applied

The method is identical to Volume 1 and is restated here so this report stands alone. Five pillars, twenty-five dimensions scored 1 to 5 on performance, pillar index as the mean of scored dimensions on a 0 to 100 scale, and two headline metrics computed at fixed weights.

- Strategic Integrity Score (SIS): weighted mean of pillar performance indices. No evidence discount.
- Evidence Confidence Index (ECI): weighted mean of pillar evidence ratings at the same weights.

3.2 Pillar weights

Pillar	Weight	Applied because
PIAI	0.20	Series default, fixed at Volume 1
IPGI	0.20	Series default
IOII	0.25	The series asks what governance meant for people
PILI	0.20	Series default
CESVI	0.15	Series default
Total	1.00	All five pillars reportable; no redistribution triggered

Table 3. No weight was adjusted for this evaluand. Adjusting weights between volumes would make the series incomparable, which is the one outcome the series cannot afford.

3.3 The Claim Licence

At ECI 79.30 the licence is Substantiated: contributed to, indicates, the evidence supports. It forbids demonstrates, caused and established. Impact statements are held at the lower Indicative licence set by the contribution track: is associated with, suggests, consistent with. No verb in this report exceeds its licence.

3.4 Evidence ladders

Ladder	Tier	Rating	Where used
ESI-5 Adjudicated	Not claimed	100	No source accessed at full adjudicated tier
ESI-4 Primary official	Applied	90	Bosire, Akiwumi, TJRC and Ndung'u findings; World Bank WDI; Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005; election results of record
ESI-3 Mixed primary and scholarly	Applied	80	Peer-reviewed and documentary analysis with at least one primary document and three provenance chains
CC-2 Contribution, hoop passed	Applied	60	Whole of IOII; rivals tested and not eliminated

Table 4. Access-tier cap applied throughout. The Bosire, Akiwumi, TJRC and Ndung'u reports were read in published summary or through scholarly and documentary analysis of their findings, and are rated ESI-4 rather than ESI-5. Reading the originals would raise the PIAI, IPGI and PILI evidence terms and would not change the performance scores.

3.5 Coverage, the Dual-Subject Rule and the Safeguarding Veto

Performance and coverage are scored separately. A score of 1 means the system failed; it never means the record is silent. The rule does less work in this volume than in Volume 1, because the archive for 1978 to 2002 is dense and the state's conduct is documented rather than inferred.

The Safeguarding Veto caps the reportable band at LOW-MODERATE where Do No Harm or Safeguarding Architecture scores 1 or 2, or PILI falls below 50. All three conditions are met. The veto fired, the Protection Flag is raised, and the protection finding leads the report.

3.6 The contribution track

No counterfactual Kenya exists. Impact runs on the contribution track with a ceiling of 82 and a bar on causal language. Rivals must be tested. Five were tested for this volume and are set out at Chapter 4.3. The theory of change survives the hoop test and the rivals are not eliminated, placing the tier at CC-2 and the rating at 60, identical to Volume 1.

3.7 Declared adaptations

- Presidential evaluand outside the v2.2 design envelope. Public Institution Effectiveness configuration applied with process tracing, as registered at Volume 1.
- Contemporaneous-standard rule. Conduct scored against the law and norms in force in the period. For this volume that includes Kenya's own constitution as amended, the Preservation of Public Security Act, and Kenya's treaty commitments as they stood. Present-day standards are carried separately in the roadmap and never blended into the score.
- Multi-phase evaluand. A twenty-four year period spanning three constitutional arrangements is scored as one system, with phase differences reported in the findings. This is a reporting adaptation, not a scoring one, and is logged at Annex A6.

3.8 Evidence base, triangulation and tools

Triangulation counts distinct upstream provenance chains. Every scored dimension met the three-chain requirement, and most exceeded it. Twenty-six distinct chains are recorded, against twenty-three in Volume 1. The ledger is at Annex A3.

Tools: the SSII Evaluation Annex Workbook v2.2 scoring engine; World Bank World Development Indicators retrieved directly in July 2026; and independent computation of pillar indices, the SIS, the ECI, compound growth rates and the per capita index in Figure 2. The computation is reproducible from Annex R1 and the series are given at Annex R2.

3.9 Limitations

- Coverage gap at CESVI. Cost per Outcome and the Cost-Consequence Matrix are Withheld. CESVI is reported at Coverage C and anchors nothing. Retrieval route at Annex R4.
- Access-tier cap on all four commission sources. Each is rated at the tier at which it was actually read.
- DEI ceiling at Partial. The Demographic and Health Survey programme from 1989 supplies sex-disaggregated data the Volume 1 archive lacked. Disability and displacement-status disaggregation remain weak. PILI evidence is capped at 85 against a raw rating of 86.
- Contribution ceiling. Impact cannot exceed 82 and sits at 60. Association is the strongest impact claim made.
- Phase compression. A single composite for twenty-four years compresses three materially different constitutional arrangements. The findings report phase differences and the composite does not.
- Secondary macroeconomic figures. Per capita income levels of approximately USD 271 in 1990 and USD 239 in 2002, and poverty of approximately 48 and 56 per cent at those dates, are drawn from a secondary source. They corroborate the World Bank series direction and are not used as scored quantities. They are logged at Annex A12 for verification.
- Right of reply. Several individuals named in the underlying commission findings are living. This report names no living individual in an adverse finding and restates institutional findings only. The position is recorded at Annex A10.

Chapter 4 · Findings

4.0 Headline result and the pillar profile

SIS 31.60 · LOW-MODERATE ECI 79.30 · Substantiated

Protection Flag RAISED. Safeguarding Veto fired on Do No Harm (1), Safeguarding Architecture (1) and PILI index 28.00. Two pillars sit in the CRITICAL band on their own arithmetic. The composite is 1.60 points above CRITICAL.

Pillar	Weight	Perf. index	Band	Coverage	Scored	Evidence	SIS contrib.	ECI contrib.
PIAI	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	5/5	88.00	5.60	17.60
IPGI	0.20	32.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	86.00	6.40	17.20
IOII	0.25	36.00	LOW-MODERATE	A	5/5	60.00	9.00	15.00
PILI	0.20	28.00	CRITICAL	A	5/5	85.00	5.60	17.00
CESVI	0.15	33.33	LOW-MODERATE	C	3/5	83.33	5.00	12.50
TOTAL	1.00	—	—	—	23/25	—	31.60	79.30

Table 5. Full arithmetic at Annex R1. Weights of reportable pillars sum to 1.000.




Figure 1. Pillar performance against evidence confidence. The gap at IOII is the contribution ceiling; the gap at PILI is the DEI cap at Partial.

The profile is flatter and lower than Volume 1. No pillar clears 36, and the spread between the highest and lowest performing pillar is 8 points against 24 in Volume 1. That pattern indicates simultaneous rather than sequential failure: the political, institutional, protection and value layers degraded together, and impact followed them down rather than holding up independently.

The evidence line sits far above the performance line everywhere except IOII. This administration is the best-documented in Kenyan history to date, because the successor government commissioned four inquiries into it within three years of taking office. The reader should treat the adverse findings as well supported and should not treat the impact findings as causal.

4.1 PIAI — Political and Incentive Alignment

Performance index 28.00 · CRITICAL · Coverage A · Evidence ESI-4 (88)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Power Mapping	2	ESI-4	Power was read accurately and restructured for regime survival: the ethnic base of the executive was rebuilt after 1978, the constitution was amended in June 1982 to make KANU the sole lawful party, and after 1991 the administration won two elections against an opposition that failed to unite. Competence directed at survival, at continuous cost to the stated development objectives.
Stakeholder Incentives	1	ESI-4	The Bosire Commission established a scheme in which export compensation was paid on shipments that could not have existed, running through the Central Bank, with the director of the Special Branch listed as a company director. Twenty-three senior judges resigned as evidence of judicial involvement emerged. The evidence indicates diversion functioned as the incentive system of political maintenance.
Elite Capture Risk	1	ESI-4	The TJRC found illegal and irregular allocation of land became institutionalised and normalised in this period. The Ndung'u Commission found abuse of presidential discretion across both post-independence administrations, intensifying here. Approximately KSh 158.3 billion of Goldenberg money reached 487 companies and individuals.
Regulatory Feasibility	2	ESI-3	The regulatory environment deteriorated sharply through the exchange-control manipulation that made Goldenberg possible, then liberalised under external conditionality from 1993. Against this the period produced two durable reforms: the repeal of Section 2A in December 1991 and the two-term presidential limit legislated in 1992, which bound the administration that enacted it.
Conflict Sensitivity	1	ESI-4	A parliamentary select committee in 1992 and a judicial commission reporting in 1999 both found the ethnic violence around the 1992 and 1997 elections to have been organised rather than spontaneous, with the involvement of local administration and security officers. The state was an instigator of conflict rather than a party managing it.

Table 6. Dimension scoring at Annex A4; evidence at Annex A3.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that political and economic incentives in this period were aligned against the administration's own stated objectives, and that the misalignment was structural rather than incidental. Three dimensions score 1, which is the first time in this series that a pillar carries three failing dimensions.

The Volume 1 finding on elite capture was that capture was designed into a redistributive instrument. The finding here is different in kind. Goldenberg was not a redistributive instrument captured for private gain. It was a mechanism constructed to move public money to private hands, and the institutions that should have stopped it, the Central Bank, the intelligence service and the judiciary, appear in the record as participants. The evidence indicates a state financing its own politics from its own reserves.

Regulatory Feasibility at 2 carries the period's genuine achievement and the report gives it full weight. The repeal of Section 2A in December 1991 restored competitive politics after twenty-two years, and the two-term limit legislated the following year is the single constitutional constraint from this period that still binds. Both were conceded under pressure rather than initiated. Both survived.

4.2 IPGI — Institutional Performance and Governance

Performance index 32.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage A · Evidence ESI-4 (86)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Leadership Accountability	1	ESI-4	The TJRC found the judiciary became an accomplice in the perpetuation of violations and Parliament was reduced to an instrument of the executive. The Akiwumi report, commissioned by the President, was withheld for approximately three years and disputed by the Attorney-General on release. The President was named before the Bosire Commission as a beneficiary by nominee and was never called to give evidence.
Financial Stewardship	1	ESI-4	A scheme widely estimated at around ten per cent of annual GDP ran through the Central Bank. Inflation reached 46.0 per cent in 1993, the peak transaction year. Balance-of-payments support was suspended in 1991 and again in 1997. Official development assistance rose from 4.8 per cent of gross national income in 1978 to 16.98 per cent in 1993 and fell to 2.98 per cent by 2002.
Procurement Integrity	1	ESI-4	At DONOR tier the allocation of public assets is the procurement analogue. Two commissions found systematic irregular allocation of public land and systematic irregular payment of public funds, with senior officials implicated in both.
Data Governance	3	ESI-3	Statistical capability was maintained and extended: census rounds in 1979, 1989 and 1999, and the Demographic and Health Survey programme from 1989 which supplies the disaggregated data this evaluation relies on. Against this, the Akiwumi report was withheld and investigations into politically sensitive deaths were obstructed.
Decision-Making Velocity	2	ESI-3	Decision speed was high on regime-security matters and slow on everything else. The June 1982 constitutional amendment moved quickly. The national response to the epidemic came in November 1999, approximately fifteen years after the first recorded cases. Economic reform proceeded largely at the pace external conditionality forced.

Table 7. Dimension scoring at Annex A4; evidence at Annex A3.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding that the state's internal accountability organs were disabled in this period and that the accountability function migrated outside the state. Volume 1 found a legislature that investigated a political killing and an executive that overrode it. Here the legislature rejected its own select committee's findings on organised violence, the judiciary is recorded by a truth commission as complicit, and a judicial commission appointed by the President was shelved for three years.

What replaced them is part of the finding. The pressure that produced the repeal of Section 2A in December 1991 came from church leadership, the legal profession, the press, university staff, a returning opposition and the suspension of donor support. The evidence indicates institutional self-correction did not occur and external correction did.

Data Governance at 3 is the pillar's only score above 2, and it is earned in a way that matters for this series. The Demographic and Health Survey programme begun in 1989 is why this volume carries a DEI completeness level of Partial rather than Minimal, and therefore a PILI evidence ceiling of 85 rather than 70. An administration that continued to measure its population created the record by which it is now assessed.

4.3 IOII — Impact and Outcome Integrity

Performance index 36.00 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage A · Contribution tier CC-2 (60)

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Outcome Performance	2	CC-2	Net decline on three headline measures and net improvement on two. Real GDP per capita CAGR minus 0.11 per cent, 1979–2002. Life expectancy 58.2 (1978) to 56.8 (2002), having peaked at 60.9 in 1985. Primary GER 95.6 (1978) to 89.2 (2002), having peaked at 118.2 in 1983. Against this, infant mortality fell 72.5 to 58.3 per 1,000 and under-five mortality 117.8 to 85.6.
Contribution Analysis	2	CC-2	The administration maintained a planning apparatus, ran three census rounds and participated in survey programmes that generated usable outcome data. It ran no counterfactual assessment and publicly contested adverse findings, including those of its own commissions.
Unintended Consequences	2	CC-2	Cost-sharing in health and education from the late 1980s is associated with the enrolment decline that followed. The displacement created by organised violence produced a caseload that outlasted the administration by decades. Educated unemployment persisted from the previous period without a policy response.
Systemic Spillovers	1	ESI-4	The land question was made materially worse. Corruption normalised through the public service, which the TJRC recorded as institutionalised. Displacement from the clashes of the 1990s persisted into the following decade and interacted with the violence of 2007 to 2008. The spillovers were negative, large and durable.
Sustainability Probability	2	CC-2	The negative institutional inheritance persisted. So did two positives: the multiparty framework restored in 1991 and the two-term limit legislated in 1992, both of which constrain every administration since. Human development gains that were rising at the start of the period did not sustain.

Table 8. IOII evidence is rated on the contribution track. Systemic Spillovers carries an ESI-4 documentary basis in addition and is rated within the pillar tier.

Figure 2. The reversal: three headline outcomes over the Moi period. Source: World Bank WDI, retrieved July 2026. Per capita index computed from the annual growth series.



Figure 2. The reversal. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, retrieved July 2026; per capita index computed from the annual growth series.

Rival explanations tested

The contribution track requires rivals to be tested. An untested rival caps the tier at CC-1. Five were tested, and the exercise here concerns a decline rather than a gain.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
The HIV epidemic explains the life expectancy decline	The government's own strategic plan recorded approximately 1.5 million deaths since the early 1980s, more than one million orphans and over two million people infected in a population of about 29 million	Not excluded for life expectancy. The epidemic is a genuine exogenous shock and the largest single factor in that series. It is excluded for the per capita income and enrolment series, which it does not explain. The fifteen-year delay in national response is not exogenous and is scored separately at Decision-Making Velocity.
Structural adjustment conditionality explains the social sector decline	Cost-sharing in health and education from the late 1980s coincides with the enrolment reversal	Not excluded. Conditionality is a real constraint. It is partly endogenous, because the fiscal position that made Kenya dependent on that finance was produced in part by the diversion documented by the Bosire Commission.

Rival explanation	Evidence for it	Status after testing
Donor suspension explains the economic stagnation	Balance-of-payments support was suspended in 1991 and again in 1997; ODA fell from 16.98 per cent of GNI in 1993 to 2.98 per cent in 2002	Excluded as an independent rival. The suspensions were responses to governance conduct within the administration's control, so they transmit rather than originate the effect.
Global and regional shocks explain the stagnation	Oil price movements, drought cycles, regional instability across the period	Not excluded, and weak. Comparable economies in the region absorbed similar shocks over the same period without twenty-four years of flat per capita output.
Population growth explains the per capita result	Population rose from 14.93 million to 32.63 million across the period	Partially excluded. Population growth is why aggregate growth of 3.19 per cent produced per capita growth of minus 0.11 per cent, and the administration's own family planning programme is part of the policy record rather than external to it.

Table 9. Three rivals survive testing in whole or part. The theory of change survives the hoop test and rivals are not eliminated, placing the claim at CC-2 (rating 60, Indicative). Causal language is barred at any tier on this track.

Findings

The headline outcome finding is a decline, and the licence permits it to be stated as association rather than as cause. Twenty-four years of governance are associated with a net fall in life expectancy of 1.4 years, a net fall in primary gross enrolment of 6.4 percentage points, and per capita output that ended approximately where it began. That is the plainest statement the evidence supports.

The child survival record cuts the other way and the report gives it its weight. Infant mortality fell by roughly 20 per cent and under-five mortality by roughly 27 per cent across the period. Both improved despite the epidemic and despite the enrolment reversal, which is consistent with immunisation and primary health interventions continuing to function while the adult health picture deteriorated. An account of this period that reports only the decline is incomplete.

One causal link is materially stronger than the aggregate and is separated here, as the education link was in Volume 1. Inflation moved from 27.3 per cent in 1992 to 46.0 per cent in 1993, the peak year of the Goldenberg transactions, and a judicial commission subsequently established the mechanism by which public funds moved through the Central Bank. The link between the scheme and the macroeconomic crisis of those years is closer to a smoking gun than the aggregate claim. The pillar is rated as a whole and therefore carries the weaker tier.

Systemic Spillovers at 1 is the pillar's decisive dimension. The displacement created by organised violence in the 1990s was not resolved, the land grievances documented since 1963 were compounded, and the normalisation of diversion through the public service is recorded by a truth commission as a structural condition rather than an episode. Those spillovers were still generating harm two decades after the administration ended.

4.4 PILI — Protection, Inclusion and Legitimacy

Performance index 28.00 · CRITICAL · Coverage A · Evidence 85 (DEI-capped from 86)

Protection Flag

Do No Harm Compliance scores 1. Safeguarding Architecture scores 1. The PILI index is 28.00, below the veto threshold of 50. All three conditions met independently. The band cap of LOW-MODERATE applies to the whole evaluation and cannot be lifted by performance in another pillar.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Do No Harm Compliance	1	ESI-4	The TJRC recorded systematic torture in the aftermath of the 1982 coup attempt, during the Mwakenya crackdown from 1986, and through the suppression of pro-democracy activism to 1991. Two inquiries found organised violence around the 1992 and 1997 elections, with more than 800 deaths and approximately 130,000 people displaced between 1991 and 1994 on the judicial commission's findings. The Wagalla massacre of February 1984 sits in the same record.
Safeguarding Architecture	1	ESI-4	Basement rooms in a government office block completed in 1983 were altered during construction and used by the intelligence service for detention and interrogation. Survivor testimony collected by the TJRC described conditions consistent with that design. Under the DONOR tier assurance rule, architecture that has never detected a failure scores no higher than 2; here it scores 1 because public capital was applied to building a capability to harm.
Gender-Transformative Impact	2	ESI-3	The Demographic and Health Survey programme from 1989 made women's health and education outcomes visible and measurable for the first time, which is a real institutional gain. Against this, the TJRC found state-sanctioned discrimination against women across the mandate period, and recorded sexual violence in security operations and in detention. The score is held at 2 on the measurement and access gains.
Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	ESI-4	No referral pathway, survivor support or acknowledgement operated for victims of torture, of security operations or of the organised violence of the 1990s. The TJRC recorded survivors of sexual violence in this period carrying the consequences in silence for decades, and recommended a reparations framework that remains substantially unimplemented.
Community Trust & Accountability	2	ESI-3	Legitimacy was contested and eventually lost through a lawful process. Independent churches, the legal profession, the press, university staff and a restored opposition operated as genuine accountability channels from the late 1980s and ultimately prevailed at the ballot. Against this, detention of journalists and activists, news control, and two regions governed through organised violence.

Table 10. Raw pillar evidence 86.00, capped to 85.00 by the DEI Partial ceiling. Veto counter-sign at Annex A5.

Findings

The evidence supports a finding of systemic protection failure sustained across the whole period and applied to the administration's own citizens as an instrument of rule. The distinguishing feature against Volume 1 is not scale. It is design. The previous administration's protection failures occurred in the conduct of a military campaign and were then shielded by statute. This administration built rooms for the purpose.

The organised violence of the 1990s is the second distinguishing feature. Volume 1 recorded a state using force against a region in a secessionist conflict. This volume records a state, on the findings of its own parliamentary committee and its own judicial commission, coordinating violence between communities to secure electoral outcomes. Both inquiries reported at the time. Neither was acted upon while the administration remained in office.

Community Trust at 2 rather than 1 records something the score alone hides. Legitimacy in this period was actively contested and the contest was won by Kenyans, through churches, courts, newsrooms, lecture halls and eventually the ballot box. The administration did not restore competitive politics. It conceded it, and was then removed by it.

The DEI position improves on Volume 1 and the improvement is attributable to the administration's own statistical programme. The evidence ceiling rises from 70 to 85 because the Demographic and Health Survey series makes sex-disaggregated assessment possible from 1989. Disability and displacement-status disaggregation remain insufficient, which is why the level is Partial rather than Full.

4.5 CESVI — Cost-Effectiveness and Strategic Value

Performance index 33.33 · LOW-MODERATE · Coverage C · Evidence ESI-3/4 (83.33)

Coverage C. This pillar is indicative only and anchors no headline claim or recommendation.

Dimension	Score	Evid	Basis for the score
Cost per Outcome	Withheld	—	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population is not retrievable from published sources for the period. Retrieval route at Annex R4.
Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	—	Full cost mapping against intended and unintended consequences requires the same archival series.
Portfolio Efficiency	1	ESI-4	A judicial commission established approximately KSh 158.3 billion transacted with 487 companies and individuals for exports that could not have existed. The scheme produced no output of any kind. This is the clearest efficiency failure in the series to date and it is the reason the dimension scores 1.
Counterfactual Cost Modelling	2	ESI-3	External conditionality from 1991 forced costed reform options onto the agenda and the administration engaged with them under pressure. It produced no independent counterfactual modelling of its own strategy and resisted adverse analysis.
Opportunity Cost Mapping	2	ESI-3	Development planning and sessional paper processes continued through the period and stated priorities. The gap between the stated allocation and the actual one is the finding, and it is scored at Portfolio Efficiency rather than counted twice here.

Table 11. Two dimensions Withheld; coverage log at Annex A11; gate check at Annex R4.

Findings

The evidence indicates the largest single destruction of public value in the period was deliberate rather than accidental. Volume 1 found a windfall absorbed rather than converted, which is a failure of fiscal judgement. This volume finds a mechanism built to extract public funds and produce nothing, which is a different category.

The opportunity cost is not modelled here because CESVI carries Coverage C and the pillar may not anchor a claim. The scale is nonetheless on the record: a sum the Commission put at approximately KSh 158.3 billion moved through 487 recipients during a decade in which per capita output was falling and primary enrolment was declining.

4.6 Coverage and evidence gaps

Twenty-three of twenty-five dimensions are scored. Both Withheld dimensions sit in CESVI and are logged at Annex A11 with retrieval routes. Four pillars carry Coverage A. No pillar fell below the three-dimension threshold, so no redistribution was triggered.

4.7 Overlay results

Overlay	Status	Result
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame as a condition of the evaluand's own objectives.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	Multilateral assessment of this period diverges by decade: favourable through the mid-1980s, severely adverse from 1991 with the suspension of support. This evaluation does not contest either assessment. It scores the administration as one system across all three phases and explains the divergence by phase.
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially engaged	Cold War alignment to 1989 shaped the external tolerance within which the administration operated. The withdrawal of that tolerance is associated with the reform pressure of 1990 to 1991. Stated domestic objectives remain the scoring frame and the report does not treat external tolerance as excusing domestic conduct.
Exit harm	Assessed, none arising	The status is CLOSED and the exit was constitutional, electorally contested and peacefully completed. No exit harm arises. The managed exit is recorded as a positive finding at Regulatory Feasibility and Sustainability.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Control-oriented dimensions scored on net effect. Low scores reflect excess of control through 1991 and, from 1992, failure of control over organised violence and over the Central Bank. The same dimension can fail in both directions across a long evaluand and this one did.

Full overlay detail at Annex R3.

Chapter 5 · Conclusions

These conclusions synthesise Chapter 4. They introduce no new findings and each is stated in the language the Claim Licence permits.

5.1 EQ1 · Did the political settlement support or undermine the stated objectives?

It undermined them structurally. The evidence supports a finding that political and economic incentives were aligned to regime maintenance and against the stated development objectives, and that the alignment was built rather than drifted into. Three PIAI dimensions score 1, and the mechanism in each case is documented by a commission of inquiry. The settlement produced twenty-four years of political survival and a state that could not deliver.

5.2 EQ2 · Did institutions deliver with integrity, and did accountability function when tested?

Integrity failed and accountability migrated out of the state. The evidence supports a finding that the internal organs of correction were disabled: a truth commission records the judiciary as complicit and Parliament as an instrument of the executive, the National Assembly rejected its own committee's findings on organised violence, and a judicial commission the President himself appointed was withheld for approximately three years. The correction that eventually occurred came from churches, lawyers, journalists, academics, a unified opposition and external conditionality.

5.3 EQ3 · What changed, and how much can be attributed?

The direction of change was negative on the headline measures and the attribution is Indicative. Per capita output compounded at minus 0.11 per cent across twenty-four years. Life expectancy ended 1.4 years lower than it began. Primary gross enrolment ended 6.4 points lower. Child mortality improved substantially on both measures. Five rivals were tested; the epidemic survives as the principal explanation for the life expectancy series and does not explain the income or enrolment series, and donor suspension is excluded as an independent rival because it transmitted rather than originated the effect.

5.4 EQ4 · Did the administration protect those it governed, and who was excluded?

It did not, and the failure was designed. The evidence supports a finding of systemic protection failure applied to citizens as an instrument of rule, distinguished from the previous administration by the construction of purpose-built detention facilities and by the coordination of violence between communities for electoral advantage, both established by inquiries reporting at the time. Exclusion followed political alignment as much as region: opposition-aligned communities in the Rift Valley and at the Coast bore the organised violence, and dissidents of every community bore the detention apparatus.

5.5 EQ5 · Did the resources represent value, and what was foregone?

This conclusion is indicative only, because CESVI carries Coverage C. On the available evidence, the period contains the clearest destruction of public value in the series to date: a mechanism established by judicial commission to have moved approximately KSh 158.3 billion to 487 recipients for output that did not exist. A defensible value-for-money verdict requires the archival retrieval at Annex R4.

5.6 EQ6 · What does the period bequeath?

Five inheritances are traceable into the present order. Four are liabilities and one is an asset.

- The multiparty framework restored in December 1991 and the two-term presidential limit legislated in 1992. These are the period's durable positive bequest and they constrain every administration since.
- An unresolved displacement caseload originating in the organised violence of 1991 to 1998, which interacted with the violence of 2007 to 2008.

- A land question compounded rather than resolved, with the Ndung'u recommendations of 2004 substantially unimplemented.
- Normalised diversion through the public service, recorded by the TJRC as institutionalised rather than episodic, and an unrecovered asset position from the Goldenberg findings.
- A reparations obligation to survivors of torture and of the security operations of the period, which the TJRC framed in 2013 and which remains substantially unmet.

EQ	Conclusion in one line	Licence	Chapter
EQ1	Incentives were built for regime maintenance and against the stated objectives.	Substantiated	4.1
EQ2	Internal accountability was disabled; correction came from outside the state.	Substantiated	4.2
EQ3	Headline welfare measures declined; attribution is Indicative, not established.	Indicative	4.3
EQ4	Protection failure was systemic and, in part, purpose-built.	Substantiated	4.4
EQ5	The period contains the series' clearest destruction of public value; verdict awaits retrieval.	Indicative only	4.5
EQ6	Four liabilities and one significant constitutional asset.	Substantiated	5.6

Table 12. Full traceability at Annex R5.

Chapter 6 · Recommendations

The status is CLOSED, so the roadmap variant is Legacy Remediation. These recommendations address what the period left in force. No reform scenario is modelled.

6.1 Legacy Remediation Roadmap

#	Recommendation	Addressed to	From	Sequence
1	Publish an implementation status report on the Bosire Commission recommendations, naming which prosecutions were opened, which were discontinued and on what stated grounds, so that the record of action or inaction is itself on the record.	Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney-General	4.1, 4.5	Immediate
2	Recover and account for assets traced by the Bosire Commission, reporting publicly against the figure the Commission established.	Asset Recovery Agency; National Treasury	4.5	Short term
3	Act on the Akiwumi Commission recommendations for investigation, or publish the reasons they will not be pursued, and resolve the outstanding displacement caseload originating in 1991 to 1998.	Attorney-General; National Land Commission	4.1, 4.4	Short term
4	Convert the Nyayo House chambers into the memorial the TJRC recommended and complete the reparations framework for survivors of torture and of the security operations of the period.	Ministry responsible for national heritage; Parliament	4.4	Medium term
5	Protect the two-term presidential limit and the multiparty framework. These are the period's single durable gain, and any move against either would reverse the one clear positive outcome of twenty-four years.	Parliament; the electorate	4.1, 5.6	Standing
6	Complete the Ndung'u and TJRC land recommendations, which now carry findings against two consecutive administrations and remain substantially unimplemented.	National Land Commission; Parliament	4.1, 5.6	Medium term

Table 13. Full roadmap at Annex A8. Recommendations 1 to 4 and 6 restate commitments already made in Kenya's own commission record. This evaluation does not originate them; it scores their non-implementation.

6.2 Recommendations to the commissioner

8. Publish the fixed release schedule for all five volumes before broadcast, under the Electoral Salience Independence Clause. This action remains open from Volume 1 and is now overdue.
9. Commission the archival retrieval at Annex R4 for both volumes together, since the gap and the retrieval route are identical and a single archival engagement closes both.
10. Hold the weight vector, dimension anchors and contemporaneous-standard rule unchanged for Volumes 3 to 5. Two volumes are now comparable; a change at Volume 3 would forfeit that.
11. Commission a second-rater review of Volumes 1 and 2 before any series composite is published. Both volumes are single-rater desk evaluations and neither claims an inter-rater agreement gate.

6.3 Primary-data recommendation

The confidence gate is passed for CESVI alone. Primary collection in the framework's standard sense does not apply to an evaluand that closed in 2002 for questions of fiscal series construction, and no Phase 5 instruments are generated. The proportionate instrument is documentary retrieval, specified at Annex R4, which would move CESVI from Coverage C to Coverage A at an estimated ESI-4. The remaining four pillars did not pass the gate.

Annex pack

Part 1 carries the SSII framework working annexes. Part 2 carries the reporting annexes for this evaluation, including a series comparison annex introduced at this volume. Annexes that do not apply are marked so rather than omitted.

Part 1 · SSII framework working annexes

Annex A1 · Design Selection Memo

Design element	Registered position	Basis
Evaluand	Executive government of Kenya under President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi, 22 Aug 1978 to 30 Dec 2002	Chapter 1.1
Commissioner	CASA NEXUS Limited, self-commissioned	Chapter 1.2
Evaluand tier	DONOR	Inherited unchanged from Volume 1
Evaluand status	CLOSED	Ended by constitutional term limit and electoral defeat; handover completed 30 Dec 2002; Legacy Remediation Roadmap; projection barred
Single or portfolio	Single evaluand	Portfolio mode not applicable
Counterfactual decision	Contribution track	No counterfactual exists; ceiling 82; rivals tested
Funder mandate	None	No Mandate Compliance overlay
Prior official score	Present, phase-divergent	Reconciliation overlay active
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially declared	Cold War alignment to 1989 shaped external tolerance; stated domestic objectives held as the scoring frame
Pillar weights	Default 0.20 / 0.20 / 0.25 / 0.20 / 0.15	Unchanged from Volume 1; no adjustment for this evaluand
DEI completeness level	Partial (ceiling 85)	Demographic and Health Survey programme from 1989 supplies sex-disaggregated data; disability and displacement-status data remain weak
Declared adaptation	Multi-phase evaluand reported by phase, scored as one system	Logged at Annex A6
Sign-off	CASA NEXUS Research, 28 July 2026	Reversible on commissioner instruction

Annex A2 · Strategic Hypotheses Log

#	Hypothesis tested	Result
H1	Incentive misalignment in this period was drift from an inherited system rather than deliberate construction.	Not supported. Two judicial commissions establish constructed mechanisms.
H2	Internal state accountability organs functioned and were overridden, as in Volume 1.	Not supported. The organs were substantially disabled; correction came from outside the state.
H3	The economic decline is explained by external shocks and conditionality.	Partially supported. Conditionality survives as a partial rival; donor suspension is excluded as endogenous.
H4	The life expectancy decline is explained by the HIV epidemic alone.	Partially supported. The epidemic is the principal factor for that series and explains neither the income nor the enrolment series.
H5	Protection failure in this period was comparable in kind to Volume 1.	Not supported. Purpose-built facilities and coordinated inter-communal violence differ in kind from the Volume 1 record.
H6	The 2002 transition was a product of institutional self-correction.	Not supported. The evidence indicates external and civic pressure, with the administration conceding rather than initiating.

Annex A3 · Evidence, Provenance and Triangulation Ledger

Chains counted by distinct upstream origin. Every scored dimension met the three-chain requirement.

Chain	Source	Type	Access tier	Pillars served
M1	Judicial Commission of Inquiry into the Goldenberg Affair (Bosire), reported Feb 2006	Judicial commission; 102 witnesses, 188 exhibits	ESI-4 (findings via published analysis)	PIAI, IPGI, CESVI, IOII
M2	Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes (Akiwumi), reported 1999, released Oct 2002	Judicial commission; 200+ witnesses	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI, PILI
M3	Parliamentary Select Committee on ethnic clashes (Kiliku), National Assembly 1992	Parliamentary committee	ESI-4	PIAI, PILI
M4	Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, final report 2013	Commission of inquiry; 42,465 statements	ESI-4 (published summary)	PILI, IPGI, PIAI, IOII
M5	Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung'u), 2004	Commission of inquiry	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI
M6	World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya, retrieved July 2026	Official statistics	ESI-4	IOII
M7	Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005	Government policy document	ESI-4	IOII, PILI
M8	Kenya census rounds 1979, 1989, 1999; Demographic and Health Survey programme from 1989	Official statistics	ESI-3	IPGI, PILI, IOII
M9	2002 general election results of record and contemporaneous observation	Electoral record	ESI-4	PIAI, IPGI
M10	Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act 1982 (Section 2A); repeal of Section 2A, December 1991	Statute	ESI-4	PIAI
M11	International human rights documentation of state-sponsored ethnic violence, 1993	Established NGO reporting	ESI-3	PIAI, PILI
M12	Survivor testimony compilations on the Nyayo House detention facility	Documented survivor accounts, TJRC-corroborated	ESI-3	PILI
M13	Peer-reviewed and policy analysis of Kenya's democratic transition 1990–2002	Scholarly	ESI-3	PIAI, IPGI
M14	Institute for Security Studies analysis of the Goldenberg conspiracy, 2005	Research institute	ESI-3	IPGI, CESVI

Table 15. Fourteen principal chains listed; twelve further chains supporting single dimensions are held in the working ledger. Total distinct upstream chains: 26.

Annex A4 • Sub-Indicator Scoring, Coverage and Reconciliation Worksheet

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
1	PIAI	Power Mapping	2	Scored	ESI-4
2	PIAI	Stakeholder Incentives	1	Scored	ESI-4
3	PIAI	Elite Capture Risk	1	Scored	ESI-4
4	PIAI	Regulatory Feasibility	2	Scored	ESI-3
5	PIAI	Conflict Sensitivity	1	Scored	ESI-4
6	IPGI	Leadership Accountability	1	Scored	ESI-4
7	IPGI	Financial Stewardship	1	Scored	ESI-4
8	IPGI	Procurement Integrity	1	Scored	ESI-4
9	IPGI	Data Governance	3	Scored	ESI-3
10	IPGI	Decision-Making Velocity	2	Scored	ESI-3
11	IOII	Outcome Performance	2	Scored	CC-2
12	IOII	Contribution Analysis	2	Scored	CC-2
13	IOII	Unintended Consequences	2	Scored	CC-2

#	Pillar	Dimension	Score	Coverage	Evidence
14	IOII	Systemic Spillovers	1	Scored	CC-2
15	IOII	Sustainability Probability	2	Scored	CC-2
16	PILI	Do No Harm Compliance	1	Scored	ESI-4
17	PILI	Safeguarding Architecture	1	Scored	ESI-4
18	PILI	Gender-Transformative Impact	2	Scored	ESI-3
19	PILI	Survivor-Centred Integrity	1	Scored	ESI-4
20	PILI	Community Trust & Accountability	2	Scored	ESI-3
21	CESVI	Cost per Outcome	—	Withheld	—
22	CESVI	Cost-Consequence Matrix	—	Withheld	—
23	CESVI	Portfolio Efficiency	1	Scored	ESI-4
24	CESVI	Counterfactual Cost Modelling	2	Scored	ESI-3
25	CESVI	Opportunity Cost Mapping	2	Scored	ESI-3

Reconciliation: single-rater desk evaluation. No inter-rater agreement gate applies and none is claimed. Second-rater review of Volumes 1 and 2 is recommended before any series composite.

Annex A5 • Safeguarding Veto Counter-Sign

Veto condition	Threshold	Observed	Triggered
Do No Harm Compliance	Score of 1 or 2	1	Yes
Safeguarding Architecture	Score of 1 or 2	1	Yes
PILI performance index	Below 50	28.00	Yes
Cross-tier offset applied	Not permitted	None	—
Band cap imposed	LOW-MODERATE	LOW-MODERATE	Yes
Composite band absent the veto	—	LOW-MODERATE (31.60)	Cap not decisive
Protection finding leads report	Required	Yes, at Chapter 4.4 and in the summary	Yes
Lift condition	Re-collected evidence above threshold	Not met	—

Annex A6 • Documented Degradation Log

Change	Type	Effect on comparability
Multi-phase reporting adaptation: a twenty-four year evaluand spanning three constitutional arrangements is reported by phase and scored as one system.	Reporting adaptation	None. No scoring rule changed. Volume 1 comparability preserved.
DEI completeness level set to Partial rather than Minimal.	Evidence assessment, not a rule change	None. The rule is unchanged; the archive is better. Documented at Annex A1 and Chapter 3.9.
Annex R7 (series comparison) introduced.	New reporting annex	None. Additive.
Weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders, contemporaneous-standard rule	No change	Volumes 1 and 2 are directly comparable.

Annex A7 • Electoral Salience Independence Flag

Test	Position
Salience trigger	Fired, as for Volume 1. The clause triggers on foreseeable electoral salience regardless of client type.
Basis	A series assessing Kenya's administrations published into the approach to the 2027 general election. Political heirs and former officeholders of this period are active in the current cycle.

Test	Position
Named living persons	None. This report names no living individual in an adverse finding and restates institutional findings from commissions before which affected parties had opportunity to appear.
Client	None. Self-commissioned; no publication-delay right applies.
Controls	Findings determined by evidence; fixed schedule; Evaluation Independence Protocol invoked automatically on any documented attempt to time findings for electoral advantage.
Status at issue	Schedule still not published. Open action carried from Volume 1 and now overdue. Recorded as Recommendation 6.2(1).

Annex A8 • Legacy Remediation Roadmap

Full roadmap at Table 13. Four classes of inheritance are addressed.

- Asset inheritance: unrecovered sums traced by the Bosire Commission. Remediation is recovery and public accounting.
- Record inheritance: commission recommendations from Bosire, Akiwumi, Ndung'u and the TJRC that remain unimplemented. Remediation is action or reasoned refusal, published.
- Human inheritance: survivors of torture and of the organised violence, and an unresolved displacement caseload. Remediation is reparation and resettlement.
- Constitutional inheritance: the two-term limit and the multiparty framework. Remediation here is protection rather than repair.

Annex A9 • Evaluation Sign-Off Sheet

#	Quality checkpoint	Status
1	All 25 dimensions carry a performance score or an explicit Withheld flag	Certified
2	SIS and ECI reported together with bands in every product	Certified
3	Claim Licence applied; no verb exceeds the ECI band	Certified
4	Contribution track applied where no counterfactual exists	Certified
5	Rival explanations tested rather than acknowledged (five tested)	Certified
6	Access-tier cap applied to every source	Certified
7	Triangulation counted by upstream provenance chain (26 chains)	Certified
8	Dual-Subject Rule applied	Certified
9	Coverage flags assigned and the Pillar Coverage Rule checked	Certified
10	Safeguarding Veto checked and counter-signed	Certified
11	DEI completeness assessed and the PILI ceiling applied	Certified
12	Weight redistribution checked; reportable weights sum to 1.000	Certified
13	Overlays assessed; inapplicable ones marked rather than omitted	Certified
14	Primary-data gate run per pillar and the result disclosed	Certified
15	Contested figures carried at both values, never averaged	Certified
16	Electoral salience test run and controls stated	Certified with one overdue action
17	Right of reply position recorded; no living person named adversely	Certified
18	Inter-rater reconciliation	Not applicable to a single-rater desk evaluation; second-rater review recommended

Annex A10 • Right of Reply Register

Party	Status	Position
Individuals named in the underlying commission findings	Several living	This report names no living individual in an adverse finding. It restates institutional findings from commissions before which affected parties had opportunity to appear and be represented. Where a commission recorded that a party was not called, this report records that fact and draws no inference from it.
Office of the President	Extant	No allegation is made against any serving officeholder. Conduct is scored in a closed period.
Kenya Defence Forces; National Police Service; National Intelligence Service	Extant successor institutions	Findings restate those of commissions before which predecessor institutions had opportunity to appear.
Judiciary	Extant institution	The finding is that of the TJRC and is restated. The institution has since undergone constitutional reconstitution under the 2010 Constitution, which this report notes and does not score.
Power-asymmetry channel	Not required	No funder-to-partner relationship exists in a self-commissioned historical evaluation.

Annex A11 · Coverage Log

Dimension	Flag	Why it cannot be scored	Retrieval route	Owner
CESVI · Cost per Outcome	Withheld	Unit cost by outcome type, geography and population not retrievable from published sources	Kenya National Archives and KNBS: Statistical Abstracts 1979–2003; Development Plan and sessional paper expenditure tables; Appropriation Accounts with Controller and Auditor-General reports	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI · Cost-Consequence Matrix	Withheld	Full cost mapping requires the same series	As above, plus sector expenditure disaggregation by province	CASA NEXUS Research
CESVI pillar	Coverage C	Three of five dimensions scored	Closing either dimension moves the pillar to B; both to A	CASA NEXUS Research

The retrieval route is identical to Volume 1 and a single archival engagement would close both volumes.

Annex A12 · Contested Figure Log

Both values carried in every product. No contested figure is averaged.

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
Goldenberg cost	approx. KSh 158.3 bn transacted with 487 entities	Bosire Commission finding	approx. 10% of annual GDP; one account puts it near one fifth	Widely cited estimate; a separate press account	Both carried. The Commission finding is a transaction total; the GDP percentage is an estimate of loss and is not the same quantity. Neither used as a scored value; Portfolio Efficiency scores the mechanism, not the magnitude.
1982 coup deaths	159 official	Official figure recorded by the TJRC	600 to 1,800	Speculation recorded by the TJRC	Both carried. Not used as a scored quantity.
Ethnic clash deaths 1991–1994	more than 800	Akiwumi Commission	365 official; 750 (Kiliku); 1,000 press; 1,500 (Africa Watch)	Range recorded by the TJRC and contemporaneous sources	All carried. The Akiwumi figure is used in narrative as the judicial commission finding, with the range disclosed.
Displacement 1991–1994	approx. 130,000	Akiwumi Commission	approx. 300,000 in 1992 alone	Humanitarian agency estimate	Both carried. Definitions of displacement and reference periods differ.
Saba Saba 1990 deaths	20	Government commission of inquiry	well over 100	Newspaper reports recorded by the TJRC	Both carried.
Per capita income and poverty 1990–2002	USD 271 to USD 239; poverty 48% to 56%	Secondary policy analysis	—	—	Flagged as secondary. Corroborates the direction of the World Bank series and is not used as a scored quantity. Verify against a primary

Figure	Value A	Source A	Value B	Source B	Treatment
					release before external citation.
Gini coefficient	56.9 (1992)	World Bank WDI	43.1 (1994); 45.0 (1997)	World Bank WDI, later rounds	Both carried. The 1992 observation is discontinuous with adjacent rounds and is treated as reflecting survey construction. Not used as a scored quantity.

Part 2 · Reporting annexes for this evaluation

Annex R1 · Score computation

The SIS and ECI are reproducible from this annex alone.

Pillar	Dimension scores	Mean	Index	Weight	SIS contribution	Evidence	ECI contribution
PIAI	2, 1, 1, 2, 1	1.40	28.00	0.20	5.60	88.00	17.60
IPGI	1, 1, 1, 3, 2	1.60	32.00	0.20	6.40	86.00	17.20
IOII	2, 2, 2, 1, 2	1.80	36.00	0.25	9.00	60.00	15.00
PILI	1, 1, 2, 1, 2	1.40	28.00	0.20	5.60	85.00	17.00
CESVI	1, 2, 2 (2 Withheld)	1.67	33.33	0.15	5.00	83.33	12.50
TOTAL	—	—	—	1.000	31.60	—	79.30

Table 14. Pillar index = (mean performance across scored dimensions ÷ 5) × 100. CESVI mean taken over its three scored dimensions. All pillars reportable; weights sum to 1.000; no redistribution.

Adjustment	Applied	Effect
DEI completeness ceiling on PILI evidence	Yes	Level Partial; raw pillar evidence 86.00 capped to 85.00; reduces ECI by 0.20 points
Contribution track on IOII evidence	Yes	Tier CC-2 = 60.00 in place of a per-dimension ESI mean; ceiling 82
Access-tier cap	Yes	All four commission sources held at ESI-4 rather than ESI-5
Pillar Coverage Rule	Checked, not triggered	CESVI has 3 scored dimensions, at the threshold
Weight redistribution	Not required	—
Safeguarding Veto	Fired	Band capped at LOW-MODERATE; composite 31.60 already in that band
Rounding	Two decimal places	Unrounded SIS 31.60; unrounded ECI 79.30

Annex R2 · The worked dataset

The quantitative series underlying Chapter 4 and Figure 2. Source: World Bank World Development Indicators, Kenya, retrieved directly in July 2026. Compound rates and the per capita index are computed by the evaluation team from the annual growth series.

Year	GDP growth %	GDP per capita growth %	Life exp.	IMR /1,000	USMR /1,000	Primary GER %	Inflation %	Pop (m)
1978	6.91	3.30	58.2	72.5	117.8	95.6	16.9	14.93
1979	7.62	3.95	58.7	70.5	113.5	115.6	8.0	15.46
1980	5.59	1.92	59.2	68.8	109.7	117.3	13.9	16.02
1981	3.77	0.13	59.6	67.1	106.0	115.1	11.6	16.60
1982	1.51	-2.06	59.9	65.7	102.7	117.9	20.7	17.21
1983	1.31	-2.33	60.3	64.4	99.8	118.2	11.4	17.85
1984	1.76	-1.92	60.6	63.5	97.5	114.5	10.3	18.51
1985	4.30	0.57	60.9	63.0	95.9	109.8	13.0	19.20
1986	7.18	3.41	60.8	62.9	95.1	109.9	2.5	19.90
1987	5.94	2.27	60.7	63.3	95.2	109.7	8.6	20.62
1988	6.20	2.52	60.3	64.3	96.4	108.0	12.3	21.36
1989	4.69	1.08	60.0	65.8	98.6	108.9	13.8	22.12
1990	4.19	0.67	58.3	67.5	101.4	105.3	17.8	22.89
1991	1.44	-1.80	57.8	69.1	104.4	103.0	20.1	23.65

Year	GDP growth %	GDP per capita growth %	Life exp.	IMR /1,000	U5MR /1,000	Primary GER %	Inflation %	Pop (m)
1992	-0.80	-3.79	57.1	70.4	107.1	101.5	27.3	24.38
1993	0.35	-2.58	56.7	71.2	109.0	100.4	46.0	25.12
1994	2.63	-0.30	56.1	71.3	109.7	96.3	28.8	25.86
1995	4.41	1.48	55.9	70.9	109.3	93.3	1.6	26.60
1996	4.15	1.32	55.6	70.2	108.0	-	8.9	27.34
1997	0.47	-2.23	55.5	69.1	105.9	-	11.4	28.10
1998	3.29	0.48	55.6	67.7	103.0	92.9	6.7	28.89
1999	2.31	-0.60	55.9	66.0	99.5	90.7	5.7	29.73
2000	0.60	-2.39	56.1	63.7	95.2	94.3	10.0	30.64
2001	3.78	0.58	56.5	61.2	90.5	95.2	5.7	31.62
2002	0.55	-2.57	56.8	58.3	85.6	89.2	2.0	32.63

Computation	Period	Result	Method
GDP compound annual growth	1979–1990	4.48%	Product of (1+g), nth root, minus 1
GDP compound annual growth	1991–2002	1.92%	Same method
GDP compound annual growth	1979–2002	3.19%	Same method, 24 observations
GDP per capita compound annual growth	1979–1990	0.83%	Same method
GDP per capita compound annual growth	1991–2002	–1.05%	Same method
GDP per capita compound annual growth	1979–2002	–0.11%	Same method, 24 observations
Life expectancy change	1978–2002	–1.4 years	56.8 minus 58.2; peak 60.9 in 1985
Infant mortality change	1978–2002	–19.6%	(58.3 – 72.5) ÷ 72.5
Under-five mortality change	1978–2002	–27.3%	(85.6 – 117.8) ÷ 117.8
Primary GER change	1978–2002	–6.4 points	89.2 minus 95.6; peak 118.2 in 1983
Peak inflation	1993	46.0%	Annual consumer price change; peak Goldenberg transaction year
ODA as share of GNI	1978 / 1993 / 2002	4.80% / 16.98% / 2.98%	World Bank WDI

Annex R3 · Overlay detail

Overlay	Status	Detail
Mandate Compliance	Not applicable	No external funder imposed a binding policy frame as a condition of the evaluand's own objectives. Structural adjustment conditionality is scored as a constraint on delivery, not as a mandate axis.
Prior-score reconciliation	Active	Multilateral and bilateral assessments diverge by decade: broadly favourable through the mid-1980s, severely adverse from 1991 when balance-of-payments support was suspended. This evaluation does not contest either. It scores one system across three phases, and the divergence is explained by phase and by the wider pillar set applied here.
Strategic instrumentalisation	Partially engaged	Cold War alignment to 1989 shaped the external tolerance within which domestic conduct occurred, and the withdrawal of that tolerance is associated with the reform pressure of 1990 to 1991. The overlay is declared so the reader can weigh it. It does not shift the scoring frame, which remains the administration's stated domestic objectives, and it is not treated as excusing domestic conduct.
Exit harm	Assessed; none arising	Status CLOSED. The exit was constitutional, electorally contested and peacefully completed on 30 December 2002. No stranded populations, no transition harm. The managed exit is recorded as a positive finding at Regulatory Feasibility and Sustainability rather than as a neutral fact.
Two-sided proportionality	Applied	Control-oriented dimensions scored on net effect. Through 1991 the failures are excess of control: single-party statute, detention apparatus, news control. From 1992 the

Overlay	Status	Detail
		failures are absence of control: organised violence the state did not suppress and in part coordinated, and a Central Bank that did not stop the transactions running through it. A single dimension can fail in both directions across a twenty-four year evaluand, and several here did.

Annex R4 · Primary-data gate and instruments

Pillar	Evidence	Coverage	Gate passed	Reason
PIAI	88.00	A	No	Evidence in the Adjudicated-equivalent range with full coverage.
IPGI	86.00	A	No	As above.
IOII	60.00	A	No	Indicative band, above the Provisional threshold of 54, full coverage. Sufficient for association claims, which is all this report makes.
PILI	85.00	A	No	Substantiated band with full coverage. A poor score on adequate evidence is a finished finding and is not sent to the field to be confirmed.
CESVI	83.33	C	YES	Coverage C. Two Withheld dimensions; the pillar cannot license a cost-effectiveness judgement in either direction.

Primary Data Request — CESVI

Element	Position
Pillar and dimensions	CESVI: Cost per Outcome (21) and Cost-Consequence Matrix (22)
Why the gate was passed	Coverage C. Unit cost and full cost-consequence data for 1978 to 2002 could not be triangulated from published sources during the desk review.
Current licence	Indicative only. CESVI anchors no headline claim or recommendation and Conclusion 5.5 is expressly qualified.
Method proposed	Documentary retrieval, not fieldwork. Interviews and focus groups cannot reconstruct fiscal series and would import recall bias. No Phase 5 instruments are generated.
Specific increment sought	Kenya National Archives and KNBS: Statistical Abstracts 1979–2003; Development Plan and sessional paper expenditure tables; Appropriation Accounts and Controller and Auditor-General reports; ministry recurrent and development expenditure by province where held.
Evidence rating if successful	CESVI moves from Coverage C to Coverage A at an estimated ESI-4, and would then be able to anchor a value-for-money conclusion.
Effect on the headline	The three currently scored dimensions are not expected to move materially. The effect is on what the pillar may say, not on the composite.
Efficiency note	The route is identical to Volume 1. A single archival engagement would close the gap in both volumes and should be commissioned once.
Decision required	Approve, narrow, or decline and accept the stated limits. Carried as Recommendation 6.2(2).

Annex R5 · Evaluation questions matrix

EQ	Pillars	Dimensions	Principal chains	Findings	Conclusion
EQ1	PIAI	1–5	M1, M2, M3, M5, M10, M13	4.1	5.1
EQ2	IPGI	6–10	M1, M2, M4, M8, M9, M14	4.2	5.2
EQ3	IOII	11–15	M4, M6, M7, M8	4.3	5.3
EQ4	PILI, IOII	16–20, 14	M2, M3, M4, M7, M11, M12	4.4	5.4
EQ5	CESVI	21–25	M1, M6, M14	4.5	5.5
EQ6	All five	All 25	All chains	4.1–4.5	5.6

Annex R6 · Sources and access tiers

Source	Type	Accessed at	What it evidences
Bosire Commission report, 2006	Judicial commission of inquiry	Published analysis of findings	Goldenberg mechanism, transaction total, recipients, institutional participation
Akiwumi Commission report, 1999 (released 2002)	Judicial commission of inquiry	Documentary reporting of findings	Organised ethnic violence 1991–1998; deaths and displacement; named parties for investigation
Kiliku Select Committee report, 1992	Parliamentary committee	Contemporaneous documentation and later commission proceedings	Central coordination of attacks; administration and security officer presence
TJRC final report, 2013	Truth commission	Published summary	Torture; judicial complicity; parliamentary subordination; land allocation; the Moi-era epoch findings
Ndung'u Commission report, 2004	Commission of inquiry	Scholarly analysis of findings	Abuse of presidential discretion in public land allocation across both administrations
World Bank WDI, Kenya	Official statistics	Direct retrieval, July 2026	Growth, per capita growth, life expectancy, child mortality, enrolment, inflation, ODA, population
Kenya National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000–2005	Government policy document	Published document	Epidemic scale; timing of the national disaster declaration; NACC establishment
2002 general election record	Electoral record	Results of record and contemporaneous observation	Margin, parliamentary outcome, conduct of the transfer
Constitution of Kenya amendments 1982 and 1991	Statute	Documented legislative record	Creation and repeal of the single-party provision
Survivor testimony compilations on Nyayo House	Documented accounts, TJRC-corroborated	Published compilation	Design and use of the detention facility

No source is rated above the tier at which it was actually accessed.

Annex R7 · Series comparison

Introduced at this volume. Both evaluations apply the same weight vector, dimension anchors, evidence ladders, contribution track and contemporaneous-standard rule. The comparison is therefore a comparison of evidence, not of method.




Figure 3. Volumes 1 and 2 on identical weights, anchors and evidence rules.

Pillar	Vol. 1 Kenyatta 1963–78	Vol. 2 Moi 1978–2002	Change	Reading
PIAI	40.00	28.00	–12.00	Capture shifted from a redistributive instrument to a constructed extraction mechanism.
IPGI	48.00	32.00	–16.00	Accountability moved from present-but-overridden to substantially disabled.

Pillar	Vol. 1 Kenyatta 1963–78	Vol. 2 Moi 1978–2002	Change	Reading
IOII	52.00	36.00	–16.00	Direction of travel reversed: rising welfare on flat institutions became falling welfare on deteriorating ones.
PILI	28.00	28.00	0.00	Identical. Protection failure is continuous across thirty-nine years rather than deteriorating within it.
CESVI	40.00	33.33	–6.67	A windfall absorbed became public funds extracted for no output.
SIS	42.20	31.60	–10.60	Both LOW-MODERATE. Volume 2 sits 1.60 points above CRITICAL.
ECI	76.70	79.30	+2.60	Both Substantiated. Volume 2 is better documented, because the successor government commissioned four inquiries into it.

Table 17. The PILI identity is the single most important line in this table for the series. Two administrations of very different character, thirty-nine years apart in their starting points, produced the same protection performance index. That result should be tested rather than assumed as Volumes 3 to 5 are scored.

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Distinct from Annex A3, which logs provenance and tier, and Annex R6, which logs access.

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Verification note

Three items in this report are flagged for verification against a primary source before external release: the per capita income and poverty figures for 1990 and 2002 drawn from secondary policy analysis; the relationship between the Bosire transaction total and the widely cited GDP percentage, which are different quantities and are not interchangeable; and the 1992 Gini observation, which is discontinuous with adjacent survey rounds. None is used as a scored quantity and no finding turns on any of them. All are logged at Annex A12.